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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates changing memory discourses of the post-
World War II (WWII) expulsion of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia in late-Cold 
War Central Europe. By uncovering the grassroots networks of Czech and Sudeten 
German cooperation in which these discourses evolved, I illustrate how this 
cooperation contributed to German-Czech understanding after 1989. This 
dissertation addresses three crucial questions: Firstly, why did revision of the 
expulsion become an important issue for Czech dissidents and émigré activists 
across Europe? Secondly, how did the Catholic Sudeten German organization, the 
Ackermann Gemeinde, emerge as an important partner for Czech dissidents, the 
underground Czech Catholic Church, and émigré activists during this period? And 
thirdly, how did these grassroots cooperations affect public discourse and policy in 
German-Czech relations after 1989? 
I argue that the push to reconcile disparate West German and 
Czechoslovakian narratives of the expulsion and the promotion of a shared cultural 
heritage illuminates an early process of transnationalizing historical memory and 
identity that defines more recent discourses of history-writing in Europe in the 21st 
century. This project explores assertions of a cosmopolitan Central European 
identity in Czechoslovakia and West Germany that emerged in Czech underground 
and émigré circles and in prominent sectors of Sudeten Germans in West Germany 
in the 1970s. Based on archival research and interviews conducted in Germany and 
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the Czech Republic, I use this case study to speak to broader currents in the ways 
Europeans think about identity and history-writing as they deal with histories of 
conflict and violence on the continent in the context of increasing European 
integration. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 23, 1989, Václav Havel appeared on television as candidate for 
president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR).1 After more than a month 
of street demonstrations and strikes, the previous regime under Gustáv Husák 
stepped down and members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (hereafter, 
Party) resigned their memberships by the tens of thousands.2 Havel’s television 
appearance was the first time many of his fellow citizens saw or heard the voice of 
the internationally famous dissident playwright and author who was now asking 
for their vote for president. During the interview, the young Czech television 
moderator asked Havel a question that at first glance might seem irrelevant given 
the gravity of the political reorientations taking place in Czechoslovakia and across 
Central and Eastern Europe: What was Havel’s opinion on the post-WWII forced 
removal of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia? 
1 Havel had not planned to run for president during the early protest stages and only reluctantly 
agreed on December 7 when Civic Forum leaders became convinced for the need to have a dissident 
as president and not a reform Communist from 1968. Dubček had returned to the spotlight 
alongside Havel and other dissidents gathering at Prague’s Magic Lantern Theater during the 
demonstrations in the attempt to show that the spirit of the 1968 reforms was still alive and ready 
to take over. However, it soon became clear to Civic Forum leaders that his continued use of socialist 
rhetoric was problematic for winning over all the protesting masses, leaving Havel as the best 
candidate; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: William-Heinemann, 2005), 
619–621; Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
2 Bernard Wheaton and Zdeněk Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988–1991 (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1992), 106. 
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The question was in reference to comments made by Bavarian Minister-
President Max Streibl in a speech several days prior, where he spoke directly to 
Czechs and said that after the dust settles the new democratic Czechoslovak 
government should change its previous stance that viewed the removal of the 
German population as necessary and justified. Havel was occupied around the clock 
managing the Civic Forum3 and his presidential campaign, and he was completely 
unaware of these comments. Caught off guard by the interviewer’s vague 
explanation of the question, Havel improvised, answering, “I think that we are 
obliged to apologize to the Germans.”4 
Scholarship on recent German and Czech history often notes that Havel’s 
“apology” was a watershed in bilateral relations, and indeed it proved to be a major 
step toward reconciliation in the long-run.5 However, the immediate reaction 
among Civic Forum organizers to Havel’s televised comments was panic. His fellow 
                                                        
3 Civic Forum (Občanské forum) was the political movement established during the Velvet 
Revolution to organize the dissident forces in Czechoslovakia to overthrow the Communist regime. 
4 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015; a transcript of Havel’s response was published in: “K omluvě 
sudetským Němcům,” Rudé Právo, January 3, 1990, 3. 
5 Despite contemporary assumptions to the contrary by the public as well as some scholars, Havel 
never actually apologized. His comments on television began with “I think,” and he meant for those 
comments and future statements to stimulate national self-reflection. This statement did not 
constitute a formal apology on behalf of all Czechs, which Havel felt he was incapable of giving as a 
single individual; Václav Havel, To the Castle and Back, trans. Paul Wilson (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2007), 139–140. On Havel’s comments serving as a watershed in Czech public discussion of 
the expulsions and German-Czech relations, see: Ján Pauer, “The Problem of Ethical Norms and 
Values in the Czech-German Discussion,” Perspectives 12 (1999): 65; Ján Pauer, “Moral Political 
Dissent in German-Czech Relations,” Czech Sociological Review 6 (1998): 173; Miroslav Kunštát, 
“German-Czech Relations after the Fall of the Iron Curtain,” Czech Sociological Review 6 (1998): 153; 
Michaela Witte, Entfremdung, Sprachlosigkeit, Aussöhnung? (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2002), 
85–88. 
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Forum organizer, Petr Pithart, assembled a crisis team to figure out how to deal 
with these unscripted comments, fearing a strong public backlash that might 
threaten Havel’s election. The crisis grew the next day following West German 
President Richard von Weizsäcker’s televised speech on Christmas Eve, where he 
quoted from a letter Havel sent him over a month prior in which Havel expressed 
his personal regret for the expulsion.6 Havel had hoped that Weizsäcker would 
make public that part of his letter to begin the process of reconciliation with 
Germans over the expulsion, but after a month of waiting he was unsure when or if 
Weizsäcker would do so.7 Weizsäcker’s speech now came at a most inopportune 
moment, and for the next several days Pithart and the crisis team worked franticly 
around the clock to find a resolution, all the while fearing that Havel’s stance on the 
                                                        
6 Havel wrote the letter as a thank you for Weizsäcker awarding him the German Bookseller’s Peace 
Prize in absentia early that November, in which Havel offered a friendly gesture and condemned the 
expulsion, writing, “I personally condemn—as do many of my friends—the expulsion of Germans 
after the war. I consider it a deeply immoral act which did moral as well as material harm not only to 
Germans, but also, maybe even more so, to Czechs.” Reiner Beushausen, “Die Diskussion über die 
Vertreibung der Deutschen in der ČSFR,” Dokumentation Ostmitteleuropa 17 (1991): 10; Judith 
Renner, “ ‘I’m Sorry for Apologising’: Czech and German Apologies and Their Perlocutionary Effects,” 
Review of International Studies 34 (2011): 1588. 
7 Havel smuggled the letter to Weizsäcker via the established channels of an émigré living in West 
Germany, Vilém Prečan (see chapter two), and on December 12 he wrote to Prečan again asking 
when and if Weizsäcker planned to quote from his letter. With the help of his longtime contact in the 
West German embassy in Prague, Wolfgang Scheuer, Prečan sent a message to Weizsäcker’s office 
with Havel’s question. There was no response, but the answer came on December 24 during 
Weizsäcker’s televised speech. Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. A letter from Weizsäcker 
addressed to Havel, dated December 15, 1989, is located in the German National Archives in Koblenz 
in which Weizsäcker thanks Havel for his letter and conciliatory words and expresses his hope for 
future friendship between Germans and Czechs. However, it is uncertain when or if Havel ever 
received this letter. A Czech translation of this letter can be found in: Vilém Prečan, Václav Havel—
Vilém Prečan: Korrespondenz 1983–1989 (Prague: Československé dokumentační středisko, 2011), 
771. 
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expulsion may well deny him the presidency and possibly alter the entire course of 
the recent democratic movement in Czechoslovakia.8 
The course of the next seven years saw tensions over the expulsion emerge 
as a problematic sticking point in German-Czech relations, as both sides worked to 
find common language to narrate the expulsion and to solve outstanding issues of 
restitution for Sudeten German victims and Czech victims of the Nazi regime. As 
Havel and other former dissidents and émigrés took over leadership of Czech 
politics, academia, and social institutions, they worked closely with a network of 
Sudeten Germans with whom they forged partnerships in the 1970s and 1980s to 
help them navigate bilateral relations and reassure the Czech public that Germans 
no longer represented a threat. The bulk of these individuals came from the 
Catholic Sudeten German organization in West Germany, the Ackermann Gemeinde 
(AG). Political expellee organizations like the Sudeten German Homeland 
Association (Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, hereafter, SL) demanded 
restitution and a right to return throughout the 1990s and helped engender anti-
German sentiment among Czechs that discouraged the moral reevaluation of the 
expulsion Havel called for. It was the AG and the many Czechs with whom they built 
partnerships before 1989 that were at the forefront of German-Czech reconciliation 
and helped put the outstanding political issues to rest and allow a peaceful, if 
                                                        
8 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015; Petr Pithart, “Über Gesten in der Politik,” in Češi a Němci: 
ztracené dějiny—Tschechen und Deutsche: Verlorene Geschichte, ed. Eva Malí r ova  (Prague: Prago 
Medí a, 1995), 70. 
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initially rocky, transition of Germans and Czech from Cold War foes to partners in 
Europe. 
This dissertation investigates changing memory discourses of the post-
World War II (WWII) expulsion of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia in late-Cold 
War Central Europe. By uncovering the grassroots networks of Czech and Sudeten 
German cooperation in which these discourses evolved I illustrate how this 
cooperation contributed to German-Czech understanding after 1989. This 
dissertation addresses three crucial questions: Firstly, why did revision of the 
expulsion become an important issue for Czech dissidents and émigré activists 
across Europe? Secondly, how did the AG emerge as an important partner for 
Czechs during this period? And thirdly, how did these grassroots cooperations 
affect public discourse and policy in German-Czech relations after 1989? 
I argue that the push to reconcile disparate West German and 
Czechoslovakian narratives of the expulsion and the promotion of a shared cultural 
heritage illuminates an early process of transnationalizing historical memory and 
identity that defines more recent discourses of history-writing in Europe in the 21st 
century. This project explores assertions of a cosmopolitan Central European 
identity in Czechoslovakia and West Germany that emerged in Czech underground 
and émigré circles and in prominent sectors of Sudeten Germans in West Germany 
in the 1970s. I use this case study to speak to broader currents in the ways 
Europeans think about identity and history writing as they deal with histories of 
6 
conflict and violence on the continent in the context of increasing European 
integration. 
Crucial to understanding how the AG emerged as an unlikely partner to the 
post-1989 Czech regime and elites in Czech academics and civil society is tracing 
the individual contacts and friendships they formed over the preceding two 
decades. The majority of previous scholarship on Sudeten German activities before 
1989 focuses on the narratives of political organization and institutions like the SL 
and generally argues a decline in Sudeten German influence after the policies of 
openness toward the East of the Willy Brandt government in the late 1960s.9 This 
dissertation introduces two revisions to this narrative: firstly, that the AG was 
institutionally and culturally very different from the SL and must be viewed 
separately from its political-oriented counterparts; and secondly, that while the 
political organizations like the SL did indeed suffer a decline in public status and 
influence in the final two decades of the Cold War, the AG’s grassroots activities in 
social and cultural areas greatly expanded during this same period and enabled the 
9 The standard work on the political decline of expellees in West Germany following the Brandt 
regime is: Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003). For studies on expellees in Bavaria and forms of Sudeten 
German influence that focus on the political sphere and marginalize or ignore the AG altogether, see: 
K. Erik Franzen, Der vierte Stamm Bayerns: Die Schirmherrschaft über die Sudetendeutschen,
1954−1974 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010); Samuel Salzborn, Geteilte Erinnerung: Die deutsch-
tschechische Beziehungen und die sudetendeutche Vergangenheit (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008);
Gerhard Hopp, Machtfaktor ohne Machtbasis? Die Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft und die CSU
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010).
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AG to forge critical relationships with Czechs that would have a meaningful impact 
on German-Czech relations after 1989. 
From 1968 onward the AG underwent a transformative process in response 
to aging leaders and dwindling membership numbers. Their solution in 1970 was 
to replace the leadership with younger AG members of the so-called “middle 
generation” who were children at the time of the expulsion. These new leaders 
worked to recruit more involvement of the younger generation who came of age 
during the 1950s and 1960s and were more interested in outreach and 
reconciliation with Czechs than in preserving and promoting Sudeten German 
heritage. As the middle and younger generation came to comprise more of the 
leadership and active membership base of the AG, the AG capitalized on a wave of 
new Czech immigrants in the wake of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion to build 
partnerships with Czech émigrés residing in metropoles across Europe. These 
émigré contacts assisted the AG in expanding its outreach to persecuted Catholic 
dioceses and dissidents inside Czechoslovakia and helped them build a reputation 
as a trusted partner who sought reconciliation and the rehabilitation of German-
Czech relations. After 1989 the AG and their Czech counterparts activated these 
networks to foster encounters between Germans and Czechs and open discussion 
about the expulsion with an aim toward reconciliation and friendliness between the 
two peoples. 
Accompanying the transition toward outreach with Czechs was a new 
formulation of Sudeten German identity I refer to interchangeably as “inclusivist” 
 8 
 
or “Bohemian.” This identity discourse sought to dislocate “Sudeten German” 
identity from the divisive era of national conflict from the 19th century to WWII that 
had created the very idea of “Sudeten Germans” and redefine it in terms of a pre-
nationalism era of multiethnic, cosmopolitan identities and heritage in the Czech 
lands. In their public statements, conferences, and seminars, the new AG platform 
emphasized a long history of peaceful cohabitation in Central Europe as a basis for 
promoting reconciliation. This discourse contrasted with the SL’s continued 
promotion of an “exclusivist,” nationally distinct Sudeten German identity as a way 
to legitimize their demand of a right to return to the homeland as a minority group, 
which brought the two institutions into conflict as each organization promoted 
their competing vision of Sudeten German identity. 
This movement within the AG paralleled similar discourses in Czech 
underground writing that condemned the expulsion and sought to rehabilitate a 
positive German-Czech heritage as part of larger discussions about a Central 
European identity.10 This dissertation views both iterations of Central European 
identity as part of an ongoing process of collective identity negotiation taking place 
concurrently on both sides of the border that emphasized cosmopolitanism and 
shared heritage between Germans and Czechs. It views the Czech discussions of 
                                                        
10 For an English overview of the underground Czech expulsion debates, see: Bradley F. Abrams, 
“Morality, Wisdom and Revision: The Czech Opposition of the 1970s and the Expulsion of Sudeten 
Germans,” East European Politics and Societies 9 (1995): 234–255. For full copies of many of the 
original Czech and Slovak entries to the debate, see: Bohumil Černý et al., eds., Češi, Němci, Odsun: 
Diskuse Nezávislých Historiků (Prague: Academia Praha, 1990). 
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rewriting expulsion history, and rehabilitating German-Czech heritage as a positive 
history, as part of a larger process of renegotiating Czech identity through historical 
revision of the Communist expulsion narrative into a usable past that reflected the 
current values of the underground emphasizing morality and human rights. This 
process began in the wake of the failed reform attempts of the Alexander Dubček-
led Party in the late 1960s, when many Czech intellectuals began defining 
themselves in opposition to the repressive socialist state under Dubček’s successor 
Gustáv Husák, and the values they promoted above all were support for human 
rights and morality. This necessitated a revision of the expulsion narrative to reflect 
those values, and the dissidents maintained their moral stance against the 
expulsion throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s when they confronted wider 
Czech society with a call for similar national self-reflection and reappraisal of the 
expulsion narrative. 
Equally, the AG’s inclusivist discourse toward identity and heritage in 
Central Europe was also rooted in universal feelings of morality and human rights. 
Its roots were laid during the AG’s founding with an emphasis on reconciliation in a 
Christian spirit of morality, although the bulk of their activities in the 1950s 
focused on preserving the cultural heritage of Sudeten Germans to prepare them 
for an eventual return to the homeland. Their rhetoric toward emphasizing 
reconciliation and shared heritage with Czechs evolved and grew in response to 
social and political changes in West Germany in the late 1960s and 1970s that 
 10 
 
shunned expellee politics of restitution and victimhood discourses and promoted 
European integration based on support for human rights. 
That the AG in the 1970s viewed the expulsion as a moral tragedy was 
nothing new or surprising, but what did change was an increased emphasis on 
outreach and promoting an inclusivist heritage and identity with Czechs as former 
inhabitants of the same lands. The AG’s history of emphasizing reconciliation 
offered a precedent for promoting an inclusivist identity, but this alone does not 
explain the pronounced shift in rhetoric and outreach activities in the 1970s. The 
generational transition to younger leaders and members with little or no direct 
memory of the expulsion was important for the promotion of this new discourse, 
but this explanation alone runs the risk of reducing a complex issue to age and 
generation and fails to explain support for the inclusivist rhetoric by AG members 
of the older generation.11 
I argue that the generational change was not the sole factor, but it offered an 
important and timely opportunity for rethinking the AG’s institutional identity, and 
this rethinking took place during, and was influenced by, the wider shift in West 
German society toward seeking peaceful relations with the East and promoting a 
                                                        
11 For example, founder and decades-long AG director Hans Schütz wrote in a 1981 essay “Is the 
Sudeten Question Still Relevant?” that Sudeten Germans and Czechs had to walk “hand in hand” and 
foster a new way of thinking about each other to lay the foundation for a new relationship: Hans 
Schütz, “Ist die Sudetendeutschefrage noch aktuell? Der Versuch einer Antwort 36 Jahre nach 1945 
und 63 Jahre nach 1918,” in Volk und Volkstum im Donauraum: Festgabe für Prof. Dr. Franz 
Hieronymus Riedl zum 75. Lebensjahr, ed. Theodor Veiter (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller Universitäts-
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981), 89–100. 
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European identity based on European integration and respect for human rights. 
These discourses of peace and political inclusion over isolation married well with 
the AG’s past emphasis on reconciliation and offered a way for the AG to 
disassociate itself from the “revanchist expellees” that West German society was 
increasingly shunning and recast itself as a forward-looking institution promoting a 
vision of a reunited Europe. Through the inclusivist identity discourse the AG 
framed Sudeten Germans not as a national group seeking indemnity, but as 
harbingers of a heritage of multiculturalism and peaceful multiethnic cohabitation. 
In this way, the AG presented West German society with an image of Sudeten 
German heritage as the very model for a future reunited, multiethnic, and peaceful 
Europe that West Germans sought to achieve by normalizing relations with Eastern 
Europe and shunning discourses of German victimhood in WWII. This was not a 
simple calculated political move by the AG, but instead it rested in a deeply held 
belief of the leadership influenced by the changing social times and encouraged by 
their increased interaction with Czech immigrants and activists after 1968. It was 
an expression of a changing identity renegotiated in the context of political, social, 
and generational change, and this new identity inspired them to take personal risks 
by traveling to Czechoslovakia to deliver support and aid to repressed Catholic 
communities and to seek out partnerships and dialogue with Czechs across Europe 
to work toward reconciliation. 
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Expulsion History, Memory, and German-Czech Relations in Recent 
Scholarship 
 Widespread scholarly interest in the postwar expulsion of Germans and 
their resettlement in the occupied zones emerged in the context of observing 
contemporary forced population transfers during the Balkan wars of the early 
1990s, and many of the first works aimed to bring the expulsions into the Western 
historical consciousness as an earlier incident of the “ethnic cleansing.”12 Beyond 
the scholarship of the experience of expulsion, other works have focused on the 
political and cultural impacts of expellees after their resettlement. These works 
tend to concentrate on the early decades of the Cold War and their analyses 
typically cease by the end of the 1970s, citing declines in the political and cultural 
influence of expellees in West German society following the end of the Christian 
Democratic Union-led governments and the rise of Willy Brandt’s Social Democratic 
                                                        
12 The first English-language work that comprehensively addressed the expulsions was: Alfred de 
Zayas, The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). This 
was reprinted the following year to incorporate the new contemporary term “ethnic cleansing” in 
the title: A Terrible Revenge: Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1994). Subsequent works sought to incorporate the expulsions into larger histories of forced 
population transfer as a modern phenomenon separate from genocide; Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A 
Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer, 1993): 110–121; Norman M. 
Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). The new discourses on “ethnic cleansing” were not without their critics, as 
some scholars argued that the term was simply a euphemism for genocide that enabled the West to 
stand by and watch the violence unfold without taking action. See: Stjepan G. Meštrović, Genocide 
After Emotion: The Post-Emotional Balkan War (New York: Routledge, 1996); Stjepan G. Meštrović, 
The Conceit of Innocence: Losing the Conscience of the West in the War against Bosnia (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997); and Stjepan G. Meštrović and Thomas Cushman, eds., 
This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York University Press, 
1996). 
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Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, hereafter, SPD)-led government in 
1969.13 By focusing on political influence and the role of expellees in West German 
public discourse these studies leave a void of the 1970s and 1980s, which is 
precisely where this dissertation concentrates to uncover the impactful activities of 
the AG on a grassroots level outside of the political and public mainstream. 
 The narratives of steadily declining expellee influence in West German 
society have difficulty reconciling with the resurgence of expulsion memory and 
conflict over competing narratives of the expulsion in German-Czech relations in 
the 1990s as well as the return of expulsion memory and German victimhood 
discourses in the early 2000s. Perrti Ahonen’s work on expellee political influence, 
for example, ends with the ratification of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty in 1990 and 
fails to account for the German-Czech conflict over expulsion memory that emerged 
a year later and complicated relations for the better part of the decade.14 Robert G. 
Moeller provides a comprehensive overview of the continual presence of expellees 
                                                        
13 Ahonen, After the Expulsion. Robert G. Moeller illustrated the cultural and social impact of 
expellees serving as prominent symbols of German victimhood in the 1950s as a way to 
“acknowledge the war as part of their history and at the same time to distance themselves from the 
National Socialist state” by focusing on German suffering. His study likewise marked a decline in the 
late 1960s during the transition toward confronting German guilt and perpetrators; Robert G. 
Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 3. 
Other works have since refined and expanded this analysis, also focusing predominantly on the 
same early time period. See, for example, Peter Fritz’s chapter in: Peter Fritz, “Volkstümliche 
Erinnerung und die deutsche Identität nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Verletztes Gedächtnis: 
Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt, ed. Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow 
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2002), 75–98. 
14 See Ahonen’s conclusion in which he illustrates the expellee organizations as largely being a spent 
force after reunification: Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 266–279. 
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in German collective memory through 1989 and into the new millennium to explain 
the resurgence of expulsion memory in public discourse in the early 2000s.15 
However, the primary purpose of Moeller’s work is to trace continuity in German 
collective memory to explain the return of German victimhood discourses in the 
new millennium, and although he touches upon select aspects of expulsion memory 
from the 1970s-1990s he does so in passing and restricts his analysis to domestic 
changes in West German public and academic thought, not the German-Czech 
conflict or expulsion memory debates beyond the national borders. 
A separate body of scholarship fills in some of the gaps during the German-
Czech conflict over expulsion history in the 1990s, but these works tend to focus on 
the conflict itself and trace little continuity to the late-Cold War period, further 
contributing to the trend of scholarship on expulsion memory that glosses over the 
1970s and 1980s.16 What emerges from these studies is a trend of dividing currents 
of expulsion memory into pre-1989 and post-1989 phases. This dissertation 
challenges that narrative by linking activism and identity discourses of the late-
Cold War decades to political and social reconciliation in the 1990s, illustrating that 
                                                        
15 Robert G. Moeller, “Sinking Ships, the Lost Heimat and Broken Taboos: Günter Grass and the 
Politics of Memory in Contemporary Germany,” Contemporary European History 12 (May 2003): 
147–181. 
16 Witte, Entfremdung; Jaroslav Kučera, “Zwischen Geschichte und Politik: Die aktuelle Diskussion 
über die Vertreibung der Deutschen in der tschechischen Gesellschaft und Politik,” in Flucht und 
Vertreibung: Zwischen Aufrechnung und Verdrängung, ed. Robert Streibel (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 
1994), 174–187; Miroslav Kunštát, “Deutsch-Tschechische Beziehungen—Deutsch-Tschechischer 
Dialog?” Transondra 12/13 (1996): 20–29; Kunštát, “German-Czech Relations after the Fall of the 
Iron Curtain,” 149–172; Pauer, “Moral Political Dissent,” 173–186. 
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the end of the Cold War as a watershed for European social and cultural histories is 
not as absolute as the periodization of these previous works might suggest. 
The context of European integration in which the German-Czech expulsion 
debates took place has inspired a growing body of literature adopting comparative 
and transnational approaches that focus on cross-border patterns of German and 
Czech expulsion memory politics. At the forefront are the publications associated 
with the Joint German-Czech Historians’ Commission established in 1990 to work 
out the two countries’ complicated past.17 The edited volume Dictatorship—War—
Expulsion provides strong theoretical as well as practical work on the development 
of contemporary transnational memory cultures surrounding the expulsions taking 
place in the 1990s and early 2000s.18 Contributions in this anthology reinforce 
arguments for the emergence of transnational forms of expulsion remembrance 
inspired by moral abhorrence of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and desires for 
European integration that gave rise to movements for creating a “European” form 
                                                        
17 The commission’s publication list is vast, but some of the more notable works dealing with 
memory culture specifically are: Dietmar Neutatz and Volker Zimmermann, eds., Die Deutschen und 
das östliche Europa: Aspekte einer vielfältigen Beziehungsgeschichte (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2006); 
Detlef Brandes, Dušan Kováč, and Jiří Pešek, eds., Wendepunkte in den Beziehungen zwischen 
Deutschen, Tschechen und Slowaken 1848–1989 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007). 
18 Christoph Cornelißen, Roman Holec, and Jiri Pešek, eds., Diktatur—Krieg—Vertreibung. 
Erinnerungskulturen in Tschechien, der Slowakei und Deutschland seit 1945 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 
2005). 
16 
of expulsion remembrance by the early 2000s. 19 These patterns of 
transnationalism, however, are largely attributed to the post-1989 era and do not 
explore at length the roots of their development in the 1970s and 1980s or their 
connections to the AG and Sudeten German discourses of identity and 
remembrance before 1989.20 
Other scholars have called for a transnational approach to writing troubled 
European histories in a way that downplays national perpetrator-victim 
dichotomies and Europeanizes victims of particular forms of violence like forced 
population transfer.21 Some scholars argue this was already taking place in the 
19 The introductory chapter of Diktatur—Krieg—Vertreibung discusses pan-European tendencies to 
universalize collective memory and a growing trend toward the Europeanization of historical 
memory. The second chapter outlines frameworks to analyze and understand history-writing as a 
collective memory promoting a particular identity and world view. An addition by Peter Haslinger 
engages the influences of German post-unification identity formation, European integration, moral 
outrage at the Balkan ethnic cleansings, and restitution questions to explain changing dynamics in 
the international debates about expellee remembrance toward the end of the nineties; see: 
Christoph Cornelißen, Roman Holec, and Jiri Pešek, “Politisch-historische Erinnerungen in Mittel-
und Ostmitteleuropa seit 1945,” in ibid., 9–24; Christoph Cornelissen, “Zur Erforschung von 
Erinnerungskulturen in West und Osteuropa: Methoden und Fragestellen,” in ibid., 25–44; Peter 
Haslinger, “Von der Erinnerung zur Identität und zurück: Zur aktuellen Debatte über die 
Vertreibungen in Ostmitteleuropa,” in ibid., 473–488. 
20 One significant exception is Claudia Kraft’s contribution that traces Czech expulsion remembrance 
discourses from the postwar era to the mid-1990s. Kraft traces the debates in Czech underground 
circles in the 1970s and 1980s and notes that many of the actors involved led the calls for public 
moral revision of the expulsion after 1989. She attributes the negative public reactions to these calls 
for moral revision in part to collective desires for a self-assured past as part of forging a post-
communist Czech national identity; Claudia Kraft, “Der Platz der Vertreibung der Deutschen im 
historischen Gedachtnis Polens und der Tscheschoslowakei/Tschechiens, ” in ibid., 329–354. For 
her argument of the need for a transnational theoretical framework to better understand the Czech 
public resistance to calls to morally condemn the expulsion after 1989, see: Claudia Kraft, “Locating 
German Refugees in Polish and Czech Memories,” in Restitution and Memory: Material Restoration in 
Europe, eds. Dan Diner and Gotthart Wunberg, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 285–286. 
21 Norbert Frei, “Gefühlte Geschichte,” Die Zeit, October 21, 2004; Ute Frevert, 
“Geschichtsvergessenheit und Geschichtsversessenheit Revisited,” Politik und Zeitgeschichte 40–41 
(2003): 6–13. 
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1990s and that European integration and the “Europeanization of memory” were 
combining with recontextualizations of World War II experiences into comparative 
concepts of genocide and ethnic cleansing that enabled sympathy for victims in a 
universal discourse.22 The result was new victimhood discourses in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s that moved away from national contexts and adopted a growing 
sense of European identities and commonalities. Yet all these works continue the 
trend of studying expulsion memory and expellee influence either in the early Cold 
War period or after 1989. They do not ascribe any transnational currents or 
identity discourses to the dissident debates of the 1970s and 1980s, nor do they 
explore the grassroots activities of expellee organizations like the AG that thrived 
during the late-Cold War period even as expellees lost their political and cultural 
influence on a national level. Moreover, they imbue 1989 with too much 
importance as a watershed and thus cannot account for how Cold War contacts 
shaped post Cold War politics, memory, and relations. 
                                                        
22 Constantin Goschler, “ ‘Versöhnung’ und ‘Viktimisierung’: Die Vertriebenen und der deutsche 
Opferdiskurs,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 53 (2005): 881. These processes were also 
taking place among Czechs in their discourses of expulsion memory, although the Czech public’s 
initial skepticism toward revision of the expulsion narrative illustrated persisting national 
frameworks of expulsion memory that juxtaposed Czech nationality against a perennial German 
threat; Martin Schulze Wessel, “Die Mitte liegt Westwärts: Mitteleuropa in tschechischen 
Diskussion,” Bohemia 29 (1988): 325–344; Pavel Kolář, “Vertreibung zwischen nationaler 
Meisterzählung und Deutungspluralität,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 53 (2005): 927–928. 
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Transnational Memory and Identity 
In many of these analyses of German and Czech expulsion memories in the 
1990s scholars have applied theoretical conceptions of collective memory and 
identity in a transnational context largely credited to the study of Holocaust 
memory by Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider.23 In their seminal work The Holocaust 
and Memory in the Global Age they argue that the container of the nation-state, 
which had previously been the assumed harbinger of collective memory, has given 
way to new forms of identity that have slowly developed since the end of WWII. 
They follow the processes of globalization behind the “deterritorialization” of 
politics and culture to trace the decoupling of collective memory and national 
history, using Holocaust remembrance as a case study. Holocaust remembrance 
and history-writing has been confronted by a long list of actors which have 
attempted to universalize it, to particularize it, and to nationalize it; yet, it 
continues to exist as a global collective memory which has been powered, 
maintained, and altered by these interactions between global and local.24 
                                                        
23 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001). An English translation is available: Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The 
Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, trans. Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2005). 
24 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of 
Cosmopolitan Memory,” European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2002): 93. See also the discussion of 
transnational ethics in international Holocaust remembrance in: Helmut Dubiel, “The Remembrance 
of the Holocaust as a Catalyst for a Transnational Ethic?” New German Critique 90 (2003): 59–70. 
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Levy and Sznaider dub Holocaust memory a “cosmopolitan memory,” 
existing neither as a global universal nor a local particular but as a conglomeration 
floating somewhere in between.25 Cosmopolitanism is roughly defined as a process 
of “internal globalization” through which global concerns become part of the local 
experiences of an increasing number of people.26 They argue that studies and 
remembrance of the Holocaust have exploded in historiography and public thinking 
in recent decades as a reflex to the need for a moral touchstone in an age of 
uncertainty and the absence of a master ideological narrative.27 
While I do not propose to put expulsion memory during the 1970s and 
1980s on this same level of proliferation, the same forces of transnationalization, 
cosmopolitanism, and morality were certainly at play among the Czech dissidents 
and within the AG, and they influenced both groups’ emphasis on reconciliation and 
promotion of shared heritage and identity as historical inhabitants of the Czech 
lands. Levy and Sznaider share the same historical limitations of the scholars of 
expulsion memory cited above by viewing 1989 as a watershed after which 
transnationalism and cosmopolitanism began to take hold. My work seeks to 
illustrate that cosmopolitan identities and memories of the expulsion were already 
                                                        
25 Levy and Sznaider adopted the term “cosmopolitan memory” from the previous work of Ulrich 
Beck. See: Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity,” 
British Journal of Sociology 51 (January/March 2000): 79–105. 
26 Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, 21. 
27 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 93. 
 20 
 
visible among Czech dissidents and the AG in the 1970s; the developments in the 
1990s were the rest of Europe catching up.28 
Scholars investigating the emergence of cosmopolitan identities often focus 
on universal human rights and morality as a prime unifying force in creating 
identities beyond the nation-state and encompassing geographically distant 
peoples.29 This dissertation proceeds from this same perspective by highlighting 
the centrality of the human rights discourses as a foundation for the cosmopolitan 
European identities that both the Czech dissidents and AG leaders expressed. 
Although this occurred in different countries for different reasons, both of these 
groups began redefining their respective identities in a way that emphasized a 
shared cosmopolitan heritage as former inhabitants in the Czech lands from the 
1970s onward. It was this cosmopolitanism and its intrinsic morality emphasizing 
human rights that made revising the expulsion narrative from a victory to a tragedy 
a moral imperative for the Czech dissidents; it was also this same cosmopolitanism 
that drove the AG to assist the repressed Catholic Church in Cold War 
                                                        
28 Levy and Sznaider argue it was only after Serbian crimes began to be equated to the Holocaust 
that moral outrage grew to the point of inspiring military action, including Germany’s first combat 
deployments since WWII. Memory of the Holocaust and “never again,” thus, served as a 
cosmopolitan memory and a moral measuring stick invoked to justify military action against similar 
events of the present; Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, 97–100.  
29 Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective,” 83; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, Human Rights and 
Memory (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); Levy and Sznaider, 
Erinnerung im Globalen Zeitalter, 97–100; Jack Crittenden, Wide as the World: Cosmopolitan Identity, 
Integral Politics, and Democratic Dialogue (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); Florian Pichler, “How 
Real is Cosmopolitanism in Europe?” Sociology 42 (2008): 1107–1126. 
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Czechoslovakia and to work closely with the former Czech dissidents to ensure a 
peaceful transition toward German-Czech partnership in reunited Europe. 
The international popularity of human rights discourses, though not the 
direct cause of these reconstructed visions of the past, provided useful language in 
which to couch the moral basis for asserting a cosmopolitan identity, particularly 
for the Czechs. Human rights discourses gained prominence worldwide in the 
1970s as a response to the recent decline in utopian ideals of modernity. They 
emerged in the wake of crushed hopes for reforming socialism in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 and Chile in 1973, as well as growing disillusionment with the promises of 
capitalism and the welfare state that had sparked street protests from Paris to 
Berkeley, brought war to Vietnam, divided Germany, and turned it into the front 
line of Mutually Assured Destruction. By the mid-1970s, human rights perhaps 
served as “the last utopia” that could offer a framework for ordering peaceful, free 
societies and a moral world order, and they were vested with an almost 
mythological power to guide the world from chaos and disarray toward freedom 
and stability.30 
                                                        
30 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010), 3–4; Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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For many behind the Iron Curtain, human rights provided the rhetorical 
basis for an alternative value system as “a language of moral empowerment.”31 The 
Charter 77 petition invoked human rights in its rallying cry for a civil society 
outside Communist Party, asserting that the Charter emerged “from a background 
of friendship and solidarity among people who share our concerns for those ideals 
[human rights].”32 It was also human rights that provided the stated moral 
foundation of the cosmopolitan identity that engendered revision of the expulsion 
narrative as part of a reshuffling of Czech identity. 
Yet, more so than arguing for the enforcement of laws concerning basic 
human rights, the dissidents were concerned with restoring morality in a broader 
sense and promoting “life in truth” and personal authenticity.33 Havel even warned 
against fetishizing the law in his landmark essay: “The Power of the Powerless,” 
saying, “Even in the most ideal of cases, the law is only one of several imperfect and 
more or less external ways of defending what is better in life against what is worse. 
By itself, the law can never create anything better.”34 Human rights itself was not 
the cause of the dissident movement nor its only concern, but it served as a 
universalistic language to connect to the transnational web of Helsinki 
                                                        
31 Michal Kopeček, “Human Rights Facing a National Past: Dissident ‘Civic Patriotism’ and the Return 
of History in East Central Europe,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 38 (2012): 574. 
32 "Text from the original Charter 77 petition, cited from: H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human 
Rights in Czechoslovakia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 211–212. 
33 See: Jan Vladislav, ed., Václav Havel or Living in Truth (London: Faber and Faber, 1986). 
34 Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” International Journal of Politics 15 (Fall–Winter 
1985–1986): 77. 
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organizations and human rights agendas of Western governments while also 
appealing to the various domestic dissident groups with differing focuses and 
interests. As Michal Kopeček writes, human rights was a convenient framework to 
translate the dissidents’ visions into internationally understandable cultural codes: 
“The reconsiderations of national history, national political traditions, and 
conceptions of patriotism—as vaguely formulated as they mostly were—leaned on 
the new powerful instrument of human rights. In a different political situation, they 
might have gone without it.”35  
Human rights discourses, though offering the AG a moral foundation, 
provided somewhat less useful externally directed rhetoric than it did for the 
Czechs. Sudeten German activists had often invoked human rights in the 1940s and 
1950s to invoke sympathy for their suffering and loss and to base their legal claim 
of a right to return, and the Konrad Adenauer-led government of the 1950s equally 
invoked their violation through the expulsions as the basis for its refusal to 
recognize Poland’s western frontier on the Oder and Neisse rivers.36 With the 
international ascendance of human rights discourses in the 1970s the SL ramped 
up their invocation of human rights in their public statements as a pretext for 
                                                        
35 Kopeček, “Human Rights Facing a National Past,” 601–602. 
36 Lora Wildenthal, “Human Rights Activism in Occupied and Early West Germany: The Case of the 
German League for Human Rights,” The Journal of Modern History 80 (2008): 526–527, 541; Andrew 
Demshuk, “What is the ‘Right to Heimat’? West German Expellees and the Many Meanings of 
‘Heimkehr’,” Central European History 45 (2012): 524–525; Robert G. Moeller, “War Stories: The 
Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany,” The American Historical Review 101 
(1996): 1022–1023. 
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preserving a right for expellees to return to their homeland as an irredentist 
minority group.37 With the AG attempting to disassociate itself from the negative 
stereotypes of revanchist expellees during the 1970s, the SL’s public emphasis on 
human rights caused the AG to avoid using such rhetoric in order to draw a clearer 
dinstinction between the two organizations. 
However, for a younger generation of expellee children enamored with the 
suffering of those behind the Iron Curtain, the popularity of human rights 
discourses undoubtedly played a strong role in inspiring them to become more 
active through the AG in assisting the Czechs who relocated in West Germany after 
1968. Many of the AG’s symposiums directed toward the youth held human rights 
as their topic of discussion to further contribute to the idea that the AG’s work was 
grounded in the same currents of human rights that had grown to such popularity 
in West German public discourse. So while human rights discourses provided useful 
internal rhetoric for gaining more support from the youth, the external invocation 
of human rights as the basis for the AG’s activities to the public did not take place 
on the same level as the Czech dissidents or, and due in part to, the SL. 
The AG and Czech intellectuals’ “resurrection” of a cosmopolitan heritage in 
Central Europe lost through nationalism, war, and Cold War geopolitics raises 
fundamental questions about the importance of nostalgia, namely how historically 
                                                        
37 In particular, the SL attempted to connect their arguments to the plight of Palestinians, which was 
a popular topic in West Germany in the 1970s; Yuliya H. Komska, “Heimat in the Cold War: West 
Germany’s Multimedial Easts, 1945–1989” (PhD diss, Cornell University, 2009): 1–47. 
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accurate were the AG’s “inclusivist” version of Sudeten German identity and the 
Czech dissidents’ assertion of a cosmopolitan Central European identity? Recent 
historians have argued the widespread existence of multiculturalism and fluid 
identities in the Czech lands that the forces of nationalism and ethnic chauvinism 
reduced into new national-ethnic categories of “Czechs and Germans.”38 These 
works challenge previous scholarship that accepted the ethnic master narratives 
constructed during the rise of nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries which 
spoke of “revivals” and “awakenings” of national identities among Germans and 
Czechs that purportedly had always existed under the surface. Their findings 
support the late-Cold War assertions of the AG and many Czech dissidents that it 
was social class, communities, and locations and not specific national or ethnic 
heritage that comprised the most common bases of identity in the Czech lands 
before the mid-19th century. 
That is not to say that questions of nostalgia do not factor into this story. 
Nostalgia for the recent past lay at the center of Sudeten German forms of collective 
remembrance and celebration of their culture and heritage in the 1950s and 1960s, 
giving rise to what Andrew Demshuk calls a “Heimat [homeland] of Memory.” This 
                                                        
38 Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 8–10; Gary Cohen, Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans 
in Prague, 1861–1914 (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2006), 9–15; Chad Bryant, “Either 
German or Czech: Fixing Nationality in Bohemia and Moravia, 1939–1946,” Slavic Review 61 (2002): 
683–706; Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the 
Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) 
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idealized view of the homeland recalled individual remembrances of their former 
villages and the surrounding countryside that often invoked peaceful memories of 
childhood innocence.39 These patterns of remembrance allowed Sudeten Germans 
of the 1950s to lament a lost homeland in a way that was devoid of the divisive 
forces of nationalism and questions of culpability or guilt in the brutal wartime 
occupation. However, the middle and younger generation of expellees that took 
over leadership of the AG in the 1970s had no such direct remembrances of the lost 
Heimat and thus had little connection to the patterns of remembrance of their 
parents, even going so far as to reject being labelled “Sudeten Germans.”40 In this 
light we may perhaps view the resurrection of an older, pre-nationalism view of 
historic cosmopolitan heritage in the Czech lands as the creation of new forms of 
nostalgia to which younger expellees could relate, even if imaginatively, to serve as 
a historical reinforcement for their current worldview that valued peace and 
reconciliation. 
For the Czechs in this story, discourses of cosmopolitan Central European 
heritage may be a continuation of a historic transnational identification with 
multicultural intellectual life spread across Europe that Josef Škvorecký argues has 
been an integral component of the Czech mind since the wave of Czech immigration 
                                                        
39 Andrew Demshuk, The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14–20. 
40 See chapter two’s subsection “1968 in West Germany: Political Reorientations and a ‘Generation 
Problem.’ ” 
 27 
 
following the 1620 defeat by Austrian-led forces at the Battle of White Mountain.41 
Indeed, German thinkers have long been part of Europe’s international intellectual 
life, and Czechs’ resurrection of German-Czech heritage was an important gateway 
to rejoining the intellectual community of Western Europe. Or perhaps these 
discourses comprised, to quote Helmut Illbruck’s analysis of the concept of 
nostalgia, a set of postmodern simulacra that kept “alive […] the dream of a return 
to particularity in the age of hyperreality.”42 Hyperreality, or the inability of the 
consciousness to distinguish reality from a simulation of reality, is indeed an apt 
description of a post-1968 Czech society that was inundated with authoritarian 
symbols and rituals of socialist revolution at a time when these dissident 
intellectuals and even a vast majority of Communist Party members had ceased to 
believe (or never did to begin with) that there was any truth to the cause behind 
it.43 
Following Illbruck’s view, one could interpret the promotion of 
cosmopolitan heritage in the Czech lands as a nostalgic longing for a past to serve 
as a historical touchstone to reinforce contemporary calls for cooperation, 
understanding, and peace at a time where both were hard to come by for dissidents 
                                                        
41 Josef Škvorecký, “Bohemia of the Soul,” Daedalus 119 (1990): 112–114. 
42 Helmut Illbruck, Nostalgia: Origins and Ends of an Unenlightened Disease (Evanston Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2012), 24. 
43 Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulation,” in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. Mark 
Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2001), 169–170. The application of Jean Baudrillard’s 
concepts of social simulation and hyperreality to public discourse in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s 
and 1980s is explored in more detail in chapter three. 
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in public life in Czechoslovakia. “When the real is no longer what it was, nostalgia 
assumes its full meaning,” writes Jean Baudrillard, and the concurrent assertions of 
cosmopolitan heritage in the Czech lands made by AG members and Czech 
dissidents may have represented a temporary triumph in the power of nostalgia 
over historical reality.44 Or maybe the very notion of comparing the “real” to 
nostalgia is less useful than we believe, as Illbruck argues that the fear of nostalgia 
replacing the “real” and “authentic” is itself “a form of homesickness, one which still 
figures as the bad conscience of modernity.”45 
However, for purposes of this study the answers to these questions, though 
intriguing, are largely irrelevant. The goal here is not to evaluate the historical 
accuracy of the claims of cosmopolitan heritage made by AG members and Czechs 
during the late Cold War. Rather, this study seeks to understand why they emerged 
when they did and how they came to acquire such importance in the worldviews 
and self-conceptions of these two groups. In pursuing these questions this study 
proceeds from a foundation of collective memory and identity studies laid in the 
seminal 1925 work of Èmile Durkheim’s student Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective 
Memory. Halbwachs describes collective remembrance of the past as a social 
phenomenon, arguing, “It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. 
It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories.”46 To 
                                                        
44 Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulation,” 174. 
45 Illbruck, Nostalgia, 25. 
46 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. and ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 38. 
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remember is a social act that serves a social function, and every remembered 
version of the past provides a historical foundation and reinforcement of the 
current values and morals that ground that particular group’s collective identity at 
that given time. 
The “truth” is what people accept as the truth, and whether historically 
accurate or not, memories of a cosmopolitan German-Czech heritage in the Czech 
lands came to hold a central importance for many AG members and Czech 
dissidents and émigrés from 1968 onward. They guided their writings, activities, 
and interactions during the late-Cold War, and they served as the foundation for 
promoting reconciliation on a large public scale after 1989. In light of these 
observations outlined in this work, the question ‘were these memories historically 
accurate?’ is of little importance to the story; instead, the critical question becomes 
‘why did these two geographically distant social groups of Sudeten Germans and 
Czechs come to place such importance on promoting similar idealized versions of a 
multiethnic past at the same time?’ 
The “Transfers” and Remembrance in Cold War Czechoslovakia 
Reconciliation for Czechs necessitated a revision of the disparate German 
and Czech narratives about the morality of the expulsion, and Havel’s December 
1989 comments on the expulsion reintroduced into public Czech discourse debate 
about a history that had been suppressed since the rise of the Communist Party in 
1948. Some three million ethnic Germans were expelled from or fled 
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Czechoslovakia from 1945–1947.47 This was part of a larger process that uprooted 
some 13 million people from their homes across Central and Eastern Europe and 
sent them to occupied Germany. The nationality conflicts between “ethnic 
Germans” and their Slavic neighbors had their roots in the rise of nationalism in the 
18th and 19th centuries, when the very identification by many as being “ethnic 
German” emerged, and with it, a rise in claims of ethnic superiority which 
engendered conflicts over minority rights and representation.48 These problems 
were amplified following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
creation of Czechoslovakia and the restoration of Poland through the Treaty of 
Versailles, which left millions of these “ethnic Germans” living outside of Germany 
or Austria. The widespread enthusiasm with which many of these individuals 
greeted the arrival of Nazi forces, combined with the experience of brutal 
occupation, left many across Eastern Europe no longer believing that peaceful 
cohabitation with their “ethnic German” neighbors would be possible at the war’s 
end. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile under Edvard Beneš adopted the 
decision to deport Czechoslovakia’s German population after the war in 1943 and 
sought the support of the Allies for this proposal, which came when the “orderly 
                                                        
47 Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhaussen, and Stefan Troebst, eds., Lexikon der Vertreibung: Deportation, 
Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 
2010), 202. 
48 King, Budweisers, 8–10; Cohen, Politics of Ethnic Survival, 9–15. 
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and humane” transfer of Germans from Eastern Europe was agreed upon at the 
Potsdam Conference in August 1945.49 
The deportation of Germans from Czechoslovakia occurred during the so-
called “wild expulsions” from May-August 1945 that took place during the Nazi 
retreat back to Germany, followed by the “orderly and humane” transfer of ethnic 
Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary after the Potsdam 
Conference.50 Across Central Europe ethnic Germans were removed from their 
homes, at times with little more than a half-hour’s notice, placed into holding camps 
and deported to Germany. The expulsions in Czechoslovakia (referred to by Czechs 
with the morally-neutral term “transfer” until well into the 1990s), as well as 
crimes committed during the “wild expulsions,” were legalized through a series of 
decrees by the then-President of Czechoslovakia Edvard Beneš in 1945.51 The bulk 
of those expelled Germans came from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia, and in 
discussions of later decades the expulsion was generally considered to be an issue 
                                                        
49 For more on the specific historical background of ethnic Germans in the Czech lands, see Brandes, 
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51 Detlef Brandes, “1945: Die Vertreibung und Zwangsaussiedlung der Deutschen aus der 
Tschechoslowakei,” in Brandes, Kováč, and Pešek, Wendepunkte in den Beziehungen, 223–248. 
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between Germans and Czechs, not Slovaks, and is treated as such in this work as 
well as the overwhelming body of literature surrounding the expulsion.52 
The decision to remove the German population from Czechoslovakia was 
widely popular for Czechs at the time, and there was little domestic criticism of the 
“transfer” for over three decades.53 Nationalism and the war experience convinced 
most Czechs of the day that cohabitation was no longer possible and that the 
transfers were necessary to rid themselves of a hostile element whose nationalism 
helped deliver Czechoslovakia to the Nazi regime and who were Hitler’s willing 
                                                        
52 The majority of the some 100,000 German inhabitants of the Slovak lands (so-called Carpathian 
Germans) fled to the Sudetenland or Germany in the face of the Red Army and thus the German 
inhabitants of Slovakia were not subjected to the “wild expulsions” of 1945. Roughly 30,000 were 
expelled from Slovakia in 1946 following the “orderly and humane” process established in the 
Potsdam Agreement, but in the discussions of later decades Czechs typically presented the 
“transfers” as a Czech policy and a Czech problem to deal with; Susann Bethke, “Die Entwicklung der 
tschechoslowakischen Diskussion um die Vertreibung,” Deutsche Ostkunde 3 (1992): 95–96. One 
significant exception is Slovak Historian Ján Mlynárik, whose 1978 underground publication 
condemning the expulsion helped touch off the most significant pre-1989 discussion of the 
“transfers” in Czechoslovak history. Mlynárik’s work and the discussions are treated in depth in 
chapter three of this work. 
53 A handful of publications by Czechs in exile attributed the expulsion to collective guilt and 
questioned its morality, but these works received little echo and were met with other exile writers 
justifying the transfers as necessary; Bethke, “Entwicklung,” 96–97. One notable work that sought to 
justify the transfers was Radomír Luža’s The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, where he framed 
them as the “last act of the long German-Czech dispute” and a direct “response to circumstances 
created by the Sudeten Germans themselves and implicit in the Nazi regime.” See: Radomír Luža, 
The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933–1962 (New York: New 
York University Press, 1964). Luža maintained this position and was a vocal critic during the 
discussions about reevaluating the morality of the expulsions among Czech dissidents and émigrés 
in the 1970s and 1980s. A notable exception to the acceptance of the expulsion in exile came in 1950 
with the signing of the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Czechoslovak government in exile led by 
General Lev Prchala and representatives of the Working Group for the Protection of Sudeten 
German Interests, which later became the Sudeten German Homeland Association. The agreement 
called for a right for Sudeten Germans to return after democracy was restored to Czechoslovakia; 
however, internal divisions within the Czech government in exile and disagreements over the future 
form of Czechoslovakia made this agreement and particular instance of early German-Czech 
partnership a “political stillborn,” Tobias Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende? Sudetendeutsche 
Organisationen, 1945–1955 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 441–464, quote from 458. 
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allies during the brutal occupation. Official Communist history-writing and teaching 
continued to promote this narrative after their rise to power in 1948 and framed it 
in Marxist terms as the final act of triumph over fascism. Communist Party 
censorship of the media and publications generally meant that the “transfer” was a 
taboo subject and thus was rarely the focus of research or published discussion.54 
Yet, Havel’s 1989 comment that Czechs should apologize for the expulsion 
was not a spontaneous act of national self-reflection, but rather it was the logical 
progression of a pattern of morally reevaluating Czech history that Czech dissidents 
and émigrés undertook in the late 1970s and 1980s. 1968 was the pivotal year 
here, when the Warsaw Pact invasion ended the temporary reform period under 
Communist Party Chairman Alexander Dubček and caused many reform-minded 
Communists to lose faith that the Party could be changed from the inside. In the 
wake of the reassertion of control by the new leadership of the Party under Gustáv 
Husák many Czech intellectuals were purged from the Party and from positions at 
universities and began reorganizing intellectual life in underground circles and 
                                                        
54 In 1958 future reform Communist Milan Hübl submitted his dissertation which dealt in part with 
the “transfer“ and concluded that it was a tough but necessary measure to ensure the 
Czechoslovakian state after WWII; Milan Hübl, “Glosy k vysídlení československých Nemcov,” in 
Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 92. During the relaxation of censorship in the late 1960s two other 
publications dealt briefly with the “transfers”; one from historian Jan Křen, who called for factual, 
primary source research on the transfers to better understand what took place and how, and a 
discussion by Hübl and two others published in the Brno cultural journal Host do domu, where the 
contributors questioned the morality of the collective nature of the expulsion but stopped short of 
condemning them. Neither publication reverberated much at the time given the greater importance 
of the political and social changes during this thaw in party control. See: Jan Křen, “Odsun Němcu ve 
světle nových pramenů,” Dialog: Měsíčník pro politiku, hospodářství a kulturu 4–6 (1967): 1–10; 
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from exile abroad. The 1970s saw a dramatic rise in Czech independent writing 
(samizdat) that circulated in underground circles and was published in émigré 
journals abroad. Within these publications and underground discussion groups and 
seminars Czechs began a process of pursuing morality and respect for human rights 
that the Warsaw Pact invasion and subsequent crackdown had shut out of public 
discourse, and in these discussions the expulsion and the history of German-Czech 
relations took central positions. 
The 1978 circulation of a highly critical samizdat essay on the “transfers,” 
which compared them to an act of genocide and argued they had critically 
weakened Czechoslovakia, set off years of debate in the underground and émigré 
journals about the morality of the “transfers” as well as new conceptions of 
German-Czech heritage in a historic cosmopolitan culture of the Czech lands. In 
these discussions Czechs began reevaluating the official Communist narratives of 
Czech national history in a larger process of rewriting those narratives to reflect 
values of human rights and cultural and spiritual integration with Western Europe. 
The new narratives, though varied in nuance and opinion, largely supported 
cosmopolitan, multicultural portrayals of heritage in the Czech lands as a way to 
both reject and undermine the Communist narrative and to serve to as a historical 
legitimation for Czechs’ “return to [Western] Europe.” This process is the focus of 
chapter three in this study, and that chapter will demonstrate that the revival of 
Czech discussions of Central European identity and heritage in the 1980s, which 
scholars typically attribute to Milan Kundera’s 1983 article “The Tragedy of Central 
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Europe,” began earlier as a product of moral and spiritual reevaluation of Czech 
identity in the 1970s and were strongly manifested in the expulsion debates.55 
Respect for human rights and morality was a central component of the movement 
to reject Soviet-style socialism and calls to “Return to Europe” in the 1980s. For 
Havel and many other dissidents, reevaluating the existing expulsion narrative was 
an important and necessary step to rejoining the European community and, hence, 
the reason why Havel confronted Czechs with that moral revision immediately 
following the Velvet Revolution in 1989. 
Expellees in Early Cold War West Germany and the Founding of the 
Ackermann Gemeinde 
Ethnic German refugees and expellees began pouring across the border to 
Germany in the spring of 1945, with many more continuing to arrive through 1947 
with the “orderly and humane” removals of Eastern Europe’s German populations. 
By 1950, some eight million of them resided in West Germany, with another four 
million in East Germany at least temporarily.56 Despite later narratives that 
emphasized quick expellee integration in West Germany and their participation in 
                                                        
55 See, for example, discussion of Central European discourse attributed to Milan Kundera in: 
Leonidas Donskis, Yet Another Europe After 1984: Rethinking Milan Kundera and the Idea of Central 
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the “economic miracle” of the 1950s, recent scholarship has shown that the process 
of resettlement was anything but smooth and that many indigenous Germans did 
not greet their ethnic German counterparts with enthusiasm or welcome.57 Most 
expellees arrived exhausted with few or no possessions in war-ravaged Germany 
which was already facing a severe crisis of internal refugees, and many expellees 
faced a very dire situation as they searched for food, housing, and employment.58 
Domestic organizations to assist the incoming expellees began to spring up in the 
fall of 1945, and it was in this context that the Ackermann Gemeinde was born. 
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The AG emerged from activities beginning in Munich as a Catholic aid station 
established for expellees in October 1945.59 The original AG founders were 
Paulus Sladek—a Catholic priest from Litoměřice who resettled in Munich in the 
spring of 1945—and his friend Hans Schütz—a Catholic politician and former 
member of the Czechoslovakian National Assembly who had moved to Munich in 
1939.60 Through their Catholic aid station for expellees in Munich, Sladek and 
Schütz began building a network of contacts that would become the first members 
and allies of the AG. Sladek was primarily involved in providing pastoral care for 
Catholic expellees in Munich, but he also kept a list of the names and addresses of 
those he helped as well as others assisting Sudeten German expellees at similar aid 
offices around the occupied zones. Meanwhile, Schütz used his political experience 
to gain audiences with Bavarian and national politicians to raise interest and 
assistance for the aid station in order to help as many expellees as possible.61 
The AG was established in 1946 originally with the name “Catholic Young 
Men’s Team/Ackermann Community (Sudeten German Working Team)” 
[Katholische Junge Mannschaft/Ackermann Gemeinde (Sudetendeutscher 
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Arbeitskreis)], which they later shortened to the “Ackermann Gemeinde.”62 
Including “Catholic” in the title reflected the AG’s close connection to the Catholic 
Church, which was not merely a coincidental result of Sladek’s status as a priest, 
but instead rested on the practical ground that the American occupational forces’ 
restriction on establishing political organizations did not apply if those 
organizations were founded within religious institutions.63 Organization through 
the Catholic Church also offered an important preexisting networking that 
increased early opportunities to establish contacts with Sudeten Germans around 
the occupied zones, and the Catholic orientation of the AG offered a religious moral 
foundation for promoting reconciliation over revanchism. They adopted the name 
“Ackermann Gemeinde” in reference to the 1401 poem by Johannes von Tepl “The 
Ackermann from Bohemia,” which tells the story a man who submits himself to God 
after suffering a difficult turn of events with the death of his wife and struggles over 
his property.64 The moral was one of acceptance and submission to fate and God’s 
will, and it served as a symbolic representation of the AG’s focus on helping Sudeten 
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Germans come to peace with the expulsion in a Christian spirit and encourage a 
willingness for reconciliation. 
From their early years the AG eschewed revanchism and nationalism and 
placed strong emphasis on reconciliation and recreating a multiethnic 
Czechoslovakia with their former Czech countrymen. The AG published their 
founding mission statement in 1948 that focused on three major themes: never 
rescinding their right to their homeland, encouraging economic and social 
integration of Sudeten Germans in Germany, and calling for the protection and 
preservation of Sudeten German heritage as a means to allow a future return to the 
homeland.65 This mission statement called on Sudeten Germans to recognize their 
own nationalist missteps and reject feelings of revenge and retribution in the quest 
to restore the homeland. Their vision of the “homeland” was not framed through 
the prism of earlier nationalist struggles, but rather they declared that their “most 
important task” was the restoration of the “thousand year order of peoples” in 
Central Europe that had preceded recent nationalist divisiveness. In this sense, the 
“homeland” was not just land and property but was above all the people.66 Sladek 
and Schütz reinforced this emphasis on reconciliation and restoring a peaceful 
relationship with Czechs in their many writings and publications distributed to 
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Sudeten Germans around the occupied zones in the initial years following their 
resettlement.67 
Early AG activities focused on restoring religious life among Sudeten 
Germans, helping them integrate socially and economically with native Germans, 
and preserving knowledge and heritage of the homeland. Schütz wielded 
considerable influence as a member of the Church aid office, a member of the 
Committee for Refugees and Expellees in Bavaria, a Christian Social Union 
politician, and, from 1949 onward, a member of the German Bundestag; many other 
AG leaders were also in similar positions of power.68 They opened regional offices 
across the American, British, and French occupied zones to assist in local 
integration, and they also began organizing cultural retreats, presentations, and 
regular publications like the Volksbote, a periodical to spread cultural knowledge 
among members and readers about Sudeten German history and heritage. They 
took an early interest in directing this cultural work toward the Sudeten German 
youth, and in 1950 they organized a separate youth organization called the Junge 
Aktion in order to help spread education about the homeland for the preservation 
of their heritage as they integrated in German society. 69 The Junge Aktion became a 
member of the Federation of German Catholic Youth that same year, and this 
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association with the Catholic Church helped separate them from other Sudeten 
German youth organizations and their more nationalist rhetoric.70 
For the AG, the preservation of heritage was requisite for a future return to 
the homeland, and their cultural program was aimed at maintaining interest in the 
homeland to keep people prepared to return. Renouncing revenge and retribution 
was a similar theme across all Sudeten German organizations during this time, and 
while historian Tobias Weger questions what possible alternatives to it were ever 
presented that would have allowed Sudeten Germans to physically return to their 
former homes, Markus Stadtrechter concludes that the Catholic orientation of the 
AG provided such an alternative with its emphasis on healing the “deepest and 
bitterest of wounds” with love. He argues that although a return did not take place 
in the 1950s, the rejection of violence was an “indispensable requirement for the 
subsequent deeper reconciliation between the expellees and the new inhabitants of 
their old homeland.”71 While reconciliation was difficult to achieve in the 1950s, 
considering that Germans and Czechs lay on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain, the 
AG’s willingness and emphasis on reconciliation early on laid the groundwork for 
reconciliation and cooperation as the AG’s network of Czech contacts expanded 
drastically after 1968. 
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Early Ackermann Gemeinde Relations with the 
Sudeten German Homeland Association 
 From the early years after their founding, AG leaders strove to establish 
themselves as an organization independent from the larger SL with their own aims 
and activities. The SL was officially founded in 1950 and was born from local 
Sudeten German associations from across southern Germany that banded together 
to form a single organization to pursue the political goal of reclaiming the 
homeland and securing restitution for lost property. During the years of 
consolidating the local Sudeten German assemblies from 1946-1950 a leader 
emerged in the person of Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, who aimed to establish a 
strong central organization that would effectively exert a monopoly over opinion 
concerning Sudeten German affairs. 72 Despite Schütz’s participation in the SL, that 
organization existed in a sort of tension with the AG during its early years, due 
largely to Lodgman’s desire to have the SL serve as the sole public voice for all 
Sudeten Germans as well as the different views of AG leaders and Lodgman toward 
Sudeten Germans’ relationship to Czechs.73 
 Early conflict between the budding AG and Lodgman came in November 
1949 when Sladek invited Sudeten German leaders from the separate national and 
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Social Democrat sectors to join with the Catholic Sudeten Germans for a three-day 
conference in Eichstätt to discuss Sudeten German visions of the past and future for 
Central Europe. Lodgman and his closest circle were notably not invited due to his 
claim to absolute leadership and Sladek’s desire for an open discussion.74 After the 
conference, participants published a declaration that expressed a common Sudeten 
German political stance toward Europe. The “Eichstätt Declaration” framed the 
East-West conflict as a struggle for human rights and declared that the struggle 
could only be won with the end of Communism and expellees’ right to return to 
their homeland. Sudeten Germans had a duty to help in this struggle and reclaim 
the homeland and establish a sustainable relationship with Slavs in the larger 
context of a humanitarian rebirth of Europe.75 This declaration became another 
founding statement of sorts for the AG and one they would continue to recall and 
emphasize as the foundation of the AG’s model for a unified Christian Europe.76 
Lodgman’s reaction to Eichstätt was anger at the participation of Sudeten 
Germans with whom he was working to consolidate the SL, whom he wrote 
privately “must be shown the teeth.”77 Lodgman worked over the next several 
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months to delegitimize the Eichstätt Declaration in Sudeten German circles and 
among Bavarian and national German politicians, even going so far as to accuse it of 
being a thinly veiled plan for the restoration of Catholic Hapsburg hegemony in 
Central Europe.78 Meanwhile, Lodgman organized a conference in Detmold in 
January 1950 to assemble the local SL offices and create a unified political platform 
for the SL, and the resulting declaration illustrated the differences in political 
outlook between Lodgman and the AG. 
The Detmold Declaration contrasted with the Eichstätt Declaration’s focus 
on promoting a policy toward the East that would restore a multinational Central 
Europe in a way that defined the fundamental difference in world views between 
the SL and AG for decades to come. The Detmold Declaration referenced “Europe” 
only in calling for a single economic space with respect for minority rights, and it 
focused instead on the relationship between Sudeten Germans and native Germans 
as a mechanism for preserving a separate nationalist identity and heritage. The 
central statement of the declaration read: “The Sudeten German ethnic group 
considers its task to preserve itself for the German Volk, to keep their 
consciousness and legal claim of the homeland alive and to share their borderland-
German experience with the German nationality.”79 In this case, the “borderland-
German experience” referred to the nationalist stance of Sudeten Germans toward 
                                                        
78 Weger, Volkstumskampf, 436. 
79 Ibid., 137. 
 45 
 
Czechs in the interwar period as Sudeten Germans’ contribution of “experience” to 
guide West German anti-communist foreign policy toward the East.80 The SL’s tone 
in the Detmold Declaration was more nationalistic and less friendly toward Czechs 
than the Eichstätt Declaration, which Lodgman criticized for being too 
reconciliatory and not nationalist enough.81 
The circumstances surrounding the issuing of these two separate decrees 
created a rocky relationship between the AG and SL that persisted for the next 
several years, however the two main points of disagreement would resurface later 
in AG-SL relations.82 Those two points of disagreement were firstly, Lodgman’s 
insistence on the SL being the absolute authority to issue public statements and 
policies pertaining to Sudeten Germans; and secondly, the different viewpoints 
toward visions for Central Europe, with the AG voicing support for multinational 
cohabitation and the SL emphasizing national separation and minority rights for 
Sudeten Germans. 
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The 1960s: The Young Generation and the Turn to the East 
While the SL’s program during the 1950s and 1960s centered on lobbying 
the Bonn governments for making restitution and the promotion of a legal right to 
the homeland part of Bonn’s foreign policy toward the East, the AG focused on 
outreach and assistance. In the early years this assistance was aimed at helping 
Sudeten Germans with the resettlement and integration process with activities like 
helping them find homes and jobs and supporting new immigrants with 
medication, food, and spiritual guidance.83 The AG began to reach other 
nationalities in 1958 when it became the host of a newly-created exile office for 
Western Europe under the auspices of the World Federation of Catholic Youth. 
Through the exile office the AG organized courses for political, cultural, social and 
religious education for youths arriving from across Eastern Europe, including but 
not limited to Czechs and Slovaks.84 
The increased interactions with Czechs began to change the program of the 
AG’s youth organization, the Junge Aktion. During the early 1950s the events of the 
AG’s Junge Aktion youth branch concentrated on preserving cultural heritage and 
outreach programs to native German youths to combat negative stereotypes about 
them as refugees from the East. However, the opening of the exile office afforded 
AG youths with more opportunities for interaction with young people from Eastern 
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Europe and began a process of the Junge Aktion reorienting itself toward pursuing 
outreach and encounters with Czechs and Slovaks. As the Czechoslovak 
government relaxed visa restrictions in 1962–1963 as part of its gradual process of 
de-Stalinization, the Junge Aktion began hosting visiting Czech youth groups as well 
as organizing their own travel groups across the border. From this period onward, 
Junge Aktion leaders began to downplay the importance of identity preservation 
and emphasized interaction with Czechs and reconciliation. 
This shift in the younger generation’s outlook coincided with a changing of 
the old guard of AG leaders over sixty-five to members of the middle generation—
those in their forties and fifties—to bridge the generational gap between the 
original founders who experienced the expulsion and the youth who did not. This 
took place at the same time as the reorientation of Czech intellectual life in the 
underground and in exile, and it is here where the story told in this work begins. 
Chapter two of this dissertation examines the social and political shifts taking place 
in West German and Czechoslovak society in the late 1960s and 1970s and the 
establishment of networks on both sides of the border that served as the 
foundations for future AG-Czech cooperation. It traces the formation of 
underground dissident circles and independent publication in Czechoslovakia 
following the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion and the subsequent return of strict 
political and intellectual censorship that formed a new community in which 
cosmopolitanism emerged and engendered historical revision of the expulsion 
narrative. That chapter also traces the activities of Czechs who left the country and 
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resettled in metropoles across Western Europe, where they began assisting the 
underground back home with money, printing supplies, foreign literature, and 
logistical support. This outside assistance enabled the underground discussions to 
reach wider audiences and created an international network of independent Czech 
discussion in which the expulsions and German-Czech history would become 
central themes. 
Chapter two then moves to West Germany to trace how the AG navigated the 
changing socio-political context in West German society that sought peaceful 
relations with Eastern Europe and rejected German victimhood discourses that 
highlighted expellee suffering. The generational shift in the AG and its new 
emphasis on outreach and cooperation with Czechs comprise the major themes, 
with the AG’s partnership with the newly-established Czech Catholic organization 
Opus Bonum being the most crucial link in West Germany. It was this partnership 
that greatly expanded the AG’s network of contacts with Czechs in Czechoslovakia 
and around Europe and enabled the AG to establish itself as a positive Sudeten 
German partner promoting reconciliation. These contacts also allowed the AG to 
significantly increase its assistance of struggling Catholic dioceses in 
Czechoslovakia in the 1980s, further enhancing its image as a friendly Sudeten 
German institution in contrast to narratives in Czechoslovakia of revanchist 
Sudeten Germans who only sought a return of their property and restitution. 
Chapter three explores how the Czech underground’s emphasis on morality 
and human rights engendered a reevaluation of the expulsion narrative. It analyzes 
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the samizdat debates over the expulsion as manifestations of this new morality and 
an identification with westward-oriented heritage shared with Germans, 
illustrating that the roots of the cosmopolitan Central European identity discourses 
of the 1980s extend back to the 1970s and served as a source of inspiration in these 
debates. Chapter three then explores the expansion of samizdat and underground 
seminars that received Western help and proliferated in the 1980s, when this new 
morality also engendered reevaluations of the expulsion narrative in underground 
seminars in Prague and Brno and found resonance among a wider populace. I argue 
here that the experience of education and discussion in these underground 
seminars also displayed similar discourses of Central European identity and values 
that reached much wider audiences than the earlier circle of dissidents active in the 
1970s expulsion debates. 
Chapter four returns to West Germany to illustrate how the AG advanced its 
vision of promoting a multiethnic Central European heritage as part of an 
inclusivist identity that contrasted the exclusivist discourse of a nationally-distinct 
Sudeten German identity promoted in the SL and other Sudeten German 
institutions. Both the AG and SL had to respond to an aging expellee population and 
West German society’s changing view of expellees and their claims of a right to the 
homeland, but they did so in very different ways. The AG adopted the currents of 
Europeanism and inclusion in West German society to recast Sudeten Germans as a 
multicultural group embodying values of Europeanism, while the SL sought to 
preserve a distinctly German vision of Sudeten German identity to legitimate their 
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right to the homeland as a minority group. The struggle over competing visions of 
identity played out in a prolonged conflict throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
over control of the Sudeten German research institute the Collegium Carolinum. 
Both the AG and the SL sought to ensure that the Collegium Carolinum’s research 
program would reflect their particular visions of identity in its scholarship, 
illustrating the importance of historical narrative in reinforcing current group 
identity and values. 
Chapter four also traces the AG’s support of the Catholic Church and 
underground religious activities in Czechoslovakia as part of its expanding network 
of cooperation and activism with Czechs inspired by the AG’s belief in the 
universality of human rights and its duty to assist the repressed Catholic Church in 
Czechoslovakia. The underground Catholic Church had close ties to many dissidents 
and Charter 77 spokesmen85, and the AG’s assistance to the underground Church 
bought the AG good will and helped it gain the trust and respect of crucial figures in 
the Czech underground. When these figures took over prominent positions in Czech 
society after 1989 they worked together with the AG to encourage the wider Czech 
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society to morally reevaluate the expulsion and work toward a smooth transition to 
friendly German-Czech bilateral relations.  
Chapter five follows these contacts and partnerships between the AG and 
prominent Czechs now in positions of political and social power into the 1990s as 
they worked toward German-Czech rapprochement as part of Czechs’ “Return to 
Europe.” Early calls by the former Czech dissidents for the Czech public to reassess 
the morality of the expulsion were met with resistance, and this was further 
complicated by SL demands of restitution and a right to return with minority rights 
that appeared hostile to Czechs and encouraged the spread of anti-German 
sentiments. Although issues relating to the expulsion were an early stumbling block 
in political and social relations between Germans and Czechs, the AG-Czech 
network forged over the previous two decades took the lead in guiding Czechs and 
Sudeten Germans toward reconciliation, which culminated in the signing of the 
1997 German-Czech Declaration which aimed to put the issues of restitution, 
blame, and morality to rest. While this treaty did not end all disputes over 
expulsion remembrance, the AG and its Czech partners created a host of 
institutions and partnerships on a national and local level in the 1990s to 
encourage dialogue and promote further reconciliation and understanding into the 
future. These institutions, born of AG-Czech partnerships extending back to the 
early 1970s, remain some of the most influential organizations and partnerships 
helping Germans and Czechs live together peacefully in Europe and find a way to 
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re-narrate their troubled history in a way that reinforces their common heritage as 
a pathway forward for continued cooperation in Europe. 
Finally, the concluding chapter places this story in the larger context of post-
1989 European discussions about constructing narratives of expulsion that 
reinforce European integration and shared identities and experiences. The roots of 
these discussions lay in the cautionary spectacle of violence in the Balkans in the 
1990s and the universalization of repudiating ethnic cleansing as a European moral 
imperative. These discussions also rose to public prominence after a 1999 proposal 
by the Federation of Expellees to construct a Center Against Expulsions to serve as 
a site for remembering ethnic cleansing. The debates that ensued illustrated 
discourses promoting the need for writing and telling European histories of 
expulsion in a way that Europeanized victims and perpetrators and avoided 
divisive national dichotomies of victims and perpetrators to foster integration and 
peaceful cohabitation. Forging a common identity and shared set of values as 
Europeans through history-writing were primary concerns in these debates, and 
expulsion history and remembrance were transformed from being a bilateral 
concern of Germany and its Eastern neighbors to a problem for Europe. The tales of 
expulsion and drives for forging a common Central European identity told in this 
work, thus, emerge as precursors to the discourses that occupied organs of the 
European Union in the 2000s and brought politicians and academics from around 
Europe and North America together to find a way to tell expulsion history in a way 
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that would preserve European unity and provide a historical foundation for dealing 
collectively with the traumatic past of recent violence on the continent. 
A Note on Sources 
This dissertation is based on archival research and interviews conducted in 
Germany and the Czech Republic. Except where cited otherwise, all interviews were 
conducted by the author in an open discussion-based format and ranged from one 
to six hours in duration. All primary documents marked “AG” are contained in the 
central archives of the Ackermann Gemeinde in Munich, Germany. All documents 
marked “JHEF” are part of the Jan Hus Educational Foundation collection housed in 
the archive of the Moravian Museum in Brno, Czech Republic (archiv Moravského 
zemského muzea). At the time of research these documents had just been donated 
and were still packed in boxes and suitcases. They were not yet catalogued and 
there were no file or folder numbers to record; however, I have made every 
attempt to indicate sufficient identifying information for each document cited. All 
documents marked “BayHStA” refer to collections housed at the Bavarian State 
Archives (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv). Items marked “Libri prohibiti” belong to 
the archive of the same name in Prague, Czech Republic that collects all forms of 
Czech and Slovak samizdat and émigré writing; all documents labelled “ČSDS” 
belong to Czechoslovak Documentation Center in Prague assembled by Vilém 
Prečan. All documents marked “WSA” belong to the personal private archive of 
Wolfgang Stock who graciously granted me access. These documents are in the 
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process of being relocated to the Jan Hus Educational Foundation collection at the 
Moravian National Museum Archive. 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL REORIENTATIONS AND NEW CONTACTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND 
WEST GERMANY, 1968–1977 
 
Czech Abbot Anastáz Opasek (1913–1999) was fifty-five years old and 
visiting his birthplace of Vienna when the tanks and troops of the Warsaw Pact 
invasion entered Czechoslovakia in late August 1968. For this trip he had taken 
temporary leave from his job carting boxes in the warehouse of Prague’s National 
Gallery, which itself was an improvement over his previous employment as a 
construction worker. Born Jan Nepomucký Vojtěch Opasek, Opasek received the 
new name of Anastáz when entered the Břevnov-Braunau monastery in 1932. 
During his years at the monastery he experienced firsthand the damage of ethnic 
nationalism: First in 1939, when the monastery was split into two houses between 
German monks in Braunau and Czechs in Břevnov under pressure from the German 
occupying forces; and then again when the German monks were expelled from 
Czechoslovakia in 1946 following the transfer decrees by Czechoslovakian 
President Beneš. 
Opasek remained at the Břevnov monastery over the next five years, 
becoming its abbot in 1947 and forging close ties with the Vatican, even after the 
Communists seized power in February 1948 and sought to sever Catholic ties to the 
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Vatican and create a Catholic Church loyal to the Czechoslovak state.86 It was these 
ties, and Opasek’s vocal opposition to the repression of the Catholic Church in 
Eastern Europe in his sermons and speeches abroad, which caused Opasek to be 
convicted of espionage and treason in a 1950 show trial and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.87 Opasek served ten years of this sentence before being pardoned 
during a blanket of presidential amnesty granted to many religious and political 
prisoners in 1960. During his prison sentence Opasek’s fellow inmates knew him as 
“always a funny man with a number of distinctive and peculiar views,” and he 
earned the nickname the “Hooligan Abbot” for surprising his cell-mates with walls 
full of colorful caricature drawings when they returned one day from work in the 
prison.88 
 The invasion of 1968 dashed Opasek’s hopes for reforms in Czechoslovakia, 
and, with little faith that he would be allowed to resume his service as an abbot and 
fearful that his commuted prison sentence might be reinstated, he declined to 
return to Czechoslovakia from his vacation in Vienna and relocated instead to West 
Germany. There, he reunited with his former fellow German monks from Braunau 
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who had reestablished a monastery at the former Rohr Abbey in Bavaria, 
previously closed since 1803.89 It was from Rohr that Opasek became one of the 
most well-known and well-respected Czech figures among Czech émigrés and 
expellees in West Germany. 
Opasek was in contact with representatives from the AG from the mid-
1960s, when he twice received AG visitor groups touring their former homelands 
and learning about the state of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia.90 Once 
Opasek relocated in West Germany he quickly strengthened these contacts, and 
with strong support from the AG he founded the Czech cultural organization Opus 
Bonum in 1972, which went on to be arguably the single most important Czech 
émigré organization in Europe.91 From the late 1970s onward Opus Bonum 
established itself as the central uniting organization bringing the most prominent 
émigré leaders and external facilitators of Czechoslovakia’s thriving intellectual 
underground together to discuss the future of Czechoslovakia. This network 
integrated with the AG and afforded both sides with invaluable contacts through 
which they worked to support underground intellectual and religious life in 
Czechoslovakia before 1989, and this network also proved crucial to bringing 
Germans and Czechs together to promote reconciliation after end of the Cold War. 
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 This chapter traces the foundations of Czech underground dissident circles 
and AG partnerships with Czech émigrés abroad in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The 1968 invasion and subsequent political crackdown spawned a wholesale 
reorientation of Czech intellectual life into underground circles and an 
international network of émigrés abroad. Through their contacts with émigrés the 
AG forged extensive contacts and partnerships with Czechs on both sides of the 
border to lay the groundwork for efforts toward reconciliation. 
In Czechoslovakia, the period from 1968 to 1976 witnessed the creation of 
an underground network of repressed and ostracized intellectuals that discussed 
and wrote about Czech identity, history and politics beyond the confines of state 
censorship. These groups benefitted from material and logistical support from the 
wave of post-1968 Czech émigrés and organizations based abroad that helped 
increase participation in activities like underground samizdat circulation and 
underground academic seminars, which expanded in frequency later in the decade 
and even more so in the 1980s.92 Many of these Czechs founded émigré journals 
that published domestic samizdat for audiences abroad, and they also forged ties 
with Western organizations like the AG and helped create an international alliance 
of support for dissidents in opposing the Czechoslovak regime. It was within these 
networks that discourses on German-Czech relations and the expulsion of Sudeten 
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Germans would take a prominent role in discussions about rewriting the 
Communist narrative of Czech history and promoting discourses of a cosmopolitan 
Central European identity in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
 For the AG in West Germany the wave of Czech émigrés meant a host of new 
partners to expand outreach efforts and increase their network of Czech contacts in 
Czechoslovakia. This period was also a period of profound political and social 
change in West Germany that fundamentally altered the perception of expellees 
and their place in politics and society. Public opinion turned away from previous 
tendencies that shunned German guilt in WWII and focued on German victims 
instead, and expellees and Sudeten Germans had been a central image in this 
victimhood. Moreover, in 1969 the Social Democrats took office in West Germany 
for the first time, and new chancellor Willy Brandt largely ended the strong political 
influence that expellees and Sudeten Germans had enjoyed in Bonn and openly 
defied their wishes in his policy of reestablishing political relations with Eastern 
Europe (Ostpolitik). 
While historians have described this shift as a blanket decline in expellee 
influence, their analyses are largely restricted to political expellee organizations 
like the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen) and the SL, whose direct 
influence in Bonn did indeed decline.93 However, the AG was not a political 
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organization but a social and cultural one, and this same period saw a marked 
increase in AG grassroots activities, initiatives, and cooperations that continued to 
build through 1989 and culminated in an ability to affect real social and political 
change in the Czech Republic and Germany after 1989. As a confessional Catholic 
Sudeten German organization, the AG as an institution aimed at reconciliation and 
cooperation with Czechs, not at promoting political policy. While many AG leaders 
personally lamented the absence of the expulsion or any mention of expellee rights 
to return to their homeland in the Brandt regime’s negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia, they nevertheless focused their efforts in the AG on 
integrating younger members within its ranks and forging new ties with Czechs in 
the 1970s. 
 During this period the AG also faced a generational crisis as their leaders 
aged and their numbers began declining, and they worked to actively recruit 
younger Sudeten Germans into their ranks. AG leaders realized that the growing 
unpopularity of expellees in West German society was a hindrance to increasing 
participation of the younger generation that did not have direct experience of the 
expulsion. This generation was more interested in promoting peaceful relations 
with Czechs and Eastern Europe than in preserving a distinct identity as Sudeten 
Germans and celebrating memories of life in the old homeland. The AG responded 
by enhancing their image as reconciliationists, both through their own actions and 
by distancing themselves from the political Sudeten German organizations, whose 
opposition to Ostpolitik made them appear as revanchist and outdated to much of 
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West German society. The AG worked to separate themselves from these 
institutions and revamp their image as an institution of cooperation and 
reconciliation, and invested evermore resources into contacts and cooperation with 
Czechs to win much of the younger generation. 
 Their partnership with Opasek and Opus Bonum was the leading symbol of 
this cooperation. AG directors devoted much of their financial and political 
resources to ensuring the growth of Opus Bonum, which by the end of the decade 
forged a trusting network which could bring Czech émigrés from all political and 
social backgrounds together for discussion and debate. Opus Bonum would play a 
significant role in initiating debate among Czechs about the expulsion, and it was 
also an important partner of the AG in promoting its version of Sudeten German 
identity as being part of a historic, multicultural, and multiethnic Bohemia. 
The Husák Regime’s “Normalization” and the Creation of an International 
Czech Underground 
 Jiří Müller (1943–) was a twenty four-year-old mechanical engineering 
student in Prague when the tanks and troops of the Warsaw Pact invasion entered 
in late August 1968. Expelled from the university in 1966 for attempting to create a 
non-communist student organization, Müller was rehabilitated during the thaw of 
the spring of 1968 and resumed activities as a student leader, rallying his fellow 
students and organizing demonstrations at the Czech Technical University in 
Prague in support of the ongoing reforms. With the occupation of Prague by 
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Warsaw Pact troops, Müller organized protests against the occupation and led 
student organizations in Prague, Bohemia, and Moravia. For Müller, like many in 
Czechoslovakia who would come to be known abroad as “dissidents,” retribution 
for activities deemed oppositional did not come immediately. Müller remained 
active in student opposition groups for the next two years while also finishing his 
studies. On March 18, 1970 Müller entered the room of the state examination board 
wearing a dark suit prepared to defend his thesis, only to be told by the chairman 
that he would not be allowed to undertake his defense due to “repeated 
infringements of the principles of proper behavior and civic duty.”94 Müller was 
expelled from the university for the second time, beginning a nineteen year period 
of his life dedicated to organizing underground activities aimed at subverting the 
regime. 
 In the wake of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion, Moscow slowly but steadily 
regained its grip on Czechoslovak politics, deposing and eventually expelling from 
the Communist Party reform leader Alexander Dubček and replacing him with a 
Soviet favorite, Gustáv Husák, in April 1969. When Husák came to power many 
intellectuals initially held hope that he would be a moderate leader who could stave 
off the vindictive conservative wing of the Party clamoring for atonement for the 
insults it had received during the Prague Spring. Many, including Václav Havel, 
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believed Husák’s presentation of himself as someone who simply wanted to end the 
tumultuous era of change during Dubcek’s rule and restore peace and quiet and get 
on with repairing the economy.95 After all, Husák served prison time in the 1950s 
on treason charges, and his refusal to confess likely saved his co-defendants from 
the death sentence. This past seemed for many to be a sign of his character and an 
indication that he would not resort to similar abuses of justice having been a victim 
to it himself.96 
 However, Husák’s first year oversaw the gradual end of both popular and 
organized opposition and began a process of reasserting Party control over society 
dubbed “Normalization,” or as philosopher Ernst Gellner described it, “Stalinism 
with a human face.”97 The last major public demonstration against the occupation 
regime was on the anniversary of the invasion on August 29, 1969 and was 
suppressed by the army and police. Later that year, the government began cracking 
down on organized opposition.98 
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Following his second expulsion from the university in 1970, Müller 
continued his efforts at increasing the education and political awareness of fellow 
Czechs while being relegated to occupation in various capacities as a window 
cleaner, stoker, and fire extinguisher repairman. He was active in the Socialist 
Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens—an attempt to organize an oppositional 
platform around an alternative plan of socialism. From his new exile in London 
Müller’s fellow student activist and friend, Jan Kavan, began supplying Müller with 
banned literature, printers, and other materials to help his anti-regime propaganda 
campaign, thus beginning a long career for Müller of printing and disseminating 
forbidden literary works in Czechoslovakia.99 
 Müller’s initiatives with the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens 
sparked a new wave of arrests in which some two hundred people were detained 
between December 1971 and January 1972, and Müller received a five-and-a-half-
year prison sentence.100 For Kavan, the imprisonment of his old friend only 
encouraged him to expand his smuggling channel and eventually open Palach Press 
in London in 1976 to distribute publications from Czech dissidents to academics 
and Czech societies around the world. These crackdowns sent a message from the 
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Husák regime that organized opposition would not be tolerated, but it also created 
fertile recruiting grounds for future dissidents. Müller and Kavan are just two 
examples of how Husak’s “Normalization” helped create an underworld of 
opposition with an international dimension of cooperation and coordination, and 
similar cases increased over the course of the 1970s. 
 Much of the ranks of Czech opposition were filled with former Party 
members. The crackdowns on oppositional activity in the late 1960s and early 
1970s coincided with a purging of the Party, which leaders framed as a massive 
reissuing of Party membership cards during which every member would have to 
affirm their support for the new Party line.101 These purges were not a throwback 
to the Stalinist terror of the 1950s, but were rather an attempt to rid the Party of 
high-profile reformers while giving everyone else a chance to pledge support for 
the new Party line rather than fight.102 While Kieren Williams has pointed out that a 
mere 4% of Party members bore the brunt of these purges, Jonathon Bolton argues 
that its effects were much further reaching for three reasons. Firstly, the family of 
those purged also suffered the aftereffects, with spouses being dismissed from their 
jobs, children often denied university entry, and close friends being brought under 
suspicion and monitored. Secondly, the purges can be seen as a “disciplinary 
mechanism” as described by Michel Foucault, whereby the act of being screening 
                                                        
101 On the purges see: Williams, Prague Spring, 226–244; Kieran Williams, “The Prague Spring: From 
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institutionalized a new model of bureaucratic speech and behavior—a kind of 
political theater—which trained members to the new rules of the game. This 
theater was founded on ritual humiliation before the screening committees and the 
performance of staged obedience, all shrouded in the anesthetized language of 
bureaucratic Communism.103 And thirdly, the purges were aimed primarily at 
ridding non-conformists in positions of higher education, the university 
professionals and intellectuals, who comprised “about 41% of all members who 
were losing their cards.”104 Historians were among the academics affected the most 
by the purges, with as many as one-third removed from the party and thus losing 
their academic posts.105 
One of those historians was Vílem Prečan (1933–). Prečan grew up in a 
family where both parents were Party members. His parents participated in the 
anti-Nazi resistance movement the final year of the war, and Prečan himself also 
received the Medal of Merit in 1947 for his involvement in the movement as a 
teenager. He was active in the Communist Czechoslovakian Youth Union from 
103 Bolton, Worlds of Dissent, 62–64; Williams, Prague Spring, 235. 
104 In his analysis of purge statistics based on the Central Committee’s own reports, historian Jiří 
Maňák notes that 56% of the Party’s “artistic and cultural workers” lost their membership, followed 
closely by academics and scholars in research institutes, with the social sciences being particularly 
hard hit, see: Jiří Maňák, Čistky v kommunistické straně Československa v letech 1968–1970 (Prague: 
Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1997), 63. 
105 Jan Kren, “Czech Historiography at the Turning Point,” East European Society and Politics 6 
(1992): 153. A 1975 report on historians listed 145 who had lost their posts, but Jiří Kořalka 
estimates that more than 500 historians may have been removed; Acta Persecutionis: A Document 
from Czechoslovakia (San Francisco: XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences, 1975); Jiří 
Kořalka, “Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia,” American Historical 
Review 97 (1992): 1030. 
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age 15, and in 1951 he formally applied to the Party and was granted membership 
in 1954. During this time he studied history in Prague and was, in his words, 
“indoctrinated” into Party philosophy.106 He joined the history institute at the 
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in 1957, and it was from there that he and 
several of his colleagues watched with disapproval the retreat of the Dubcek 
leadership under Soviet pressure in the fall of 1968. 
 As secretary of the Commission for Recent Czechoslovakian History at the 
Academy of Sciences, Prečan helped organized the Historians’ Assembly held 
June 26, 1968 at the philosophical faculty at Charles University to discuss ways to 
democratize the organization and leadership of the academy. Once the occupation 
began he issued a leaflet of behalf of all Prague historians denouncing the 
occupation, and he also published a personal statement against the occupation in a 
special issue of the journal Český časopis historický that fall.107 Still a member of the 
Academy, Prečan was tasked with recording and publishing an official history of the 
population’s response to the initial days of military occupation in Prague together 
with colleague Milan Otáhal. It was the results of this publication which ultimately 
led to his dismissal from the Party in 1970. What began as a small brochure swelled 
into over four hundred pages documenting acts of violence and opposition 
                                                        
106 Interview, Vílem Prečan, June 2, 2014. 
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complete with emotional eye-witness accounts and bound in a solid black cover.108 
The first recourse for his role in the “Black Book” came in September 1969 when 
his passport was revoked, his publications banned from print, and his current 
research projects canceled; he was dismissed from the Party in April 1970. 
The course of the next several years, before Prečan’s immigration to West 
Germany in 1976, illustrated how Czechs like Prečan used contacts inside and 
outside Czechoslovakia to organize international networks of activism and 
subversion against the regime, and it was these networks that the AG would tap 
into to forge meaningful and lasting contacts and partnerships to work toward 
German-Czech reconciliation during the 1970s and 1980s and especially after 
1989. Though never imprisoned before his exile, Prečan faced outstanding charges 
of sedition, and for the next six years he was continually harassed by the police in 
the form of arrests, interrogations, and his removal from various menial jobs such 
as waiting tables. During this time he prepared a number of underground texts for 
publication in exile journals on themes like the nature and substance of the purges 
as part of “Normalization” as well as a letter on the dire situation in Czechoslovak 
academia, which was presented to the International Congress of Historical Sciences 
in San Francisco in 1975.109 
108 Historický ústav (Československá akademie věd), Sedm pražských dnů, 21.–27. Srpen 1968 
(Prague: Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences, 1968). For an English translation, see: Robert Little, 
ed., The Czech Black Book (New York: Avon Books, 1969). 
109 Acta Persecutionis, 1975. 
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Being pushed from his official job as a historian into underground 
publications, Prečan had many contacts with others in the underground whom he 
would remain in cooperation with after his exile. He remained friends with his old 
colleagues Milan Otáhal and historian Karel Kaplan who were also dismissed from 
their positions. Otáhal would go on to be one in a group of writers that worked to 
confront Czechs with the immorality of the expulsion later in samizdat debates the 
decade which is the focus of the next chapter; Kaplan later immigrated to Munich 
and worked in the Collegium Carolinum, the research institute on the Bohemian 
lands whose close relationship to the AG and emphasis on promoting a 
cosmopolitan German-Czech identity and heritage in the Czech lands is the focus of 
chapter four. Prečan also developed relationships with Ludvík Vaculík, author and 
future Charter 77 spokesman and underground seminar organizer, and Jiří Pelikan, 
who would immigrate to Rome and publish the prominent émigré journal Listy and 
become a close friend of the AG and frequent participant in their conferences and 
seminars. 
Beginning in 1974, Prečan took on the role of Jan Kavan’s primary contact 
person under the pseudonym “Františka,” under which he received large shipments 
of foreign literature from Kavan and distributed them to others in the underground 
with the help of a taxi driver he met while working as a restaurant waiter. Through 
his smuggling operations Prečan began correspondence with Pavel Tigrid 
(1917−2003), whose Paris-based journal Svědectví was perhaps the most well-
known of émigré publications and one that Prečan helped disseminate inside 
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Czechoslovakia.110 Tigrid, an early émigré from 1948, was perhaps the most 
renown of all Czech figures abroad and also became a very close ally of the AG and 
frequent participant in their events. It was Tigrid who later brought the AG 
together with the new dissident-run Czechoslovak government in January 1990 and 
afforded the AG with direct influence in the Prague government which they would 
use to promote reconciliation and friendly bilateral relations.  
 It was Prečan’s letter to the 1975 International Congress of Historians 
detailing the persecution of Czech historians, which was widely reported on Radio 
Free Europe, Voice of America, and in foreign press, which caused Prečan to be 
called into a hearing at the Ministry of Interior later that year. The chairman of the 
hearing berated Prečan for two hours accusing him of subverting Czechoslovakia 
and offending Husák personally and then suggested that Precan should leave the 
country. By this point Prečan had lost hope in the Husák regime and had reoriented 
his life around cultivating and feeding an independent intellectual life in 
Czechoslovakia outside the Party’s rigid institutions. After discussing the idea of 
emigration with his wife and believing that they both would be able to leave as 
Czechoslovakian citizens, Prečan ultimately agreed, though not before creating a 
framework for future clandestine correspondence from abroad. He worked out a 
coded writing system with friends Jiřina Šiklová and Vaculík for the purposes of 
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continuing his smuggling work, and he left a trove of archival documents collected 
by Kaplan with Otáhal to send through a mutual friend in the West German 
embassy later, rather than risk it being seized by customs on departure.111 Through 
this embassy contact he was also able to secure a scholarship through the 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to help him and his wife resettle in West 
Germany. 
 From his West German exile Prečan continued his literature smuggling 
operations in and out of Czechoslovakia and slowly amassed the world’s largest 
collection of Czech samizdat from his residence at the castle of Karel 
Schwarzenberg in Scheinfeld. He built close relationships with Pelikan, Tigrid, and 
other Czech emigres and founded the Documentation Center for Independent 
Czechoslovak Literature in Scheinfeld in 1986. With the help of Šiklová, who herself 
had extensive contacts with Czech dissidents in Prague, Prečan became perhaps the 
most central figure in bringing foreign literature into the country and smuggling 
samizdat out for publication in émigré journals. His smuggling channels were 
paramount to enabling the expulsion debate to take place in émigré journals in the 
late 1970s and 1980s and allowed it to receive a much wider readership and 
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contributions of opinion from inside and outside Czechoslovakia. He also served as 
an important messenger for dissidents communicating with the outside world, 
including Havel.112 He sent and received literature and messages via Jan Kavan’s 
smuggling courier until 1981 when the van he used was searched at the border and 
hundreds of books and journals were seized along with names of recipients. After 
this, Precan used various diplomatic channels, first through the Swedish embassy 
and then through the West German embassy in Prague with the help of diplomat 
Wolfgang Scheuer.113 Precan was one of the most central figures in enabling Czech 
intellectual discourse to cross Europe’s Cold War borders and allow Czechs abroad 
to engage with Czech dissidents at home, and he became a crucial contact of the AG 
beginning in the late 1970s that allowed the AG to tap into this network and lay the 
groundwork for trust and cooperation to pursue reconciliation after 1989. 
Underground Community in the “Shadow World” 
 The early years of the 1970s saw the loose formation of an underground 
“shadow world” of intellectuals and academics.114 As this network expanded and 
increased in interconnectivity toward the end of the 1970s, it encouraged the 
formation of a shared sense of identity and purpose in the underground based in 
part in opposition to the repressive socialism around them and to the belief in the 
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necessity for independent thought. Many Czech intellectuals of the shadow world 
were transplanted into working-class jobs, one of the defining features of Czech 
intellectual life between 1968 and 1989. Whereas in the 1950s many dissident 
intellectuals often simply disappeared from daily life, either from imprisonment or 
assigned to forced labor camps, Jiří Lederer wrote of the new phenomenon in the 
1970s, “I began to encounter many friends and close acquaintances as taxi drivers, 
parking lot attendants, night watchmen in factories, window washers, salespeople 
at newsstands.”115 These new positions often held the advantage of a great deal of 
down time at work, which gave many time to undertake other intellectual pursuits. 
Kaplan, who found work in the boiler room of a Prague tire factory, recalled of this 
time, “I wrote a whole book there on Czechoslovakia from 1945 to 1948.”116 
 Future discourses of a Central European identity in which the expulsions 
played a central role, emerged from two activities that largely defined life in the 
shadow world: publishing and reading samizdat, and informal discussion meetings. 
Historians have yet to fully map the various mini-meetings and semi-official 
gatherings of the 1970s and 1980s, but many of them sprang up in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The gatherings ranged from informal encounters in cafes and 
                                                        
115 Jiří Lederer, Touhy a iluze II (Toronto: Sixty-Eight Publishers, 1988), 156. 
116 “Vzpomínám … (Rozhovor s Karlem Kaplanem),” in Gottwaldovi muži, ed. Karl Kaplan and Pavel 
Kosatik (Prague: Paseka, 2004), 322. 
 74 
 
countryside cottages to organized underground lecture and discussions series.117 
These gatherings originated among friends and former colleagues and were largely 
segregated by political leanings in the early years. But the shared common 
experience of dissidence and repression gradually brought many of these groups 
together based on their mutual identification as independent thinkers and non-
conformists and helped forge a common sense of community. As Havel recalled of 
early meetings at his cottage, “There were former communists […] who in earlier 
days had often been my opponents […] [including] Pavel Kohout, Ludvík Vaculík, 
Ivan Klíma and others […] [and] another group would come along every summer as 
well, friends from earlier times, noncommunist writers. […] .” Gradually, these 
separate groups merged and built a shared sense of purpose and existence: “These 
people all had very different pasts, but the differences of opinion that had once 
separated them had long since ceased to be important. We were all in the same boat 
and we were in agreement about general matters.”118 
 As the initially disparate groups of reform and non-communists gradually 
became more integrated, the expansion of a samizdat network enhanced their 
cohesion and helped spread ideas further by enabling informed and wider 
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communication and debate of the ideas in the various circles. The first major post-
1968 publishing house began in 1973, when Ludvík Vaculík and others established 
Edice Petlice (Padlock Editions) which published a variety of essays from 
philosophers, historians, playwrights, and novelists. Edice Petlice was soon joined 
by a number of smaller ventures, and in 1975 two larger journals were founded by 
Václav Havel and his brother, Ivan (Edice Expedice) and by Jan Vladislav, Jiří Kolář, 
and František Kautman (Edice Kvart). Early samizdat publishing was tedious work, 
and circulation was limited to small circles during most of the 1970s.119 However, 
as more Czechs like Prečan left the country over the 1970s and began to provide 
outside resources like foreign publications and paper, typewriters, copy machines 
and later, computers, samizdat circulation increased and began to reach into more 
hands and enable a wider spread of independent thought and ideas. 
 The proliferation of independent opinions in samizdat helped to create a 
stronger sense of community among those active in various groups as well as those 
who simply read samizdat. People who otherwise would not have crossed paths in 
their daily lives could now feel connected based on shared readership and 
knowledge of the current opinions and perspectives of leading Czech intellectuals. 
This helped to reach people who still maintained their official employment in the 
academies and universities like the young political scientist Rudolf Kučera (1947–). 
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Kučera was a philosophy student in Prague during the late 1960s, and although he 
was active in the student demonstrations in 1968 he was able to remain in his 
studies, graduating in 1970, and finding employment at the Czechoslovak Academy 
of Sciences in Prague. In the 1980s Kučera organized the samizdat journal Štředni 
Evropa (Central Europe), which became one of the most widely-circulated journals 
inside Czechoslovakia, and published many essays and opinions critical of the 
expulsions and promoting shared Czech heritage with Germans. AG leaders were 
encouraged by his Štředni Evropa publications, and after 1989 he became a primary 
contact and ally of the AG in hosting international conferences and gatherings 
aimed at promoting reconciliation and shared German-Czech heritage.120 
During the early seventies, however, Kučera was one of many independent 
writers still in official employment, although he harbored a growing sense of 
opposition to the Husák regime and to the strong political influence of the Soviet 
Union. As with many others during this period, he credits the 1968 invasion and the 
repressive “Normalization” period with inspiring a sense of a Central European 
identity and heritage that better represented the true Czech character than 
Communism. He regularly read publications in Prague’s growing samizdat culture 
and occasionally contributed essays to them while still in the academy until he was 
dismissed from the academy in 1977 after signing Charter 77.121 
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 For many like Kučera, the proliferation of samizdat helped grow a sense of 
community and shared purpose that facilitated the development of a stronger 
culture of dissent and activism. This sense of community, and to a certain extent 
solidarity, in the shadow world helped lay the groundwork for the growth of the 
Charter 77 movement and the expansion of underground seminar and samizdat 
activities in the late 1970s and 1980s. Living in the underground world and 
rejecting the values and narratives of Communism encouraged many to think about 
alternative conceptions of Czech identity, and these were debated in samizdat. 
In 1978 one anonymous author published an essay rebutting the entire 
Communist narrative of the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and recasting it as a 
tragic, deeply immoral mistake. This essay touched off years of debate about the 
role of Germans in Czech history and the very roots and nature of Czech national 
identity and is the focus of the next chapter. Many of the contributing authors 
promoted a cosmopolitan Czech identity and heritage that included Germans, and 
many expressed a spiritual and moral need to rewrite expulsion history to reflect 
those values and to seek rapprochement with Germans. This new way of thinking 
about the expulsion emerged within the underground and became the standard for 
the dissidents who would take over political leadership after 1989 and become 
close allies of the AG in their pursuit of reconciliation between Germans and Czechs. 
As the following section and later chapters illustrate, the AG was concurrently 
promoting its own similar version of cosmopolitan, German-Czech heritage and 
identity for the Czech lands in West Germany. It was this perspective that won them 
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the trust and support of Czech émigrés abroad and put them in a position to have a 
meaningful impact on German-Czech relations and rapprochement after 1989. 
1968 in West Germany: Political Reorientations and a “Generation Problem” 
 In West Germany AG leaders watched with dysphoria the “tragic end” of the 
liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia through the invasion of August 1968.122 
The political relaxation in Czechoslovakia in the preceding years had temporarily 
enabled much stronger and more open outreach across the border, and from 1965 
onward the AG organized small trips to Czechoslovakia with the youth branch of 
the AG, the Junge Aktion, where students also met with the Abbot-turned-
warehouseman Anastáz Opasek.123 In 1968 Prague Bishop František Tomášek sent 
a group of Czech youths to participate in the Junge Aktion’s Bundesjugendwoche in 
Wettenhausen. The AG was expecting another group of twenty young Czechs at the 
fall 1968 summit of the AG’s college youth organization (Hochschulring), and in 
1969 there were no less than five Junge Aktion trips to ČSSR and six visits of Czech 
youths to West Germany.124 These youth trips were supplemented with adult trips 
as well as personal trips by AG leaders like Franz Olbert, which helped significantly 
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increase the AG’s contacts to Czech bishops, priests, Catholic youths, and 
institutions in Czechoslovakia. By 1968 they had a list of six hundred priests in 
Czechoslovakia to support with shipments of religious literature and noted that 
members of the Junge Aktion had more personal contacts they made during their 
trip the previous year. They also formed partnerships with journalists and began 
building cooperation for a partnership to maintain German graves in 
Czechoslovakia.125 
 Already by this point the AG’s reputation as conciliatory and friendly toward 
Czechs helped enable and expand these contacts. In discussions for one planned 
cooperation effort to maintain graves of Germans in and around Prague, the AG’s 
Czech contacts insisted that, “only representatives from the AG and Seliger 
Gemeinde126 would be considered as partners in dialogue,” and raised specific 
objections to any involvement of representatives from the SL.127 The distinction 
that Czechs who knew AG representatives made between the AG and the SL 
afforded the AG with an ability to make partnerships and gain the trust of Czechs 
that would serve them well over the coming decades and especially after 1989. 
                                                        
125 Niederschrift, Vorstandssitzung der AG, July 30, 1968, AG 107 
126 The Seliger Gemeinde is a Sudeten German organization of Social Democrats that engaged in 
many cultural outreach programs similar to the AG and with whom the AG frequently cooperated. 
As evidence by this quote, they had a reputation as being friendly and open to Czechs and Slovaks 
and were not typically associated with revanchist politics. 
127 Niederschrift, Vorstandssitzung der AG, July 30, 1968, AG 107. The plan was to create a youth 
work exchange and send young AG and Junge Aktion members to Czechoslovakia and renovate 
cemetaries together, but these plans were halted by the Warsaw Pact invasion and the subsequent 
tightening of visas. 
 80 
 
These plans, as well as future exchanges across the border, came to a halt in 1970 
as the Husák regime ceased allowing visas for such trips. 
 Aside from the travel restrictions that complicated their activities in 
Czechoslovakia after 1970, the immediate years after 1968 presented two 
additional problems for the future program of the AG. The first was declining 
membership in the AG and the overall aging of its members. “We are getting old,” 
was the frank observation of one leader.128 The head of the AG at the time was 
original founder Hans Schütz (1901−1982), and most of the managerial board was 
also of that same generation and over sixty-five. AG leaders were concerned by 
recent declines in memberships so much that they discussed waiving the 
accumulating sums of unpaid dues for members in the hopes that they could 
maintain strong numbers.129 Looking ahead, the AG sought to strengthen their 
recruitment of younger member and bring more members of its youth branch, the 
Junge Aktion, into the main organization of the AG. 
The Junge Aktion made clear that it would be difficult to integrate the 
younger generation into the “leadership generation of 65 year-olds” because the 
culture and interest gap was so vast, and there were too few members of the 
“middle generation” in leadership positions at the AG to which the youth could 
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better relate.130 This was a problem AG leaders were aware of, and they began 
encouraging “middle generation” members—those in their 30s–50s who were alive 
but young at the time of the expulsion—to take on more leadership positions.131 
The changing of the old guard took place in 1970, as Schütz declined to run as 
chairman and the board unanimously voted in fifty-one year-old Josef Stingl 
(1919−2004) as the new leader of the AG. Franz Olbert (1935–), thirty-five at the 
time and the director of the Junge Aktion, became the head of the AG’s Sozialwerk 
office that oversaw outreach efforts to Czechs on both sides of the border, and 
other AG leadership positions saw a similar transfer of authority to the middle 
generation.132 This transition was crucial to integrating younger members into the 
AG and securing its existence for the future, and it also began a steady process of 
the AG coming into its own as an institution aimed at reconciliation and becoming 
more willing to publically disagree with the SL, when the latter levied political 
demands the AG felt were harmful toward its own goals of rapprochement with 
Czechs. 
As AG leaders sought to increase the participation of the youth in the late 
1960s they ran into another problem, namely that much of the youth was turned off 
by the idea of being labelled as “expellees” and being associated with the expellee 
politics and forms of remembrance of their parents’ generation. In analyzing his 
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concept of the “Heimat of memory” comprised of idealized childhood experiences 
in the homeland that dominated the witness generation’s forms of remembrance in 
the 1950s and 1960s, Andrew Demshuk noted that the youth born after the 
expulsion felt little identification to the patterns of Heimat remembrance of their 
parents.133 Junge Aktion members expressed similar discontent with the forms of 
identification and remembrance the older generation of the AG promoted, and they 
began to openly reject their emphasis on remembering Heimat and clinging to an 
expellee identity and even asked the AG leadership to not refer to Junge Aktion 
members as “expellee youth” (Vertriebenenjugend).134 If the wanted to integrate the 
Junge Aktion into the AG, older AG leaders would have to find another motivation to 
replace the Heimat remembrance and Sudeten German identity discourses of the 
previous two decades. 
The Ackermann Gemeinde and Junge Aktion Navigate West Germany’s 
“Mastering of the Past” 
There was an immediate social impetus for the youth to shy away from and 
even reject association as expellee children. This generation came of age during an 
era of West German critical self-reflection on the roots and origins of the 
Third Reich and how West Germans chose to remember their victimhood in WWII 
and forget German perpetrators. Historians in the 1950s and 1960s were at the 
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forefront of this reappraisal of the past in defining a German Sonderweg (particular 
path) that led from an authoritarian German empire to authoritarian National 
Socialism. From this perspective, National Socialism was not a catastrophe that 
befell the German people, but rather a system deeply rooted in German society that 
enabled and encouraged the authoritarianism of the Nazi regime.135 The path to 
catharsis in the new 1960s focus on German guilt necessitated confronting 
Germans as perpetrators and abandoning the previous post-WWII trend of viewing 
Germans as a nation of victims, and a postwar generation of radical students joined 
these historians in insisting that Germans must focus on the victims of Germans, 
not on what Germans had suffered at the end of “Hitler’s war.”136 
 German expellees held a central place in the established narratives of 
German WWII victimhood, and expellees and their plight served as strong political 
imagery in the Cold War politics and anti-Soviet/communist rhetoric of the 
1950s.137 Public opinion and politics in West Germany witnessed a shift to the 
political left in the 1960s that discouraged selective remembrance of German 
victimhood and hostile policies toward the East and helped sweep into power the 
first post-war Social Democrat government in Bonn under Willy Brandt in 1969, 
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who pursued policies of détente and openness (Ostpolitik) toward Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. 
Expellee youths were influenced by this shift and many hesitated to claim an 
identity as expellees, whose political organizations were publically opposing 
Ostpolitik. Junge Aktion members wished to be part of the new currents promoting 
Europeanism and friendly relations, and indeed many of their activities had already 
moved in this direction. While earlier Junge Aktion activities in the 1950s 
concentrated on preserving the heritage and identity of their parents, the cross-
border exchanges enabled by a relaxing of visa restrictions by the slowly reforming 
Czechoslovak regime in the mid-1960s paralleled this transformative process in 
their aims and goals. The Junge Aktion’s emphasis on looking outward and building 
bridges with Czechs was already evident in their greeting words to a Czech youth 
delegation visiting for the Junge Aktion’s 1964 national gathering in Waldsassen: 
“As youths whose parents and ancestors built a common homeland together with 
your ancestors over centuries we see our particular task for today and the future to 
build a new community with the German people and the Slavic people.”138 Junge 
Aktion members went through a coming-of-age process of sorts and sought to 
recast themselves as a youth organization promoting peace and multiculturalism, 
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and they encouraged their members to take Czech language courses to help bridge 
the cultural and lingual divide.139 
Many of them wanted to integrate more with the AG, but they held 
reservations about being labeled “Sudeten Germans” and suffering the negative 
associations that came with it.140 Junge Aktion leadership discussed the growing 
negative opinion toward the SL and the AG in the broader public and noted that 
within the Junge Aktion there were even suspicions of nationalist revanchism 
against the AG leadership.141 Olbert, then the director of the Junge Aktion, discussed 
their concerns with the AG board and they decided that the best course would be 
the creation of an entirely new mission statement to replace the original 1948 
statement and clarify the AG’s institutional aims. This was a move to redefine the 
AG for the next generation in the new era of changing political and social 
landscapes, and it was formulated in direct cooperation and dialogue with the 
Junge Aktion.142 
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In discussions with the AG the Junge Aktion expressed a wholesale rejection 
of the labels and phrases of Sudeten German identity of the older generation. The 
Junge Aktion leadership agreed that they had no identification with the older 
generation’s concerns of maintaining the “heritage of the homeland” (Heimaterbe), 
and efforts to promote this came across to the youth as “homeland jingoism” 
(Heimattümelei) and “clubbiness” (Vereinsmeierei), which they resoundingly 
rejected.143 The youth was “allergic” to phrases like “our homeland” and wanted to 
see the AG recast itself and its rhetoric in a tone more inclusive to Czechs and 
showed a desire for peaceful cohabitation and friendliness. 
The SL was the most prominent symbol of promoting Heimat and (in the 
Junge Aktion’s eyes) outdated visions of Sudeten Germans as a separate ethnic 
entity from Czechs, and Junge Aktion members were blunt in their rejection of 
being associated in any way with them, saying “collaboration with the SL stands in 
the way of cooperation with the Czech people.”144 Junge Aktion representatives 
who participated in the earlier cross-border exchanges cited firsthand 
conversations with Czechs as evidence of the roundly negative view of the SL and 
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argued that even Junge Aktion cooperation with other Germans in the German 
Catholic Youth League (Bund der deutschen katholischen Jugend) was often 
complicated because many outsiders associated the Junge Aktion with the SL. They 
asked the AG leadership to become more vocal in articulating their differences with 
the SL, but this was something the older leadership of the AG was hesitant to do.145  
The AG leadership argued that the AG should avoid isolation from the SL “at 
any price” in order to be able to continue to influence the SL’s program and 
statements, and they stressed that Junge Aktion members could become more 
active in the SL and in political parties to further influence the SL in the future. 
Junge Aktion members need not “identify with the SL on every detail,” but AG 
leaders insisted that one could not simply “abandon” a “natural entity” like an 
ethnic group (Volksgruppe).146 This was in 1969 and the middle generation of AG 
leaders like Olbert and Stingl would not assume leadership responsibility from the 
older, original founding AG members until the following year. Once they did, 
however, the AG showed more willingness for public confrontation with the SL 
during the following decade when they felt the SL was hampering the AG’s outreach 
efforts. 
 AG leaders nevertheless integrated the concerns of the Junge Aktion on the 
AG’s future outlook and activities in the new mission statement. In internal 
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discussions of the AG board on formulating the statement, the organizing 
committee stated it should “contain a clear statement of the self-image of the AG 
[…] for the future, above all with regard to the younger generation that will soon 
have to take over the managerial functions in the AG.”147 Furthermore, the subtext 
of specific aims must be “clear and unambiguous about the goals and tasks of the 
AG,” and here, “(out of psychological concerns!) strictly positive formulations 
should be used.” 
The new mission statement, which the AG and Junge Aktion ratified 
unanimously and with acclaim later in 1970, was strongly influenced by these 
concerns and desires of the younger generation.148 The AG’s stated aim in its 
preamble was to reaffirm its principles to guide the younger generation as they 
took over the leadership and tasks of the AG, and the nine principles they encoded 
in their mission were a Christian foundation, personal social engagement, a 
promotion of the cultural and historical values and heritage “of the Bohemian 
lands,” reconciliation with the east, European peace, European integration, self-
determination for all peoples, material help for those in need and for the 
persecuted Catholic church, and solidarity with all young emerging democratic 
states around the world.149 
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Notably, the new mission statement was almost entirely devoid of 
references to “Sudeten Germans” or the “homeland”—two major points that Junge 
Aktion members objected to in their self-portrayals. Whereas the AG’s original 
mission statement from 1948 mentioned “homeland” fourteen times and 
“expellees” or “Sudeten Germans” thirteen times, the 1970 statement spoke of 
“Sudeten German” and “expellees” only once each, and it did so only in describing 
the past work of the AG in helping “Sudeten Germans” and “expellees” integrate 
into German society in the immediate postwar years.150 Instead, the new statement 
described the AG as “a group of German Catholics who see their heritage from 
Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia as an historical obligation to work for the Church, 
state, and society.”151 This symbolic but important change in terminology marked a 
turning point for the AG toward emphasizing shared heritage with Czechs over a 
separate Sudeten German identity and a stronger emphasis on inclusive rhetoric of 
a multiethnic Central Europe. This was the course the new “middle generation” 
leaders of the AG took in the 1970s and 1980s as they built more bridges and 
contacts with Czechs at home and émigrés abroad and brought younger 
participants into the AG, and it is one that we shall see in chapter four led to conflict 
and disagreement with the SL over how to write and portray Sudeten German 
identity and heritage. 
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The 1970s and a Growing Rift between the Ackermann Gemeinde and the 
Sudeten German Homeland Association 
 It was not just the younger generation that had concerns about the SL. AG 
leaders were also worried about the SL’s demands for restitution and their political 
opposition to Ostpolitik were creating a bad public image of expellees whose 
repercussions would harm the work of the AG and Junge Aktion. The AG was also 
concerned that the SL’s influence was growing within the Sudeten German Council 
(Sudetendeutscher Rat, hereafter, Council)—an institution comprised of 
representatives of the various Sudeten German organizations whose primary goal 
is to formulate a shared platform among Sudeten Germans and lobby political 
representatives at the state and federal level. Whereas the older AG leaders 
cautioned against a public rift with the SL in 1969, the new managerial board 
promptly rethought this hesitation when faced with the SL’s growing dominance in 
the Council. 
Appointments to the Council were made by the political parties, and before 
the 1969 Bundestag vote, AG leaders discussed ways they could try to get people on 
the board they approved of.152 They were not pleased with the outcome, which saw 
the speaker of the SL, Walter Becher (1912-2005), voted chairman of the Council. 
After the first new meeting of the Council in 1970 AG leader Adolf Kunzmann 
(1920–1976) wrote to fellow AG board member Richard Hackenberg (1909–1995) 
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that “the meeting at the Sudeten German Council was catastrophic. I have as many 
regrets about going there as I have hairs on my head. Dr. Becher made a very bad 
impression and everything else was unpleasant except for Hanz Schütz’s 
presentation, which was excellent. […] It would be good for Sudeten Germans in 
general to have such formulations [Schütz’s presentation] become their face. It will 
probably disappear again into the drawer, and we lose much on our image.”153 
 Other AG leaders also shared these negative feelings toward Becher leading 
the Council. In a meeting later that summer AG leaders discussed the topic of 
Becher serving as the chairman of the SL and Council congruently, and “the board 
members joined in largely with the opinion of the chairman [Stingl] who expressed 
that this solution is not considered ideal and a change will be sought.”154 AG leaders 
raised objections in the Council that Becher’s dual leadership of both institutions 
brought the legitimacy of the Council as a separate entity into question, but this 
failed to effect any change and Becher maintained his leadership role in both 
institutions.155 
 The relationship between leaders of the AG and the SL became more pointed 
and public following the results of the vote for the SL’s board of directors at their 
6th National Assembly in January–February of 1976. Since the SL was the primary 
political organ of Sudeten Germans that claimed authority to speak for the entire 
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group, the AG had a vested interest in having their opinions represented. An 
internal memo on the national assembly by the AG’s Richard Hackenberg revealed 
AG concerns that the nationalist Sudeten German organization Witikobund, which 
the AG held in little regard and saw as counterproductive to their goals of 
reconciliation and understanding, had strongly influenced the results of the 
election.156 In December 1975 before the election, representatives of the AG and 
Seliger Gemeinde attempted to arrange a meeting with Witikobund leader Heinz 
Lange to discuss their concerns about rumors that suggested the Witikobund was 
lobbying to stack vote results heavily in their favor, which would effectively 
eliminate “the share of responsibility of the other two communities” 
(Gesinnungsgemeinschaften, in this case referring to the AG and the Seliger 
Gemeinde).157 However, despite repeated invitations to Lange to attend a scheduled 
meeting with the AG and Seliger Gemeinde he was a no-show, and the AG and the 
Seliger Gemeinde met alone and discussed their mutual concerns over the coming 
vote.158 
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At this same time the AG was also attempting to curb SL influence in another 
institution, the Sudeten German Foundation (Sudetendeutsche Stiftung). The 
Sudeten German Foundation was founded in 1970 by Bavarian Minister-President 
Alfons Goppel to fund Sudeten German events and projects. Stingl met with Goppel 
in January 1976 just before the SL’s national assembly to lobby for Goppel to 
appoint an AG member to the Foundation’s board instead of solely SL 
representatives.159 Becher learned about the meeting and took it as a direct attack 
on the leadership of the SL, writing to Stingl, “It will be difficult to heal the rifts this 
has opened. Do you really think that you thereby win young, capable people [...] 
more focused on performance than on plotting when you go about this in all public 
view as you did? […] ”160 He accused Stingl of weakening the political weight of the 
SL, and that as its speaker Becher was not allowed to endorse a path that would 
lead to the relativizing and exclusion of the SL in state or federal politics. By the 
spring of 1976 the new middle generation leaders of the AG had thus moved to a 
more combative stance toward the SL that its older leaders were hesitant to do a 
half-decade prior. 
 The results of the votes at the SL’s national assembly in spring 1976 went 
strongly in the Witikobund’s favor. Its members gained 18 positions total, including 
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president of the national assembly (beating out the AG’s Hackenberg by 56 votes to 
his 12), first vice president, both representative of the speaker positions, and 
additional members of the national board (Bundesvorstand).161 In his report to the 
AG board Hackenberg did not overtly accuse the SL of conspiring with the Wikitko 
Bund, but he did assert that “the occupation of each position [by Witikonen] was 
preplanned and agreed upon in every detail.”162 AG chairman Stingl voiced 
concerns of the Witikobund’s overrepresentation in the SL publicly at an open 
ceremony for Hans Schütz’s seventy-fifth birthday a month later and also in a letter 
directly to Becher in which he wrote that “a majority has damaged the principle of 
plurality.”163 Becher served as the chairman of the Witikobund from 1956–1958 
and remained an active member up to this point, and he seemed perfectly content 
with the Witikobund’s increased representation in the SL. Becher refuted Stingl’s 
assertions in a five-page letter in which he argued “if there is a predominant 
number of Witikonen, it is obviously because they worked more actively in the 
areas which send the electoral delegates.” He further attributed the large number of 
Witikobund members to a generational problem and the necessity to fill leadership 
positions as many older members retired, and he claimed that Heinz Lange of the 
Witikobund had simply found a solution within the ranks of his institution. 
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The SL and the AG both faced a generational crisis during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, but both responded in different ways. The AG sought to win over a 
youth more interested in outreach with Czechs than in holding on to national-
ethnic conceptions of a Sudeten German heritage. The SL under Becher, by contrast, 
moved closer to the nationalistic Witikobund and opened up much of its leadership 
to their members. This process paralleled another rift between the AG and SL over 
how to portray Sudeten German identity, with the SL emphasizing a closed 
nationalist conception and the AG promoting a multicultural identity that included 
Germans and Czechs into a single heritage and culture of the Bohemian lands. This 
identity debate will be discussed in more detail in chapter four, but before we can 
understand the AG’s emphasis on inclusion and multiculturalism we first must look 
at the ways in which the AG built and expanded their network of cooperation with 
the wave of Czechs who immigrated from Czechoslovakia to West Germany and 
Western Europe in the years after 1968. 
Opus Bonum and Ackermann Gemeinde-Czech Cooperation 
 By the time Anastáz Opasek resettled in West Germany at the Braunau in 
Rohr Abbey in 1969 he had decided to devote his life to more than simple prayer 
and to become active in helping those who had suffered under the Communists as 
he had. Recalling the segregation and ultimate expulsion of his fellow German 
priests from the Břevnov Monastery, Opasek also desired to work toward mending 
the rift between Germans and Czechs caused by nationalisms of the 1930s and 
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1940s. He began attending the AG’s organizational meetings as early as October 
1969 and served as a consultant on how to best help Catholic diocese and clergy in 
ČSSR, and he soon began planning for the creation of a Czech émigré organization 
based on their model.164 His friend, future AG associate and Radio Free Europe 
employee, Richard Belcredi recalled of Opasek’s mindset at the time: 
 
In 1969 he was with me during the visit of a friend from Moravia who spent 
several years in a Communist prison. Suddenly, [Opasek] began to talk of a 
pledge to his former cellmates from Břevnov. I admit I was very curious—I 
knew his life story well […] I expected that he would begin recounting the 
tragic fate of him and his brothers. Nothing like that. Opasek excited me, and 
for the first time I was influenced by his vitality. He immediately began 
talking of the need to do something for the Czech émigré community, for 
people in Czechoslovakia, and for our common future. He was the one who 
caused me to re-engage in exile.165 
 
This prison pledge of activism in exile also involved Vladmír Neuwirth, an 
active figure in the Czech émigré community in West Germany who served time 
with Opasek prior to relocating to Germany. Neuwirth was imprisoned in 1961 for 
his role in a grassroots religious organization he founded along with six others in 
1947 during his theology studies at the university in Olomouc. The organization 
called itself Společenství (The Community) and aimed to promote secular Christian 
spiritual and cultural life. After February 1948 their activities continued secretly, by 
which time Společenství had grown to include over one hundred members. It was 
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during this grassroots Catholic movement in Olomouc that Neuwirth met Josef 
Zvěřina, who would later become Opus Bonum’s primary contact in Czechoslovakia 
through which it assisted underground priests and clergy in the 1970s and 
1980s.166 Through Opus Bonum’s cooperation with the AG, Zvěřina also became a 
central contact for the AG’s clergy assistance, and he later served as a crucial 
partner for AG-Czech outreach and reconciliation efforts after 1989. 
Neuwirth was released from prison during the thaw in April 1968 and 
immigrated to West Germany that summer, where he reunited with Opasek. 
Together they began planning an initiative similar to Společenství and the AG that 
resulted in the founding of Opus Bonum in March 1972. Although Opus Bonum was 
conceived by Czechs and was often referred to and treated as a Czech Catholic 
organization, its membership and activities were aimed at educating and 
integrating all people who traced their heritage to the Czechoslovak lands, with a 
special emphasis on laymen. Nowhere in its charter was “Czech” mentioned 
explicitly, and instead it declared itself to be “an organization for the preservation 
and fostering of the native cultural heritage from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and 
Slovakia as well as youth support and education for fulfilling charitable duties.”167 
In this way, from its conception, Opus Bonum served as a perfect sister 
                                                        
166 Vojtěch Novotný, Odvaha být církví: Josef Zvěřina v letech 1913–1967 (Prague: Karolinum Pres, 
2014), 164–166. 
167 Satzung des Opus Bonum, AG 1441. 
 98 
 
organization to the AG in promoting shared German-Czech heritage in the Czech 
lands. 
Opus Bonum’s second goal of involving the youth echoed AG concerns about 
increasing activism in the younger generation, and indeed, AG leaders and the 
future leaders of Opus Bonum were already discussing desires to integrate the 
youth activities of both organizations the year before Opus Bonum was formally 
founded.168 In their 1974 annual report, Opus Bonum leaders wrote that one of 
their primary objectives was to “offer trust” and inform about Christian culture and 
religious thought for a Czech youth that “was raised atheistically and 
materialistically for twenty years” and were either “deprived of Christianly and 
other free ideals” or were taught them as reactionary remnants of a disqualified 
capitalism.169 Beginning in the year of its founding, Opus Bonum held annual youth 
meetings over Pentecost weekend to promote awareness of Czech and Slovak 
history and culture with an emphasis on German-Czech relations and a 
“consciousness of belonging to Europe.”170 
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From its founding Opus Bonum organizers worked closely with AG leaders 
in securing the viability of the institution and offering their separate national 
perspectives as guest speakers and national representatives at each other’s 
summits and events.171 However, Opus Bonum ran into initial opposition from 
Czech Catholic émigrés already working in religious institutions in West Germany 
and Rome, particularly the Czech Catholic Mission in West Germany (Česká misie). 
Some of the opposition can be attributed to the Czech Mission attempting to claim 
its authority as the established provider of pastoral care for Czechs in West 
Germany. Czech Mission leaders expressed displeasure that they were not notified 
in advance of Opus Bonum’s founding, nor were they consulted as Opus Bonum 
sought funding from the German Bishop's Conference and other Catholic 
organizations in West Germany.172 Czech Mission leader Karel Fořt wrote to Opasek 
saying that while he supported Opus Bonum’s funding request, he was not entirely 
pleased with “the manner of its portrayal and justification,” and he cautioned 
Opasek to refer to Opus Bonum by its name only and not refer to “Czech Catholic 
                                                        
171 Protokoll der Vorbesprechung über das deutsch-tschechische Gespräch im Rahmen des II. 
Kulturkongresses der AG, November 1, 1971, AG 1441; Selbständige Veranstaltungen des Opus 
Bonums, AG 1441. 
172 Letter, Adolf Kunzmann to Alexander Heidler, October 4, 1972, AG 1441; Letter Karl Woertner to 
Richard Hackenberg, September 25, 1973, AG 1249. Czech Mission leaders Karel Fořt and Alexander 
Heidler led the criticism of Opus Bonum. Fořt and Heidler were the two original founders of the 
Czech Mission and remained at its helm in the early 1970s. For more on their biographies and the 
founding of the Czech Mission in West Germany, see the homepage of the Czech Mission in Germany: 
http://www.misie-nemecko.com/ (accessed September 9, 2016). 
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pastoral care, which are not identical to each other.”173 In the same letter Fořt 
assumed that Opus Bonum would subordinate its activities under the Czech 
Mission’s umbrella and that Fořt would take over correspondence with other 
Catholic institutions on Opus Bonum’s behalf.174 
Some of the opposition in the Czech Mission stemmed from a perceived 
slighting of their work with Opus Bonum’s assumption that a new organization was 
required to perform pastoral care for Czechs in West Germany, something the 
Czech Mission already did. Opasek and AG leaders had to them explain that Opus 
Bonum’s aim was to reach out to recent émigrés who had grown up under 
Communism, many of whom were not Catholic and otherwise would not encounter 
any of the existing services of the Czech Mission.175 It was this group that was the 
most politically active and where the AG would benefit the most from in terms of 
establishing contacts and cooperations with prominent Czech émigrés, who in-turn 
had contacts with dissidents at home.  
These initial disagreements with the Czech Mission about the focus and 
institutional independence of Opus Bonum required the negotiation of a formal 
                                                        
173 Fořt wrote: “Nächstes mal ist es notwendig, zwischen dem Verein ‘Opus Bonum’ und der 
tschechischen katholischen Seelsorge, die nicht miteinander identisch sind, zu unterscheiden.” 
Letter Karel Fořt to Anastas Opasek, September 2, 1972, AG 1441. 
174 Fořt wrote, “In order for us to have a clear basis for further negotiations with church officials I 
would appreciate if you would briefly send me your plans and wishes concerning your participation 
in Czech pastoral care,” referring to Opasek working within the auspices of the Czech Mission; Letter 
Karel Fořt to Anastas Opasek, September 2, 1972, AG 1441. 
175 Letter, Adolf Kunzmann to Alexander Heidler, October 4, 1972, AG 1441; Protokoll, 
Mitgliederversammlung des OB, 17.2.1973, AG 1441. 
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covenant of sorts, establishing recognition and mutual expectations. In this 
agreement the Czech Mission recognized the need for Opus Bonum to work within 
cultural and social-religious areas, and they agreed to endorse Opus Bonum’s 
requests for financial support from church offices if they were given representation 
within Opus Bonum. They also agreed that Opus Bonum would become the cultural 
component of the Czech Mission, and they pledged to work together to fund and 
organize annual academic and student events.176 
 Despite this working agreement between the two institutions, tension 
persisted concerning Opus Bonum’s closeness to the AG that showed nationalist 
tendencies of mistrust of Sudeten Germans even in Czech Catholic circles. The 
international Czech Missions were coordinated from Rome, which was also the site 
of the publication of its international journal, Vinculum. That journal, edited by 
Jaroslav Skarvada, introduced Opus Bunum to the wider community of 
international Czech missions with an unceremonious 1973 article that instantly 
criticized Opus Bonum for being created “without any prior agreement or notice of 
our priests” and for supposedly refusing official membership to representatives of 
the West German Czech Mission.177 Furthermore, the article objected that the 
director of the AG was the one who had informed Pope Paul VI about Opus Bonum’s 
                                                        
176 Abkommen zwischen Abt. A. Opasek und den tschechischen Seelsorgen, October 20, 1972, AG 
1249. 
177 “A ještě Něměcko: Opus Bonum,” Vinculum XVIII 3 (Summer 1973): 5, 
http://www.scriptum.cz/vinculum/vinculum_1973_03.pdf (accessed February 24, 2015). 
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founding, saying “On what grounds—perhaps the Ackermann Gemeinde considers 
[Opus Bonum] its offshoot?” 
This was Opus Bonum’s public introduction to Czech pastorals outside West 
Germany and even many within, and it cast a suspicious and mistrusting light on 
the infant organization. AG leaders refuted Skarvada’s suspicions and the negative 
portrayal of Opus Bonum and argued to Skarvada that Czech contacts with Sudeten 
Germans should be welcomed in the spirit of Christianity unity and to the overall 
benefit of German-Czech relations.178 Skarvada responded that he wished for all 
Czech Catholics living abroad to have a single pastoral community and stated that 
Opus Bonum “was founded outside of this community and exists in a certain 
tension to this community.”179 At the same time characterizations of Opus Bonum 
as traitors and collaborators for working with the AG were circulating in pamphlets 
within circles of the Czech Mission in West Germany, with one even taking making a 
religious association by characterizing Opasek as Judas, and Hackenberg appealed 
to Skarvada’s religious sensibilities to take leadership in refuting any such 
characterization.180 
                                                        
178 Letter, Karl Reiss to Skarvada, August 24, 1973, AG 1441; Letter, Richard Hackenberg to 
Skarvada, September 9, 1973, AG 1441; Letter, Richard Hackenberg to Jaroslav Skarvada, September 
25, 1973, AG 1441. 
179 Letter, Richard Hackenberg to Jaroslav Skarvada, September 25, 1973, AG 1441. 
180 Letter, Richard Hackenberg to Herbert Leuniger, May 18, 1973, AG 1441; Letter, Richard 
Hackenberg to Jaroslav Skarvada, September 25, 1973, AG 1441. 
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Tension between some within the Czech Mission and Opasek persisted 
through much of the 1970s even as the two organizations cooperated in other 
ventures, with one Mission representative on Opus Bonum’s leadership board even 
leading a failed campaign to push Opasek to resign.181 Throughout these early years 
of rocky relations with the Czech Mission the relationship between Opasek and AG 
directors remained strong. AG directors were active from the beginning in tapping 
their established contacts for financial resources to raise funds for Opus Bonum’s 
organization and activities182, and they hosted cultural and academic events with 
Opus Bonum and also helped organize Opus Bonum partnerships with other 
                                                        
181 The Czech Mission representative at the forefront of this criticism was Karl Wortner, who 
protested that Opasek did not allow enough discussion and accommodation from other board 
members about the direction of Opus Bonum. AG leaders suspected he was acting on behalf of other 
Czech Missions and they came out in support of Opasek when Wortner called for Opasek to step 
down. For AG suspicions about Wortner as a proxy for higher-ranking Czech Mission officials 
working against Opasek, see: Letter, Walter Klötzl to Richard Hackenberg, September 28, 1973, AG 
1441; Letter, Richard Hackenberg to Herbert Leuniger, May 18, 1973, AG 1441; Letter, Richard 
Hackenberg to Josef Stingl, September 1, 1975, AG 1441. On tensions relating to Wortner in the 
board, see: Protokoll, Mitgliederversammlung Opus Bonum, February 17, 1973, AG 1441; Letter, 
Anastaz Opasek to Richard Hackenberg, October 23, 1973, AG1441; Anastas Opasek, 
Gedächtnisprotokoll über Gespräch mit Karel Wortner, October 16, 1973, AG 144; Anastas Opasek, 
Gedächtnisprotokoll über Gespräch mit Karel Fort, October 23, 1973, AG 1441. On Karl Wortner’s 
call for Opasek to resign and the ensuing support of Opasek by AG leaders, see: Karl Wortner, 
Offener Brief, undated from 1976, AG 1249; Letter, Richard Belcredi to Richard Hackenberg, October 
1, 1976, AG 1249; Letter, Walter Klötzl to Josef Stingl, October 28, 1976, AG 144; Letter, Richard 
Belcredi to Richard Hackenberg, November 25, 1976, AG 1249; Letter, Richard Hackenberg to 
Richard Belcredi, November 29, 1976, AG 1249. 
182 AG fundraising on behalf of Opus Bonum helped increase opus Bonum’s budget from twelve and 
ten thousand DM in 1972 and 1973 respectively to over one hundred nine thousand by 1975; 
Protokoll, Mitgliederversammlung Opus Bonum, February 17, 1973, AG 1441; Protokoll, Sitzung des 
Komitees Opus Bonum, March 5, 1976, AG 1249. This increase in funding was still not enough to 
cover Opus Bonum’s ambitious cultural program, in 1975 they had to cancel planned orders of 
printers and books as well as publications they wanted to finance in 1975; Protokoll, Sitzung des 
Komitees Opus Bonum, June 27, 1975, AG 1249. 
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institutions the AG worked with.183 This initial series of educational events 
prompted Opus Bonum leaders to establish a library of important works on 
religion, history, and culture in the Bohemian, Moravian, and Slovak lands, which 
they opened in cooperation with the AG. 
As the decade progressed, Opus Bonum’s events shifted toward focusing on 
political issues and began attracting more prominent figures from around Europe. 
While the events of 1972–1974 centered around topics such as “A Thousand Years 
of the Prague Bishopric,” “The Self-Image of the Czech Nation,” and “Marriage and 
Family,” the meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 
Helsinki in 1975 ushered in a shift in Opus Bonum programs toward contemporary 
politics and the state of Czechoslovakian society.184 Opus Bonum’s annual 
“Academic Week” event organizing held in the September following the Helsinki 
meeting held the theme “A United Europe: An Appeal to Hope” and featured 
                                                        
183 Among these events included annual “Academic Week” gatherings featuring presentations and 
discussions on various aspects of religion life, culture and history in the Czech lands; Letter, 
Allgemeine Begründung zum Antrag des “Opus Bonum e.v. ” für das Rechnungsjahr 1974 an das 
Sekretariat der Deutschen Bishofskonferenz, AG 1441. For an overview of these events from 
1974−1979, see: Veranstaltungen des Opus Bonum in der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Vereinen, 
AG 1441. 
184 Sebständige Veranstaltungen des Opus Bonum 1972–1979, AG 1441. 
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prominent German and Czech academics and intellectuals who spoke on topics 
relating to Czechs and Slovaks in Central Europe and European integration.185 
In January 1977 the Charter 77 petition against human rights violations in 
Czechoslovakia was published and appeared the following day in major western 
newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde, The Times, and The 
New York Times. At first glance the brief document seemed relatively innocuous and 
not unlike other manifestos and declarations that came before it. It appealed to the 
two United Nations covenants on human rights and their reiteration at Helsinki in 
1975 and pointed out the ways in which the Czechoslovak regime was violating 
these rights. However, the savage attacks against it launched in official 
Czechoslovak state media and the repressive measures taken against its supporters 
helped transform Charter 77 from a simple government petition with 
240 signatories into what was declared a dangerous act of counter-revolution and 
treason, thus publicizing it at home and abroad in a way that its initial signatories 
could not have imagined.186 
                                                        
185 Program der Akademischen Woche, September 1–7, 1975, AG 1441. Other Opus Bonum events 
with political themes included a 1976 lecture on European integration by the President of the 
Paneuropean Union, Otto Von Hapsburg, and they also held an international conference together 
with the CSU’s Hans-Seidel Foundation on “The Tasks of the Christian Socialist Movement in Europe 
and the Status of Intellectuals from the Eastern Bloc”; Selbständige Veranstaltungen des Opus 
Bonum 1972–1979, AG 1441; Veranstaltungen des Opus Bonum in der Zusammenarbeit mit 
anderen Vereinen 1974–1976, AG 1441. 
186 Skilling, Charter 77, 4. 
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Opasek penned the official Opus Bonum opinion on Charter 77 in 
February 1977 in which he declared Opus Bonum’s support and solidarity, calling it 
“the biggest event in Czechoslovakia since the self-immolation of student Jan 
Palach.”187 In response to the Charter, Opus Bonum shifted much of its organization 
efforts to discussing and debating Charter 77 and its origins and impacts on life, 
society and the future of Czechoslovakia. In 1977 Opus Bonum dedicated its annual 
Pentecost youth conference, academic week, and other guest lecture events to the 
topic of Charter 77, and these events drew larger crowds and more prominent 
Czech émigrés from in and around West Germany like Karl Schwarzenberg, whose 
budding relationship at the time with Vílem Prečan would result in Prečan’s 
Documentation Center for Independent Czech and Slovak Literature later housed at 
the Schwarzenberg castle in Scheinfeld, West Germany.188  
In 1978 Opus Bonum decided to add another annual event to its program: a 
yearly academic symposium aiming specifically to bring together the fragmented 
Czech and Slovak émigré community in common discussion of current 
Czechoslovak issues. The symposiums were held at the AG’s Pfarrer-Hacker-House 
event hall in Franconia-Fichtelgebirge, and over the next decade they brought 
together representatives from all political and social arenas of the Czech and Slovak 
                                                        
187 Opus Bonum, Erklärung der Gemeinschaft Opus Bonum zur Charta 77, Februarz 1977, AG 1441. 
Jan Palach was the infamous student who set himself ablaze in front of the National Museum in 
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188 Selbständige Veranstaltungen des Opus Bonum 1972–1979, AG 1441; Veranstaltungen des Opus 
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émigré community, from Catholics to atheists, conservatives to Social Democrats, 
and from those in exile since 1948 to the new wave of reform communist émigrés 
after 1968. The first meeting took place from February 23rd to 26th and brought 
figures of the Czech émigré community like Zdeněk Mlynář, Pavel Tigrid, Karel 
Kaplan, Karel Schwarzenberg, Vílem Prečan, and Jiří Pelikán together with AG 
leaders in a conference discussing developments in Czechoslovakia since 1945.189 
Thus, by 1978 Opus Bonum was well on its way to becoming the premier 
organization bringing together Czech émigrés of all political and religious leanings, 
and it was also becoming a bridging organization that brought the AG in 
cooperation with these prominent Czech intellectuals and activists. 
Conclusion 
The 1970s were a period of profound change and reorganization on both 
sides of the German-Czech border. In Czechoslovakia, the Husák regime’s 
reassertion of authoritarian control after the short-lived period of reform in 1968 
drove many Czech intellectuals out of the country, where they became activists 
promoting independent Czech thought and publishing in cities like Munich, Rome, 
Paris, London, and Stockholm. Many of those intellectuals that stayed behind were 
purged from the universities, newspapers, and printing houses and were relegated 
to menial labor positions. Over the course of the 1970s they began to develop an 
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expansive underground network promoting independent thought and ideas in 
samizdat and private discussion circles. The prevailing morality in this shadow 
world revolved around human rights and was reflected in the Charter 77 petition. 
This focus on human rights would be crucial for revision of Czech expulsion history, 
as these Czechs soon took up rewriting this history as an immoral act to reflect the 
current human rights values in Czech national history-writing. 
The Czech émigrés that spread across Western Europe were central to this 
story. Some of them like Prečan and Tigrid helped facilitate the proliferation of 
independent Czech through by smuggling samizdat and publishing it abroad to 
enable wider discourse and discussion. These émigrés also became central figures 
in the historical revision of the expulsion in their own right. Despite resistance from 
some of his Catholic countrymen, Opasek establish the organization that would 
bridge Czech émigrés and the AG and begin a host of cooperations between the two 
groups over the next decade. These contacts engendered further outreach and 
reconciliation efforts in the 1980s that became the foundation for German-Czech 
cooperation after 1989, when those Czechs took over control of Czechoslovakia’s 
political and social institutions and spearheaded campaigns for political and social 
reconciliation with Germans and a moral revision of the socialist expulsion 
narrative.  
The 1978 Opus Bonum symposium in Franken brought many of these 
émigrés together with the AG to discuss the rise of authoritarian socialism in 
Czechoslovakia. At the end of the symposium participants issued the “Franken 
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Declaration,” which placed the expulsion of Sudeten Germans at the beginning of 
this process and became the first declaration by Czechs that suggested the 
expulsions were an unjust and unlawful act. It was this declaration, and the 
subsequent debate it helped unleash in samizdat, that marked a watershed in 
German-Czech discourse on the legacies of the expulsion. The ensuing debate 
placed revision of the expulsion narrative at the heart of redefining Czech national 
identity and Central European heritage that persisted through the following decade 
and into the processes of post-1989 European integration. It is this debate and the 
morality of the “shadow world” that fueled the revisionists that is the focus of the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPULSION NARRATIVES AND CZECH IDENTITY IN THE UNDERGROUND, 
1978–1989 
Memory is the great provoker of disagreement. 
– Milan Šimečka190 
 
Over 80 prominent Czech intellectuals from Western Europe and North 
America gathered in February 1978 in Weißenstadt in northern Bavaria for Opus 
Bonum’s first international academic symposium. The theme was the development 
of Czechoslovakia in the years 1945–1948 with the aim of understanding why the 
communist takeover in 1948 was seemingly so easy. Conference participants 
declared that the future progress of the Czech nation relied on overcoming the 
“myths and illusions” of the past in order to understand how Czechoslovakia had 
evolved to its current state and how to change it and ensure that past mistakes 
would not be repeated. At the end of the symposium, a group of presenters and 
participants signed a declaration of the steps they agreed had eroded democracy 
and human rights and led to the current state of totalitarian Party rule. They wrote 
that February 1948 marked the defeat of democratic and humanitarian ideals and a 
victory for the principle of totalitarianism, which continued to shut out more and 
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more groups from the democratic process until the entire society was without 
rights.191 
This in itself would not have been overly significant were it not for the event 
they chose as the first step in this process. They wrote: “After the year 1945 in 
Czechoslovakia, first millions of citizens of German nationality were placed outside 
the rule of law, and the principle of revenge triumphed over the principles of justice 
and law.”192 This was the first Czech public statement that the expulsion might, as a 
whole, have been unjust and even illegal. Even more significant is the conscious 
placement of the disenfranchisement and expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s ethnic 
Germans as the first step toward the loss of freedom and violation of human rights 
in socialist Czechoslovakia. 
This declaration rippled through the émigré community abroad as well as 
dissident circles in Czechoslovakia, but it was a publication in an émigré journal 
later that year by a young Slovak historian named Ján Mlynárik that unleashed 
several years of impassioned debate about the recent history of Czechs and their 
former German fellow citizens.193 Writing under the pseudonym Danubius, 
Mlynárik wrote his seventeen-page “Thesis on the Deportation of the 
Czechoslovakian Germans,” (hereafter, Thesis) which gave a scathing 
condemnation of the expulsions as an inherently immoral and unjust act that had 
                                                        
191 Bericht über das Opus Bonum Symposium in Franken-Fichtelgebirge, February 23–26, AG 1441. 
192 Ibid. 
193 The full Czech texts of Svědectví as well as most other major émigré and samizdat journals can be 
found online at http://www.scriptum.cz. 
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critically weakened Czechoslovakia and paved the way for the Communists’ rise to 
power. A highly polemical text, it rejected the socialist narrative that the 
deportation of Czechoslovakia’s German population was a necessary final step in 
defeating German fascism and securing postwar peace. Instead, Mlynárik 
confronted Czech readers with a new moral interpretation, saying, “The 
resettlement can rightly be compared with the practice of genocide, provided that it 
was not even an actual genocide.”194 This thesis set off a lively debate in samizdat 
and exile publications that placed the expulsion issue in the center of discussions 
about Czech identity and became the single most significant and famous discussion 
within Czech samizdat, the so-called Danubius Debate. 
This chapter explores Czech discourses of identity negotiation from 1978 to 
1989 to illustrate how the emphasis on morality and human rights in underground 
and émigré circles engendered a reevaluation of the expulsion narrative. These 
discussions took place in the wider context of disillusionment with hopes for 
reforming Czechoslovakian Socialism from the inside, as these Czechs began a 
process of redefining Czech identity in samizdat and émigré journals to reflect the 
current values of human rights. A primary feature in these discourses was 
redefining Czech identity away from Soviet-inspired Socialism and attaching it 
instead to a historical multiethnic Central Europe that belonged to the moral value 
system of the Western European tradition. It was from these early discussions in 
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the 1970s that the roots of the “Return to Europe” motto emerged that 
characterized public Czech sentiment during and immediately after the Velvet 
Revolution in 1989. 
The reevaluation of the expulsion narrative was a moral necessity that 
stemmed from the widespread belief in the sanctity of human rights and support 
for reintegration with Western Europe in the Czech underground and émigré 
circles. Brought together in common dialogue via the international circulation of 
samizdat and émigré journals, Czechs in geographically distant locations debated 
the moral narrative of the expulsion and Czechs’ historical relations with Germans, 
and these underground circles also included academic “home seminars” that 
expanded in number and size from the late 1970s through 1989. Taking these 
writings and discussions in underground seminars together we see a transnational 
process of identity formation, as Czechs worked to redefine their identity free from 
the value system and narratives of Soviet-backed socialism through a transnational 
network of discussion. From these discussions emerged a strong tendency in the 
underground to view the expulsions as a moral failure, and these tendencies later 
guided the former dissidents to push for reconciliation with Germans after 1989. 
The Czech Underground Community as a Site of Identity Negotiation 
 With the growth of a Czech underground community in the 1970s and 1980s 
came a concurrent process of identity negotiation within that community, and this 
negotiation was in direct response to a post-1968 Czechoslovakia that seemed 
114 
devoid of any meaningful national identity. The state of the Party and official 
society during this era devolved into ritualistic disciplinary mechanisms absent of 
belief in, or dedication to, the principles of socialist revolution that instead trained 
members to regurgitate bureaucratic rhetoric. Useful here is Jean Baudrillard’s 
concept of simulation, wherein symbols and signs (simulacra) of society claim to 
represent something real—in this case, the values of socialist revolution—but 
which in fact does not exist. The simulation of revolutionary socialist values in 
public life comprised a “hyperreality” in which the Party enforced strict adherence 
to the rhetoric, symbols and rituals of socialist revolution when, in fact, the vast 
majority of society and even many Party members themselves had ceased to 
believe that there was truth to the cause behind it.195 What was left was an empty 
shell of socialism devoid of the all-encompassing truth that it laid claim to, a state 
which Havel described as a “post-totalitarian system [where] the last traces of such 
an atmosphere [of revolutionary excitement, heroism and dedication] have 
vanished.”196 
The bureaucratic banality of Socialism that permeated everyday life in post-
1968 Czechoslovakia left a void of meaning and community bonds in society and 
placed a large portion of expelled Party members, academics, and others 
persecuted by the regime into conflict with the Party and its rhetoric, rituals, and 
195 Baudrillard, “Simulation and Simulacra,” 169–174. 
196 Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” 26–27. 
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symbols. However, sociologists have noted that social conflict can serve a positive 
function, as social tension can provide a creative force that establishes new bonds 
and effects social change to diffuse that conflict and return society to 
equilibrium.197 In this case, there was a forging of new community and social bonds 
within the Czech underground that centered on the pursuit of morality above 
politics, and Czechs began a quest to reflect morality in their conceptions of Czech 
identity and history in the pages of samizdat and in underground seminar 
discussions. 198 
 In this light, the Charter 77 (hereafter, Charter) petition is best viewed as the 
result of just such an organic drive to forge a new community based on an 
alternative value system to the banal socialism of post-1968 Czechoslovakia. Its 
authors explicitly stated that Charter 77 was not an organization, having no fixed 
membership and rejecting a role as the basis for unified oppositional political 
activity. Rather, it served as a set of universal values to which individuals could lay 
claim to and identify with: “[Charter 77] is a loose, informal and open association of 
people of various shades of opinion, faiths and professions united by the will to 
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strive, individually and collectively, for the respecting of civil and human rights in 
our own country and throughout the world […] It embraces everyone who agrees 
with its ideas, participates in its work, and supports it.”199 By claiming an open 
association based on shared belief of its expressed moral ideals, the Charter offered 
a moral foundation for the creation of a common identification among those who 
shared those values. The Charter, though in actuality it consisted of a small, loose 
conglomerate of its spokesmen and writers, served as a larger call to the formation 
of community outside party lines based on respect for human rights that served to 
spiritually bring together many in the underground. 
 The rise of a new underground community and the moral reappraisal of the 
expulsion it engendered reflected a social phenomenon that Émile Durkheim called 
collective effervescence, where communities or societies come together 
spontaneously and communicate the same thought and participate in the same 
action. As Durkheim describes it, collective effervescence lays at the foundation of 
ordering societies through collective thought and the negotiation of identity, and in 
post-1968 Czechoslovakia the formation of an alternative identity in the 
underground resulted in an organically inspired re-narration of expulsion history 
to reflect the values of that identity.200 In the case of Czechoslovakia’s underground 
activity, “society” does not refer to all citizens within Czechoslovakia’s national 
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borders. Rather, it refers to a specific sub-society that existed within a loose 
conglomeration of underground seminars and discussion groups and whose voices 
reached beyond those spaces through the circulation of samizdat. This “society” 
was a subnational network of identification in this sense, but it was also 
transnational through the participation of Czechs living abroad as well as actors 
from the international academic community who participated as seminar and 
samizdat organizers, financiers, and guest lecturers.201 
Maurice Halbwachs argued that a group’s narrative of the past is a direct 
reflection of its current value system, and it is in the context that we can best 
understand the spontaneous drive to reinterpret the previous narrative of the 
expulsion from a victory to a moral tragedy.202 By observing this process of 
negotiation we find common patterns of thought that reflected the values of the 
underground, including shared heritage with Germans and Western Europeans, 
democratic values, European integration, and the sanctity of human rights. All of 
these factors were at play in the drive to rewrite the expulsion narrative, and these 
values persisted and evolved within the spreading underground community and 
seminars. The subnational nature of this underground society within 
Czechoslovakia and the formation narratives of Czech history outside the Czech 
                                                        
201 “Network” in this sense refers to a self-contained group of individuals who linked by a web of 
intellectual and emotional bonds of identification established through direct communication, in this 
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mainstream became obvious after 1989, when Havel, Pithart, and other former 
dissidents encountered strong backlash from the wider public, when they began 
pressing the latter to adopt the new interpretation of the expulsion. 
The Franken Declaration 
 The Franken Declaration’s moral condemnation of the expulsion 
represented a manifestation of a deeply held belief of its participants in the sanctity 
of universal human rights, which, by the nature of universal values, also had to be 
applied to the narratives of the expulsion. It is compelling that this statement 
against the expulsion, which proved to be a watershed moment in German-Czech 
social relations and expulsion memory, was not at all controversial among 
conference participants.203 The expulsion issue itself was not part of the official 
conference program nor was it discussed in plenum sessions, yet it found its way 
into the narrative of the communist victory based on its perceived immorality. 
Prečan recalls that the focus of the summit and the core of the declaration centered 
on the idea of human rights: 
 
The idea of the human rights that were violated then [during Party’s 
consolidation of power], and the problem of violated human rights as the 
basis for each political program was the most important issue. We worked 
under the assumption that the Communist regime acted on the belief that 
human rights would not be recognized. And we asked ourselves, “which 
human rights?” Collective guilt. No one distinguished between who was 
                                                        
203 Prečan recalled that one of the conference presenters brought up the expulsion during an 
evening gathering of presenters as they discussed ideas for a declaration to outline the major steps 
toward the rise of communism. It was briefly discussed and accepted by the group with no 
disagreement; Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
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guilty and not. They were all expelled. The Communist regime expelled 
people from society as enemies. First, it was the Germans, then the 
bourgeoisie, then Kulaks, and finally it was a portion of the Communists 
themselves. That was the core of the statement. And we came to the 
conclusion that the realization of this process began when the Germans as a 
whole were expelled from Czech society.204 
 
The 1978 conference in Franken was a cathartic coming-together both for 
Sudeten Germans and Czechs and for Czech émigrés previously fragmented 
between non-confessional anti-Communists, reform Communists, and Catholics. 
Ardent anti-communist émigrés like Paris-based publicist Pavel Tigrid sat down 
together with reform communists like former 1968 party secretary Zdeněk Mlynář, 
all under the invitation of the Catholic émigré organization Opus Bonum for an 
event sponsored by the AG.205 Émigré writer Ota Filip captured this momentous 
coming-together of the three major groups of Czech exile that mirrored the similar 
process of unity in the Czech underground back home: 
 
It was too beautiful to be true, but indeed it happened: Before the altar of a 
church in Upper Franconia, where the exiled abbot of the oldest Prague 
convent in Břevnov, Dr. Opasek, celebrated mass in his holy vestment, the 
prominent losers of the 1948 coup knelt down side-by-side with the 
previous victors. Dr. Opasek gave both groups a blessing, and the historic 
Czech compromise was concluded exactly 30 years after the communist 
coup in Prague on 25. February 1948. The once unconciliatory political 
opponents showed an almost touching willingness for dialogue after 30 
years of enmity.206 
 
                                                        
204 Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
205 Programm und Verzeichnis der Referenten und deren Themen, Franken Summit 1978, AG 1441. 
206 Tätigkeitsbericht Opus Bonum 1978, AG 1441. 
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The communal blessing that Opasek administered to all the participants on 
the morning of the first plenum day was significant for two reasons: firstly, it united 
and blessed the conservatives and socialists as equals, demonstrating critical 
solidarity in exile that bridged political divides and united former opponents with 
acrimonious recent pasts; secondly, it showed the solidarity of Czechs in exile with 
the Czech Catholic Church, which was a particularly symbolic act for atheist reform 
socialists like Mlynář, who took part despite his wife’s resentment at his 
participation engaging in a religious ceremony.207 In this context of solidarity and 
joining-together, Czech participants were more than happy to extend an open hand 
to their former countrymen, Sudeten Germans, and take a step toward 
reconciliation by condemning the expulsion. “That was the atmosphere,” recalls 
Prečan. “We were all there as expellees. We all felt expelled, and all of us were the 
losers.”208 
The symbolism of this event found echo in international press. The Parisian 
Le Monde reported that Opasek had achieved something “extraordinary” by 
bringing together over 80 victors and victims of the 1948 coup and that those 
participants had broken a “taboo” by including the expulsion in their declaration.209 
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also reported on the significance of those 
                                                        
207 Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
208 Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
209 Le Monde, March 1, 1978. 
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Czechs who were driven out of Czechoslovakia by the dictatorship of the 
communist party in both 1948 and after 1968 jointly placing the expulsion of 
Sudeten Germans in that same series of injustices, with additional articles 
published in Die Welt, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Rheinische Merkur, and more.210 
Reports of the meeting as well as the declaration were also published in émigré 
journals like Pavel Tigrid’s Svědectví where it circulated within Czechoslovakia’s 
samizdat circles.211 
Origins of the Czech Expulsion Debate 
Mlynárik’s “Thesis on the Deportation of the Czechoslovakian Germans” and 
the ensuing debate in samizdat and émigré journals highlighted the necessity of 
revising the expulsion narrative in the process of negotiating new identities in 
Central Europe perhaps more so than any other event in post-1968 Cold War Czech 
history. The debate itself consisted primarily of Czech contributors discussing in 
terms of Czech history and Czech identity, yet it was all brought about by a Slovak 
living in Bohemia.212 Mlynárik was the son of a Slovak carpenter born in Fiľakovo, 
Czechoslovakia in 1933, graduated from the Philosophical Faculty of Charles 
University in 1957, and taught history at Bratislava’s Academy of Performing Arts. 
                                                        
210 Bericht über das Opus Bonum Symposium in Franken-Fichtelgebirge, February 23–26, AG 1441. 
211 “Vítězové a poražení sněmovali,” Svědectví 56 (1978): 544–545. 
212 The discussions that follow nearly universally referred to “Czechs” specifically, not 
“Czechoslovakians” or “Slovaks.” This stems from the fact that the vast majority of expelled Germans 
resided in Bohemia and Moravia, and also because, with the great exception of Mlynárik, 
contributors to the expulsion discussions were nearly uniformly Czechs or Sudeten Germans. 
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In the 1960s he belonged to the non-conformist generation of younger historians 
for which President Antonín Novotný issued him a rebuke for “political deviation.” 
He was expelled from the Party in 1970 and removed from his position in 
Bratislava after condemning the Soviet occupation, after which he relocated to 
Prague and worked as a stagehand and furnace stoker. 
It was around this time that Mlynárik began thinking about the expulsion. 
He purchased a small house in Bedřichov in Northern Bohemia near the German 
and Polish borders, and it was the encounters with the ruined houses, lost fruit 
trees where gardens once stood, and the array of broken coffee mugs, silverware, 
and other artifacts that littered the mountainsides which caused Mlynárik to ask 
himself, “What actually happened here?”213 He began remembering the several 
months he spent in the Sudetenland during his mandatory military training as an 
undergraduate, when he was appalled at the destruction of former German 
settlements whose traces he could still see. He later wrote, “If the military 
authorities knew that instead of preparing troops what occurred was an intense 
study of the barbarism that was recently committed in this region, they would have 
chosen military installations somewhere in central Bohemia or Moravia as training 
centers.”214 It was a similar story for his neighbor, friend, and underground 
colleague, Petr Pithart, though his exposure to the remnants of the lost German past 
                                                        
213 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
214 Milan Žitný, “Ján Mlynárik, alias Danubius, dopsal poslední list,” Česká pozice: Informace pro 
svobodně lidi, June 17, 2012, http://ceskapozice.lidovky.cz/jan-Mlynárik-alias-danubius-dopsal-
posledni-list-fb1-/tema.aspx?c=A120330_230500_pozice_62186 (accessed January 31, 2017). 
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came from spending time in the woods of his wife’s birthplace near Děčín, fifty 
miles west near the East German border. Pithart recalls of Mlynárik at the time, “I 
believe to this day, that had Mlynárik not bought that house there, he never would 
have engaged in this topic. He was a sensitive and sentimental person, a musical 
person, for whom those reflections simply changed everything.”215 
 As Mlynárik prepared his Thesis in 1977, Pithart was working on a 
revisionist book on Czech history with fellow historians Petr Příhoda and Milan 
Otáhal. The trio wanted to work independently so as not to be influenced by the 
opinions of other historians, with one exception: Pithart asked Mlynárik if he could 
offer his expertise on German-Slovak relations, the focus of Mlynárik‘s earlier work. 
Mlynárik’s reply to Pithart was, “I would love to help you with your work, but I have 
just discovered an enourmous topic. I hope you are not disappointed, but I need to 
dedicate all my efforts toward this.”216 
Mlynárik finished his Thesis in December 1977 and sent it off through 
underground channels for publication abroad in 1978. He was living in Prague at 
the time, but in order to mask his identity he wrote in his native Slovak, referred to 
himself as a Slovak historian, and signed the location as Bratislava.217 Prečan 
received Mlynárik’s text in late spring of 1978, shortly after the Franken 
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216 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
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Conference.218 Prečan knew he had an important but controversial essay, and he 
first sent it to his trusted friend and fellow émigré historian Johann Wolfgang 
Brügel for his opinion.219 Prečan then forwarded it to Tigrid in Paris for publication 
with Brügel’s commentary.220 
He chose Svědectví as the most widely-circulated and well known exile 
journal to reach the widest audience possible, and he also knew that Tigrid was one 
of the few, if only, émigré journal editors who would publish such a controversial 
and polemical text. Tigrid indeed encountered fierce opposition from the other 
editorial board members of Svědectví, all of whom walked out in protest after Tigrid 
insisted on publishing Mlynárik’s text over their objections. On hearing about this 
dissention Pithart was not surprised: “I do not believe that another periodical in 
exile would have published it. It was his [Tigrid’s] personal decision.”221 The board 
members were all politicians, philosophers, and historians who fled the Communist 
repression after February 1948, but even for them Mlynárik’s Thesis was too much. 
Some of them, like Radomír Lůža, went on to be vocal opponents of revisionists like 
Mlynárik in the ensuing debates. 
                                                        
218 Opus Bonum claimed in its yearly report pamphlets that the Franken Declaration inspired 
Mlynárik to write his thesis, however Mlynárik’s compilation of texts Causa Danubius published in 
2000 dated his Thesis as signed “December 1977.” See: Bericht über das Opus Bonum Symposium in 
Franken-Fichtelgebirge, February 23–26, AG 1441; and: Tätigkeitsbericht Opus Bonum 1978, AG 
1441. This claim was repeated in subsequent Tätigkeitsberichten for the next several years. Jan 
Mlynárik, Causa Danubius (Prague: Danubius, 2000). 
219 Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
220 Johann Wolfgang Brügel, “Úvodem k tomu, co následuje...,” Svědectví 57 (1978): 103–104. 
221 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
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The Thesis itself was confrontational and blunt, provoking readers with 
references to genocide and comparisons to the Nazi regime, calling the expulsion “a 
method of Hitler’s nation” and “the final solution of the German question in 
Czechoslovakia.”222 Mlynárik asserted throughout the text that the expulsion was a 
gross violation of basic human rights, and he also expounded arguments for the 
various ways the transfer of Sudeten Germans had damaged Czechs and Slovaks 
economically, culturally, and spiritually, and precipitated the abandoning of 
democracy and human rights to the communists. He ended his thesis by saying, 
“The expulsion of the Czechoslovak Germans is not only a German tragedy, but our 
own tragedy as well,” and he couched his arguments in terms of morality and 
equated, “If we recognize the principle of human rights and their defense as the 
highest of human concerns, we must consequentially distance ourselves from this 
past.”223  
Reception of the Danubius Thesis 
Mlynárik’s Thesis set off years of discussion that captured the interest of 
many Czech historians and lay readers, but it was made all the more important by 
the participation of many of Czech society’s dissident intellectuals, the latter of 
whom were generally more concerned with passing judgment on the morality and 
                                                        
222 Danubius, “Tézy,” 110 and 112–113. 
223 Ibid., 120–122. 
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wisdom of the expulsion than arguing over historical nuances.224 The debates 
centered largely on Mlynárik’s essay as well as a later text published under the 
pseudonym “Bohemus.” Some of the initial reactions to Mlynárik were negative, 
particularly those of former Communists and Marxist historians like Luža, Václav 
Kural, and Milan Hübl, all of whom argued against morally reappraising the 
expulsion based on its supposed necessity in historical context. Luža and three 
other members of Svědectví’s editorial board published a declaration in the 
following issue of Svědectví making clear that they disagreed with the Thesis, 
saying, “we regard the deportation of the German minority out of Czechoslovakia as 
the definitive solution to a very painful and tragic question in the interests of 
security and territorial integrity and [...] European order and peace.”225 Luža and 
Hübl attacked those who would rewrite the expulsion history as a moral 
abomination, with Luža saying, “it goes beyond my understanding why some of our 
intellectuals must publically beat and whip themselves,” and Hübl arguing, “we 
cannot, however, act like medieval flagellants, placing on ourselves a larger share of 
guilt than that corresponding to reality […] The historian is not a flagellant, but a 
scholar.”226  
                                                        
224 Abrams, “Morality and Wisdom,” 235. 
225 Jiří Horák, Josef Jonaš, Radomír Lůža, and Mojmír Povolný, “Tribuna Svědectví,” Svědectví 58 
(1979): 383. 
226 Radomír Lůža, “Dopis Radomíra Lůži Ladislavu Hejdánkovi,” in Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 
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Despite these criticisms, Mlynárik’s Thesis struck a moral chord within 
many Czech readers who spoke out in his support. Writing from London, Alexander 
Tomský argued that seeing the historical context did not prevent one from 
condemning the expulsion on moral grounds, using the example that understanding 
the historical context of the rise of the Communist party in Czechoslovakia should 
not preclude one from condemning the fates that befell the Czech and Slovak 
peoples because of it.227 Similarly, émigré author Erazim Kohák argued, “historical 
necessity can explain something, but not justify.”228 Mlynář, a principle formulator 
behind the Franken Declaration, highlighted the moral nature of revision, writing, 
“The use of force against an entire group of people [...] was contrary to the 
principles of justice and law and resulted from policies of revenge and collective 
guilt.”229 He looked to the current West German discussion of the Holocaust that 
emerged from the recent broadcasting of the American television miniseries of the 
same name as a model for Czechs to follow, saying, “Nothing else but an open and 
                                                        
227 Alexandr Tomsky, “Tribuna Svědectví,” Svědectví 58 (1979): 204. 
228 Erazim Kohák, “Tribuna Svědectví,” Svědectví 59 (1979): 591. 
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unrestricted discussion about the past and a moral assessment of this past can lead 
to the way forward.”230 
The Bohemus Document 
A shift in the debate came in 1980 with a lengthy publication in the émigré 
Social Democrat periodical Právo lidu, titled “Opinion on the Transfer of Germans 
from Czechoslovakia” and published under the pseudonym Bohemus, Latin for 
Čech, the mythical ancestral founder of the Czech people.231 This text had the dual 
effect of tempering Mlynárik’s Thesis with deeper, more nuanced historical analysis 
to garner more support for the revisionist position, and it also expanded the forum 
of debate from Svědectví to the larger Social Democrat community in exile. Whereas 
Mlynárik focused on the expulsion itself and its aftermath, Bohemus reinforced 
their text with a lengthy introductory section tracing historical German-Czech 
relations since the 13th century that emphasized the very recent nature of 
                                                        
230 Ibid. Interestingly, the board of the West German public broadcasting station ARD only narrowly 
approved the broadcasting of the Holocaust series in a 5–4 vote. ARD broadcast the miniseries on all 
five of its regional channels in January 1979 and received the highest viewership of a single 
broadcast in West Germany up to that point, with an estimated 41–48% of households, comprising 
over 20 million West German adults, tuning in. ARD received over 450,000 requests for additional 
teaching materials to supplement the miniseries from teachers, professors, and private individuals 
in the weeks that followed; see: Jürgen Wilke, “Die Fernsehserie ‘Holocaust’ als Medienereignis,” 
Historische Sozialforschung 30 (2005):9–17, here: 12, 14–15. For more on the wider reception and 
the immediate public discussions that followed, see: Ernst Tilmann, “ ‘Holocaust’ in der 
Bundesrepublik: Impulse, Reaktionen und Konsequenzen aus der Sicht politischer Bildung,” 
Rundfunk und Fernsehen 28 (1980): 509–533. 
231 Bohemus (Petr Pithart, Milan Otáhal, Toman Brod, Jiří Doležal, Miloš Pojar, and Petr Příhoda), 
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odsunu Němců z Československa,” in Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 179–202. A German translation 
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nationality problems that emerged in the interwar period, though they were clear 
in pointing out that understanding the historical context did not preclude the 
necessity of passing moral judgment on those events.232 
The Bohemus text highlighted democratic and human rights values in their 
essay on the implications of the expulsion for Czech national identity, heritage, and 
culture. They attributed blame to Beneš and Czechs as a whole for failing to find a 
democratic solution to the German minority problem after World War I, and they 
described a “psychosis” that befell Czechs after Munich during the Nazi occupation, 
where nationalist chauvinism, anti-German fervor, and beliefs in the collective guilt 
of all ethnic Germans, overpowered the already weak foundations of democracy in 
Czechoslovakia and led to the expulsion of nearly all ethnic Germans. Bohemus took 
up and expanded Mlynárik’s arguments by outlining the long-term legal, ethical, 
political, economic, demographic, and cultural consequences for Czechoslovakia 
that both enabled and encouraged the removal of civil and legal rights of all Czech 
society under the socialists.233 
The authors of the Bohemus document were supporters of Mlynárik,234 but 
they sought to “soften the sharp edges” and nuance his arguments to make revision 
of the expulsion narrative more palatable for a wider audience: 
 
                                                        
232 Bohemus, “Stanovisko,” 180–181. 
233 Bohemus, “Stanovisko,” 197–202. 
234 According to Pithart, Mlynárik’s blunt and polemical personality was well known in the Prague 
underground, and upon the publication of his Thesis everyone immediately recognized who 
“Danubius” was. Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
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We [the supporters of Mlynárik] were initially attacked even by dissidents. 
We were a very small group at the time. Public opinion was completely 
ignorant or against us, and the majority within dissent opposed us and our 
positions. I felt very oppressed […] We agreed with 95% of Mlynárik’s 
position, but we wanted to make it acceptable for a broader public. And the 
remaining 5% was slightly reformulated. That is what was important for the 
former Marxist historians […] like Křen, Luža, Václav Kural and Hübl.235 
Bohemus succeeded in instigating more critical reflection and discussion of 
the specific themes of the expulsion than the initial debates of the Danubius thesis, 
which many had found too polemic and ahistorical for their liking. Marxist 
historian-turned dissident Jan Křen responded to Bohemus with “Critical Notes,” 
but praised it as a “discussion of scientific excellence” deserving the “greatest 
attention,” whereas he declined to engage the Danubius thesis directly, which he 
felt was of “questionable quality and motivation.”236  
Bohemus brought the debate to a wider readership by being published in 
Právo lidu and inspired an onslaught of letters to the editorial board from readers 
across Europe and North America. The editor published 43 of these letters in a 
235 Ibid. 
236 Jan Křen, “Češi a Němci: kritické poznámky,” in Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 203. Václav Kural, 
despite maintaining a cautious stance toward revision, nevertheless also engaged Bohemus’ 
arguments, specifically the idea of a social “psychosis”: “Was it, however, in the conditions of the 
given historical situation, really possible to make such a turnaround [and reconsider the decision for 
expulsion at the war’s end]? Are we not asking a bit much of our predecessors from our writing 
desks? Was not and is not such a call above Czech power, above the power of Czech (or Polish, or 
Yugoslav, and so forth) politics, which had to contend here not only with the mood of some kind of 
“mob” (as Bohemus understands the problem), but with the basic societal and international 
situations, which would have been difficult to change, even if it had wanted to change them?” Václav 
Kural, “Češi a Němci v československém a německém státě (1918–1945): Pokus o nástin ‘logiky’ 
vývoje,” in Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 261. 
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special edition of Právo lidu which included contributions from four 
representatives of the Sudeten German Social Democrat group the Seliger 
Gemeinde, five representatives of the German Social Democrat Party, eight 
Charter 77 signatories and eighteen members of the Czech Social Democratic party 
in exile.237 Pithart recalls the significance of spreading the debate to a wider Czech 
audience: “He [Jiří Loewy, editor of Právo lidu] greatly expanded the previous 
debate. He reached many more people in exile and at home and brought them in, so 
that it was representative and one could see what the people actually thought. The 
answers were sometimes short, sometimes long, but they nevertheless presented 
the opinions of a much larger base of people to a much wider audience.”238 
The Danubius Debate as a Window to Discourses of Czech Identity 
The Danubius and Bohemus texts as well as the letters of support for 
revision in Svědectví and Právo lidu illustrated that the impetus for the revisionist 
position stemmed from a need to rewrite the expulsion narrative to reflect the 
sanctity of universal human rights. This was an assertion of an attempt to narrate a 
new Czech national identity which defined itself in opposition to the disregard for 
human rights by the Party. The revisionists did not write in order to “correct” 
history for history’s sake; rather, the case for revision rested in the moral 
conviction that the previous narrative of the expulsion as a victory over fascism did 
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not reflect their current values and thus did not serve as a usable historical 
narrative to help define Czech identity in the present. 
Moral beliefs constitute absolute truths in the moments they are invoked, 
and the revisionists’ belief in the sanctity of human rights prompted a need to 
revise expulsion history to reflect that belief and reinforce the values that defined 
their identity as Czechs.239 Mlynárik asserted this when he wrote that recognition 
of the principle of human rights necessitated revising the expulsion narrative, and 
others echoed this point with statements like, “[The debate over revision of the 
expulsion] is by no means the result of the professional interests of one historian, 
but rather the result of a political-moral need of Czechoslovakian society to 
research through an analysis of the past the actual causes of those breakdowns of 
specific values that the ‘normalized reality’ of the past decade signifies.”240 Another 
writer who countered Luža’s oppositional argument that “every beginning student 
of history knows that you cannot remove history from its historical context” also 
                                                        
239 For more on moral universals and historical interpretation, see: Jeffrey Alexander, “On the Social 
Construction of Moral Universals: The ‘Holocaust’ from War Crime to Trauma Drama,” European 
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invoked the absolute truth of moral judgment, arguing that, “every beginner in 
moral philosophy studies learns to differentiate between the absolute element of 
moral judgment of a given human act and the facilitating circumstances that bring 
about that act but in no way justify it.”241 
The search for a moral narrative to ground a new contemporary identity lay 
at the heart of the debate, and deeper analysis of the discussions uncovers three 
primary ways in which revisionists projected current moral values of democracy, 
human rights, and a desire for European integration in their calls for re-narrating 
the past to define Czechs outside of the Socialist narrative. Firstly, there was a 
common trend of drawing separation between the mentality of 1945 Czechs and 
Slovaks and the revisionists, often invoking Bohemus’ concept of a “psychosis” in 
Czech society. The arguments here asserted that an acceptance of the collective 
guilt of Sudeten Germans, the denial of their rights and citizenship, and their forced 
deportation were all aberrant events that strayed away from Czech democratic and 
humanistic values. In order to have a national history that reflected the “true” Czech 
nature, Czechs would have to revise the ways in which they dealt with these issues 
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in the historical narrative. Ivan Pfaff argued that the Munich Agreement and 
subsequent complete Nazi occupation, “grew into a severe psychic and moral 
complex extending over the entire society, which burdened our political 
development with fatal mistakes.”242 
Other contributors rejected the collective guilt thesis on moral grounds to 
draw a clear distinction between the writers of the 1970s and Czechs of the 
wartime generation. “Collective guilt is a concept that a decent society should never 
use,” affirmed one contributor, while another wrote, “collective guilt is 
nonsense.”243 That author went on to argue that collective morality, conversely, is 
something required of all, and while the expulsion is a stain on Czech history, “the 
moral burden is even heavier, of which we cannot rid ourselves when we deny it or 
make a glorious victory out of it. It was in reality a terrible defeat.”244 
The second major theme of the discussions concentrated on the expulsion as 
a failure of democratic values which cast a long shadow over Czech politics for the 
coming decades. Bohemus placed twofold blame on “Czech anti-German sentiment 
and the weakness of democratic traditions [as] the necessary preconditions,” 
arguing, “our democracy did not show itself able, or even willing at all, to solve the 
German problem in a different manner from the way that would be the most 
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comfortable from the viewpoint of shortsighted political interests and that would 
most quickly meet the mood of the mob [...] Czech society had not previously had 
enough positive experiences, knowledge or concrete experiences with 
democracy.”245 It was on this point that several Sudeten Germans commented that a 
democratic method of determining guilt and innocence would have rendered the 
expulsion unnecessary and involved Sudeten Germans in a rebuilding process that 
could have preserved a multinational Czechoslovakia.246 
Some took the idea of Czechs’ democratic failure and placed it in a larger 
context of continental Europe that was unable to efficiently solve the many political, 
social, economic, cultural, and nationality problems that plagued prewar Europe 
and ultimately led to the rise of fascism and fervent nationalisms.247 But for others, 
the root cause of the expulsion was not a European failure but a Czech one that 
required Czechs to come to terms with their own national guilt: “These and other 
factors are only partial aspects. The decisive factor was our own attitude, or rather, 
our own failure. I admit this is a melancholy judgment, but it is the only possible 
way to catharsis.”248 The centrality of criticizing a failure of democratic practices in 
1945 during the expulsion debates illustrated how firm the belief in democratic 
values was for the revisionists, which is not surprising considering many of them 
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were the leaders of the push to democratize socialism in the 1960s and all of them 
were suffering the effects of the single-party system. 
The third major theme of the discussions illustrated that values of 
multiculturalism and post-nationalism were central to the new discourses that 
sought to redefine Czech identity from the Communist narrative. Many writers saw 
in the removal of Czechoslovakia’s German population the loss of a multiethnic 
Czechoslovakia where ethnic Germans and Czechs both claimed shared culture and 
heritage, and they regretted the turn eastward that followed it. Mlynárik mourned 
the loss of Czechoslovakia’s position as a bridge between East and West, lamenting 
that “there remains for Czechs and Slovaks today only the one, the Eastern 
alternative of cohabitation, from now on with a totalitarian, undemocratic power 
that has presented a bill to pay for supporting the expulsion and will also present 
[this bill] in the future.”249 Writing from his exile in the United States, poet Rio 
Preisner echoed the “cruel irony” that, “with the evacuation of the Germans the 
Czechs evacuated themselves from the West and were deported from their own 
historical borders.”250 Nearly all the revisionists and even some of the skeptics like 
Křen and Hübl shared the viewpoint that the expulsion was a preview to the 
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spiraling persecution by the Communist Party during their ascension to total 
power.251 
Many authors searched the decades before 1945 for the roots of the failed 
multicultural and multiethnic spirit of the Czech lands. Bohemus looked at the 
nationalism of the 19th century and asked, “Is the path that we chose since the 
National Revival truly the proper way?”252 Erazim Kohák argued that if the first 
Czechoslovak Republic had supported a historical-geographical concept of 
citizenship without regard for ethnic nationality during the state’s founding in 1918 
then Sudeten Germans could have joined a nation of “Bohemians” that could have 
resisted the nationalist allure of Nazism.253 Other authors invoked multiethnic 
cohabitation and a multicultural “Bohemia” in similar ways that devalued 
nationalism and expressed support for a Czech identity that was tied to German 
heritage and a Central European past more broadly.254 
For the revisionists, the way to proceed away from the Soviet Union and 
toward reintegration with Western Europe depended on reassessing the expulsion 
                                                        
251 Bohemus used the official terminology of the “transfer” to describe the continued violations of 
democracy, human rights, and law that Czechs suffered under the Communists after 1948: “They 
were ‘transferred’ out of a share of political power and from all independent institutions of public 
life. Individuals—often millions of them—were ‘transferred’ from their economic positions and 
denied property and land. Many were ‘transferred’ to prison and forced-labor camps, finally even 
the Communists themselves.” Bohemus, “Stanovisko,” 202. For similar opinions, see: Danubius, 
“Tézy,” 83; Brügel, “Úvodem,” 103–104, and Johann Wolfgang Brügel, “Z diskuse v Právu lidu,” in 
Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 348–349; Hübl, “Glosy,” 114–116; Křen, “Doslov,” 362; Ladislav 
Hejdánek, “Dopis přiteli,” in Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 149–150. 
252 Bohemus, “Stanovisko,” 190. 
253 Erazim Kohák, “Dopis anonymnímu příteli,” in Černý et al., Češi, Němci, Odsun, 327–29. 
254 Brügel, “Úvodem,” 104; Preisner, “Tribuna,” 572–573. 
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narrative, as one author wrote, “A revision is necessary. If we lay the foundations of 
the future on the—forgive my pathos—many errors of the past, we will fare no 
better than the Czechs and Germans in 1945,” and, “If we have not found a better 
way to solve the problems of the coming years […] it will be proof that we are 
reverting to a society that is not only primitive but barbaric.”255 The emphasis on 
the link between the expulsion and the rise of the Communist Party as well as the 
moral judgment of the expulsion were responses to the immediate situation of 
repression in Czechoslovakia and discussed in the context of a desire to look 
toward future change. The writers called for a revision of the expulsion narrative 
and a coming to terms with its immorality precisely because they saw a moral 
linkage with the oppression and total control of the Communist Party against which 
they currently struggled. Prečan summarized this sentiment best when he wrote: 
 
A nation or a society that does not only wait passively for the next historical 
opportunity but helps to create it and prepares for such a chance feels an 
irremissible necessity to reflect on its own past [...] One cannot avoid these 
questions only because they are caustic and provoke polemics that are 
unpleasant for some people. […] Perhaps all generations in all categories of 
politics and world views in exile and back home should reflect on a passage 
from [Bohemus'] “An Opinion on the Expulsion.” I quote the argument: “The 
distance of time that enables a deeper recognition of the functions of one’s 
own totalitarian state, its instruments of social manipulation and the 
personal experiences of millions of deceived and abused people calls forth 
the necessity to judge the Germans more justly and appropriately.”256 
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Summarizing the Expulsion Debates 
 On the whole, the debates that the Danubius thesis inspired illustrated a 
widespread association among most Czech writers between the expulsion of 
Czechoslovakia’s Sudeten Germans and the loss of civil rights associated with the 
rise of the Communist Party. All of the contributors to the debate had abandoned 
identifying Czech identity with the official Socialist narrative by this point, and the 
Danubius debates illustrated a reappraisal of past Czech history as a process of 
national self-reevaluation of what constituted Czech national identity. One Prague-
born French observer recalled that the father of modern Czech historiography, 
František Palacký, saw in the antagonistic German-Czech coexistence in Bohemia 
the very “meaning” of Czech history, and he posited that what was taking place in 
the debates was a search for meaning of the Czech question now that the nation’s 
main antagonist had been removed.257 
The resulting debate showed that the “meaning” of Czech history, and hence, 
identity, was still very much tied to the era of German-Czech cohabitation, but it 
was undergoing a process of redefinition. German-Czech history and relations 
remained a central problem for the revisionists, yet Germans were no longer the 
perennial antagonists they were for Palacký. Rather, echoing the Franken 
Declaration, they viewed the decision to expel Czechoslovakia’s Germans as the 
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first step in a connected series of processes that disassociated Czechs with their 
true heritage as multicultural Central Europeans. Many of the contributors were 
signatories of Charter 77 and believed that those values lay at the core of what 
Czech identity was or should be, and revision of the expulsion narrative served as 
an example of the process of negotiating a new identity through historical revision. 
Arguing that the expulsion was a tragedy that helped disjoin Czechs from Europe, 
exampled the desire to reorient Czech identity toward the West and connect it to 
the democratic values and human rights discourses of Western Europe. It was a 
manifestation of a multicultural Central European identity that included Germans 
in its heritage. Czech independent writing and underground seminars continued to 
pursue this discourse throughout the 1980s which is the subject of the following 
section. But the Danubius debates showed that the currents behind Central 
Europeanism were set in motion with the lost hopes for reform in 1968 and were 
gaining traction and consensus in the underground and in exile by the time 
Mlynárik published his Thesis in 1978. 
Střední Evropa—Samizdat for Central Europe 
 Central European discourses were widely entrenched in the Czech 
underground in the 1980s and could be found in many forms of samizdat outside 
the pages of the expulsion debate as well, yet no samizdat journal embodied this 
more so than Rudolf Kučera’s Střední Evropa (Central Europe). The founding of 
Střední Evropa was very closely tied to the Jan Hus Educational Foundation 
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discussed later in this chapter. With their help, Kučera began what to his 
knowledge was the only underground seminar in Prague specifically on political 
theory and international relations in 1982, referred to by Jan Hus Educational 
Foundation trustee Roger Scruton as “Kučera and his neo-conservatives.”258 Kučera 
first became interested in the intellectual idea of Central Europe in the 1960s when 
he traveled around Western Europe during his university studies and began 
thinking about the intellectual and spiritual connection of Czechs with Western 
Europe. After 1968, he understood Central European identity as a way to reject 
Communism and Czechoslovakia’s association with the Soviet Union, and Kučera 
felt this must be pursued through samizdat. The beginning of his seminar afforded 
an opportunity to discuss and debate ideas of Central Europe in an organized 
setting. But Kučera himself was aware that his seminar only reached a small 
number of people, usually 15–20 regular participants, and because is was 
monitored by the secret police (Státní bezpečnost, hereafter, StB), his participants 
were mostly restricted to known dissidents willing to meet under such 
circumstances. Kučera sought to expand beyond this limited circle, and the Jan Hus 
Educational Foundation provided the funding and support to do this via 
samizdat.259 
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 Kučera and a handful of his colleagues discussed the idea of publishing a 
journal from their seminar as early as 1983.260 The main motivator for the journal 
was to assert through written word that Czechoslovakia was not part of the Soviet 
imperium in a spiritual sense, but belonged to a distinct “Central European” region 
with its own traditions, culture, and politics that were tied to Western Europe 
through a long history of development within the Holy Roman and Hapsburg 
Empires. Having obtained a stipend from the Jan Hus Educational Foundation, they 
published the first edition of Střední Evropa in 1984 that ran just north of one 
hundred pages and continued publishing into the 1990s.261 
 Střední Evropa published articles on a variety of cultural and political issues 
relating to Central Europe. The first edition defined Central Europe as “a spiritual 
continuum with changing borderlines,” and a later edition clarified its editors’ view 
of Central Europeanism as an idea that demonstrated a desire for freedom and civic 
rights as well as cultural superiority over Soviet totalitarianism.262 They promoted 
Central Europeanism as a way to join Czechs with “all those—be they in the west or 
the east—who seek to establish a new European unity […] and new Europe in the 
spiritual and political sense.” Its editors promoted the education of Czechs’ 
                                                        
260 Trip Report, Roger Scruton, April 3–9, 1983, JHEF. 
261 Jan Hus Educational Foundation financial reports indicate a steady allocation of money for 
Kučera for Střední Evropa from 1984 through 1989. Bernd Posselt also recalls that his office in the 
Paneuropean Union worked together with Milan Kubes of Opus Bonum to supply Kučera with 
additional books and printing materials. Interview, Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016. 
262 Jan Ulrich, “Úvod,” Střední Evropa 1 (1984): 2. 
 143 
 
historical position in Central Europe as a guide for future political and cultural 
progress, saying, “It is simply necessary to proceed from dissidence to 
Europeanism.”263 
Kučera recalls that the expulsion issue was “an important topic” in the 
underground, and he and other colleagues followed the expulsion debates in 
samizdat closely. In particular, he remembers that the expulsion debates as a 
watershed event for Havel personally, and foreshadowing Havel’s post-1989 
campaign for open dialogue, he remembers Havel lamenting the fact that the 
expulsion was not discussed by the wider Czech society and agreed that something 
must be done to remedy this. Kučera had long been interested in the expulsion and 
the need for reconciliation, describing his connection to the theme as “spiritual” 
rather than political and tied closely to his views on Central Europe as a distinct 
cultural, political, and social region. Yet he also remembers the importance of the 
expulsion narrative for others in the underground who began viewing themselves 
not as citizens of a Socialist country but as Central Europeans: “What I found was 
that for most people [condemning the expulsion] was a natural consequence of 
thinking Central European. For other people it was a way to challenge the 
communist narrative.”264 
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A central part of establishing Czechs’ historical Europeanism involved 
resurrecting positive ties with Germans, and Střední Evropa’s contributions 
maintained a strong pro-Habsburg stance towards its construction of Czech and 
Central European heritage. Its editors promoted “critique of the first Masaryk-
Beneš Republic as a nation-state as well as a negative opinion of the previous forms 
of Czech nationalism.” They supported “reorienting relations toward Austria” as 
part of promoting a Central European manifestation of Judeo-Christian culture and 
saw in this the “deepest foundation of their activities.”265 One contribution asserted 
that the period of Habsburg rule over the Czech lands was the cultural high-point in 
Czech history. Its author wrote: 
 
It is necessary to present an outline [...] of the views of those [...] who not 
only disapproved of the expulsion of the Germans [...] but who also 
disapproved of Masaryk’s program of de-Austrianization, his program of 
Hussitism [...] as well as [the views held by] those who regard the 
destruction of Austria as the primordial mistake and as harmful to the 
Czechs and to Europe and who perceive the principles on which the First 
Republic was built as the cause of the subsequent victory of communism in 
our country.266 
 
The author lamented the expulsion of Sudeten Germans as a monumental 
failure of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia and argued that Sudeten Germans 
shared the author’s pro-Habsburg view of Czech history, and he stated that the 
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purpose of his essay was to “show the relationship between the dismemberment of 
Austria and the defective foundations of the republic, on the one side, and the 
enthronement of communism in our country on the other.”267 
Střední Evropa would become one of the most widely circulated samizdat 
journals inside Czechoslovakia, with twelve more lengthy editions following and a 
self-reported readership in the hundreds by the end of 1989 with strong support 
and sympathy from younger generations.268 Its popularity was strong in the 
Moravian city of Brno as well, although it was rather difficult to come by one of the 
limited copies that made its way from Prague. For this reason Jiří Müller began 
publishing a Brno version in 1988 which dedicated roughly half the space to 
reprinting major essays from the original Střední Evropa and filled the second half 
with contributions from Moravian authors. The idea stemmed from a young student 
in Brno, František Mikš, who approached Kučera in Prague with a group of friends 
in search of contacts to create a Brno samizdat journal. Kučera suggested printing a 
Moravian version of Střední Evropa and eventually put Mikš in touch with Müller to 
oversee the operation.269 The Brno branch of Střední Evropa published four 
complete editions (between 100–250 pages each) in the two years it was active 
before the Velvet Revolution rendered it obsolete, but it remains a testament to the 
widespread popularity of Central European discourses in Moravia. 
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Central Europe and Czech Underground Seminars 
 In evaluating the history of the rise of Central European discourses and 
revision of the expulsion narrative it is paramount to include treatment of the other 
primary forum for discussion and debate on discourses of Czech identity besides 
samizdat, and that forum was the underground seminars that expanded in 
frequency and number from the late 1970s onward. These underground seminars 
were part of a transnational network of supporters and participants that connected 
Czech participants directly with western intellectuals who were frequent guests at 
many of these seminars.270 The development of Czechoslovakia’s underground 
seminars underwent two pivotal changes in the late 1970s that led to a significant 
increase in frequency and impact in the 1980s. The first shift was the publication of 
the Charter 77 petition which served as a rallying cry for the creation of a civil 
society outside Party constraints. The Charter represented an assertion that the 
foundations on which this civil society should rest lay in post-Helsinki values of 
democracy, respect for human rights, and European integration, and this civil 
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society found a gathering place in the proliferation of underground seminars that 
increased in the late 1970s and 1980s.271 
 It was on the Helsinki themes of the right to knowledge, education, and 
freedom of thought that the second major shift impacted, which came with the 
expansion of underground organization and activities through the sponsorship and 
active involvement of an array of Western intellectuals through the creation of the 
Jan Hus Educational Foundation.272 A Prague philosopher sent an open letter to the 
philosophy departments of four Western universities in 1978 with a plea for guest 
lecturers to bring badly needed expertise to the students of Prague’s independent 
home philosophy seminars.273 Oxford was the only institution to respond, but they 
did so in grand fashion. The first visitor came that April to assess the situation and 
see what could be done, and she brought back alluring stories of clandestine 
meetings and travel, proud and defiant dissidents, and most importantly, eager 
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students yearning for dialogue with the Western world. Within a year the faculty 
had created the charitable organization Jan Hus Educational Foundation (JHEF) and 
began nearly a decade of sending regular foreign speakers as well as books and 
printing materials and technology for samizdat ventures.274 The number of visitors 
that made the trip rose in the following years to no less than sixteen visitors per 
year before 1985, and no less than thirty-one per year from 1985–1989, and the 
technology would eventually grow to include entire computers, copiers, and 
printers. Through their efforts Czechoslovakia’s home seminars became more 
expansive and better funded and created a clandestine transatlantic network of 
Western intellectual exchange that trained the generation of Czechs that took over 
the leadership of academic and political institutions after 1989. 
An Intellectual Exchange with Precedent 
The formation of a transnational network linking Czech thinkers to major 
European sites of intellectual and cultural activity was not a new phenomenon in 
Central Europe. In the 1890s a generation of young Czech literati led a movement 
out of Prague, Vienna, and Berlin to redraw the imaginary geographies of Central 
Europe. The connection centered on an intellectual exchange between the literary 
circles of Arnošt Procházka in Prague, Josef Svatopluk Machar in Vienna, and Polish 
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writer Stanisław Przybyszewski in Berlin. Through their writings and publications 
in their respective literary journals, these young literati led a movement that 
opposed the narrow nationalist ideas of the Old Czechs like František Palacký and 
worked to recast Czechs’ spiritual position in Europe by joining in and promoting 
the new literary and social movement of European modernism. 
If the older Czech nationalists were concerned with asserting the 
“Czechness” of Bohemia and Moravia as a microcosm within the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Machar and the Vienna-Prague-Berlin connection sought to relocate 
Prague and the Czech lands on the periphery of modern Europe.275 This cultural 
exchange promoted a concept of intellectual life in Central Europe that 
Europeanized Czechs as more than a provincial minority within the Hapsburg 
Empire and included a rare late-19th century rapprochement with German 
culture.276 This Czech rapprochement with Germans had a later proponent in 
Emanuel Rádl, who wrote in 1928 that the nationalist frameworks established in 
the new Czechoslovak state had led to the oppression of minorities and a misguided 
attempt to excise German culture from Czech heritage.277 Although bitterly attacked 
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by most of the Czech thinkers of his time, Rádl’s stance on relations with Germans 
continued the tradition of the young Czechs in the Vienna-Prague-Berlin connection 
and offered a prewar precursor to 1970s critiques in samizdat of the Masaryk state 
in precipitating national divisions that ultimately led to the failure of peaceful 
cohabitation between Germans and Czechs. 
The intellectual exchanges of the 1970s and 1980s paralleled this earlier 
movement in many ways. As the underground discussion circles expanded over the 
1970s, they took on an international dimension through links with émigrés and 
Czech publishing houses in cities like Vienna, Paris, Rome, London, Stockholm, and 
Toronto.278 Writings by both domestic authors and those abroad reached ever-
wider audiences through the smuggling and circulation efforts of individuals like 
Prečan and Jan Kavan, and they were recirculated by Czech societies from North 
America to Australia. Similar to the late-19th century network of cosmopolitan-
minded writers, it was in this international samizdat context that rapprochement 
with Germans over the expulsion narrative first developed. It was also within these 
circles and the expanding network of underground seminars that stemmed from 
them that ideas of a cosmopolitan, Central European identity found salience and 
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began growing in popularity. This trend expanded as the introduction of foreign 
guest lecturers helped forge a deeper spiritual and personal link to the West. 
 The British philosophers did not remain alone in their activism in 
Czechoslovakia, with separate branches established in France, North America, the 
Netherlands, and West Germany.279 In West Germany, work with the JHEF was the 
product of cooperation with a young graduate student, Wolfgang Stock. Born in 
Hannover in 1959 to parents that fled East Germany, Stock was influenced by his 
identification as a refugee child from an early age and took an interest in the 
politics of Central Europe. His views were molded by the European activism of 
Otto von Habsburg, president of the International Paneuropean Union and one of 
the initial members of the European Parliament elected in 1979.280 Stock spent a 
year working on von Habsburg’s 1979 campaign before returning to West Germany 
for his studies. He shared von Habsburg’s vision of a reunited Europe and 
volunteered his spare time to working with the International Society for Human 
Rights in Poland, being one of the first Westerners to arrive in Danzig after the 
imposition of martial law in 1981 driving a truck filled with relief supplies and 
books and literature from the West.281 
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 Stock began his affiliation with the JHEF in 1984 as a master’s student at 
Oxford, when a colleague and Polish activist introduced him to JHEF trustees 
Timothy Garton Ash and Roger Scruton.282 Believing that his efforts were more 
needed in ČSSR than in Poland, Stock focused the majority of his work there for the 
remainder of the 1980s.283 He founded the Academia Copernicana (AC) in 1985 as a 
way to funnel donations and to serve as the unofficial JHEF and Jagiellonian Trust 
partner in West Germany.284 The AC was an important West German asset to 
underground seminars and samizdat in ČSSR and contributed to their operations in 
two primary ways. The first was by sending guest lecturers, primarily to Brno. 
Stock’s interests in Central Europe were more broadly political than the JHEF’s 
interest in teaching philosophy, and he organized speakers from various non-
academic circles, which culminated in the 1989 visit of future SL chairman Berndt 
Posselt. 
The second primary contribution of the AC was sending computers, video 
recorders, and VHS players to modernize samizdat operations in ČSSR. This 
                                                        
282 Ash and Scruton had founded the Jagiellonian Trust in 1984 to organize aid for Poland, and both 
were heavily involved with the JHEF, with Scruton being arguably the JHEF’s most active trustee. 
283 By the mid-1980s, Stock recalls that the strength of the Polish Solidarity and the Polish 
opposition had resulted in a sort of stalemate that left the Polish people considerably more “free” 
than in Czechoslovakia in terms of passively allowing underground seminars in Poland in the so-
called “Flying University.” For more on Poland’s “Flying University,” see: Hanna Buczynska-
Garewicz, “The Flying University in Poland, 1978–1980,” Harvard Educational Review 55 (February 
1985): 20–33. 
284 Academica Copernicana Vereinsregister, Freiburg, West Germany, June 25, 1985, WSA. There 
were seven official trustees of the AC, the minimum required to found a charitable association in 
West Germany, however in actuality the AC itself was little more than an association on paper—they 
were unable to secure significant funding in West Germany, and Stock was the only permanently 
active trustee. Interview, Wolfgang Stock, June 22, 2014. 
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enabled a massive expansion of samizdat publishing operations that significantly 
increased both the quantity and quality of printed materials. Before the AC, those 
wishing to copy samizdat often had to place multiple carbon paper pieces into a 
typewriter and firmly hammer each letter of an entire book in order to produce just 
seven carbon copies. This placed publishers at higher risk of arrest, as they had to 
deal with enormous stacks of paper that were not easily hidden in the event of a 
police raid. With the importation of computers and printers, books could be kept 
digitally and out of immediate sight during any police intrusions. This made it 
easier to print more copies of a text at a time and much quicker than before, greatly 
expanding the scope of samizdat proliferation and with it, the spreading of Central 
European discourses and arguments for revising the expulsion narrative. 
The West Meets the Czech Underground 
 In an era where caution dictated that nothing incriminating be written 
down, the JHEF documents and trip reports provide a rare trove of first-hand 
accounts that details the inner workings of the underground seminars and the 
communities of thought they helped foster. Western visitors stepped into a world 
that was wholly foreign and characterized by cloak-and-dagger secretiveness and 
the ever-present threat of police harassment. Before departing, each new visitor 
was given guidelines detailing how to remain inconspicuous, including what to do 
when being followed, what to say to police if questioned about books or supplies 
they transported, and to always memorize names and addresses and never carry 
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them on paper.285 Police harassment was not uncommon, particularly in the early 
years of the JHEF’s operations. The StB in Prague knew of the seminars by 
prominent dissidents like Hejdánek and Tomin and routinely monitored those who 
visited; the police raided seminars and arrested and interrogated participants with 
varying frequency. By the time the JHEF began operations, regular seminar 
participants were accustomed to this danger and always carried a small overnight 
bag with a tooth brush and toiletries in case they had to spend the night in jail. JHEF 
visitors were swept up in these raids on several occasions286, but the most 
infamous case was the Derrida Affair.  
 In December 1981, as renowned French philosopher Jacques Derrida was 
attempting to return from speaking at seminars in Prague he was arrested at the 
airport and accused of drug smuggling. Airport guards singled him out at security 
check, and after two searches of his luggage with dogs produced nothing they made 
a phone call, whose content Derrida could not understand, searched again and 
found four packets of a brown substance hidden in his suitcase lining, ostensibly 
placed there while the suitcase was alone in Derrida’s hotel room. Derrida was 
                                                        
285 If questioned about their visit visitors were instructed to say they were visiting a friend. In 
Prague, this contact was most often Hejdánek, and in Brno it was playwright Petr Oslzý, both of 
whom were known to have many international friends and colleagues and thus it was not out of the 
ordinary for them to receive visitors. 
286 In 1980, while on two separate visits, JHEF speakers Anthony Kenney and William H. Newton-
Smith were arrested during raids, interrogated, and transported via police escort to the West 
German border where they were unceremoniously deported. Trip Report, Anthony Kenney, April 
1980, JHEF; Email, J.R. Lucas to Barbara Day recalling his visit in February 1981, September 1, 1997, 
JHEF. 
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arrested, interrogated about the substance as well as his purpose for being in 
Prague and contacts there, and transported to prison overnight, though not before 
he asked the defense lawyer present at his interrogation to phone his wife’s 
relatives in Prague and inform them of the situation. Shocked upon hearing the 
news, Derrida’s wife phoned friends with contacts in the French government who 
hastily worked to secure his release. 
Derrida was in Prague as a guest lecturer for Ladislav Hejdánek’s home 
philosophy seminar and became caught in the crossfire of “Operation Isolation,” a 
plan of the StB to publically discredit leading Charter 77 signatories like Hejdánek 
by smearing their visitors and friends with criminal charges.287 Derrida became the 
first victim of this plot directed at Hejdánek, but the police at the airport were 
woefully unaware of the stature of the man whom they had detained and that his 
imprisonment would spark an international incident. Word of Derrida’s 
imprisonment reached French President Mitterand, who did not hesitate to make 
use of the hot line to President Husák’s office. Derrida was roused from his cell 
between 10 and 11pm on day two of his detention, wearing prison pajamas and 
two left-footed shoes he had hastily grabbed from a pile on the floor upon his 
admittance, and he was brought back to the police station. Police brusquely 
informed him that while he was still considered guilty of drug trafficking, he was 
                                                        
287 Jiří Gruntorád, “ŠtB proti Chartě—akce ‘Izolace’,” Listy 27 (1997): 91–96. 
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being expelled from the country. Derrida spent the night in the French embassy 
before boarding a morning train to Paris, where he was met by a crowd of admiring 
French journalists on New Year’s Eve, 1981.288 
 After the embarrassment of the Derrida Affair the StB was much more 
hesitant to be openly hostile toward foreigners at the seminars, though they often 
still followed visitors and warned them verbally on several occasions not to 
proceed to the seminar where they were to give a lecture.289 A notable exception to 
this was the deportation of Roger Scruton in June 1985, although by this point 
Scruton had been a regular visitor to Brno for four years and was known to the StB, 
who upon confronting him in a park said, “We know very well that you speak Czech, 
Mr. Scruton. We should like you to come with us for questioning.” After several 
hours of unproductive interrogation, Scruton was driven to the Austrian border for 
deportation “by squads of cars, all containing the kind of gum-chewing heroes who 
in England would be doing their bit for the Liverpool Fan Club.”290 
                                                        
288 For more on Derrida’s incident in Prague, see: William Echikson, “French Professor’s Arrest Part 
of Prague Crackdown on Intellectuals,” Christian Science Monitor, January 8, 1982; Day, in Velvet 
Philosophers, 92–96; Jason Powell, Jacques Derrida: A Biography (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2006), 151; Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques 
Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 334. 
289 Trip Report, Kathy Wilkes, April 13–15, 1982, JHEF; Letter, Kathy Wilkes to Alan [Montefiore], 
September 1982, JHEF; Trip Report, Jessica Douglas-Home, September 26–October 2, 1985, JHEF; 
Trip Report, John Hale, September 1985, JHEF; Trip Report, RAD Grant, March 20–24, 1986, JHEF. In 
1985 visitor Paul Flather was detained at the border and questioned for ten hours and allowed to 
exit after having his papers confiscated, Trip Report, Paul Flather, November 14–18, 1985, JHEF 
290 Trip Report, Roger Scruton, June 1985, JHEF. 
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 Despite the inherent danger in such trips, most visitors returned with 
glowing reports of their visits. Above all, they were inspired and highly impressed 
by the dedication and enthusiasm of seminar participants. Sociologist David Levy 
noted the interest and excellent questions and discussions of the participants at his 
first lecture in Brno and contrasted it to his regular students in Middelsex who 
often seemed apathetic and disinterested.291 Seminar participants, ranging in age 
from college students to retirees, would crowd in living rooms in groups typically 
between 10–30 in the evening to hear the presentations of the visitors and engage 
in discussion. It was not uncommon for discussions to continue long after the initial 
presentation and extend into the early morning hours. For participants, the 
seminars offered a much-desired venue to learn and discuss freely outside Party 
control, and they comprised a central venue of organization in the underground 
world for the discussion of Czech history, identity and heritage. Participation in 
these seminars, and especially the threat of police raids, helped forge a common 
sense of identity and solidarity and created breeding grounds for the creation of 
collective identities beyond Party control that emphasized multiculturalism and 
common identification with the moral value system of Western Europe. 
                                                        
291 Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. 
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Reaching Beyond Dissident Circles: The Brno Operation 
Harassment and monitoring of the seminars had both a positive and 
negative effect on the underground world: On the one hand, it reinforced a sense of 
community and bond among seminar goers that reinforced impetuses for forging 
shared identities based on the value of human rights which engendered sympathy 
for revising the expulsion narrative. On the other hand, the threat of police 
retaliation relegated many of these gathering sites to a core group of dissidents and 
their families and close friends, and discouraged participation by students enrolled 
in university and professionals with something to lose, hampering the seminars’ 
reach. For those who wished to see free education and learning for wider Czech 
society this development was unacceptable, and the JHEF quickly found a partner 
with the same goal of reaching wider audiences in Jiří Müller. 
Müller helped form a loose group of other signatories of Charter 77 in the 
late 1970s to organize activities, and Brno soon had no shortage of evening 
seminars, underground theater productions, and samizdat publications.292 
However, Müller sought to expand the reach of the underground education in Brno 
beyond these circles. Müller was convinced that Socialism would end in 
Czechoslovakia during his lifetime, and he felt a responsibility to educate and 
prepare society, particularly younger Czechs, to take over afterwards. This included 
                                                        
292 Interview, Jiří Müller, June 11, 2014. For an overview of some of the literary, archaeological, 
Catholic and theater seminars and discussion groups, see: Day, Velvet Philosophers, 141–149. 
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those in the so-called “gray zone” of reform-minded Communists who still held 
official positions but maintained contacts with dissidents.293 It was this group that 
would ultimately help Müller organize educational events in Brno that reached a 
much wider audience and showed that the European way of thinking of the 
dissidents and even their critical approach to the expulsion narrative was also 
shared by many non-dissident professionals and students. 
Müller maintained contact with many dissidents in Prague, and it was them 
that put him in touch with Roger Scruton to assist in expanding his operations. 
After sizing up the dedication and capabilities of his British contact during 
Scruton’s first visit in summer 1981, Müller and Scruton began discussing ways to 
expanding the seminars and unofficial education to wider audiences. He wrote to 
Scruton, “Our foreigner friends often want to support dissidents, their independent 
culture and their independent way of life, first of all. But dissenters are living in a 
ghetto. It is important to support the life of that ghetto, but it is more important to 
seek and discover bridges from the ghetto to society. The organization of lectures, 
as I suggest it, is one such potential bridge.”294 He and Scruton hashed out a plan to 
                                                        
293 Jiřina Šiklová, “The Gray Zone” and the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia,” Social Research 57 
(Summer 1990): 347, 363. Barbara Day estimated that by the second half of the 1980s, 80% of the 
JHEF’s work was done in cooperation with, or directed at, those in the the gray zone; Barbara Day, 
“The Jan Hus Educational Foundation: It’s Origins, Intentions and Development,” in Filosofie 
v podzemí—Filosofie v zázemí: Podoby filosofie v českých zemích v období normalizace a po sametové 
revoluci, ed. Markéta Bendová, Johana Borovanská, and Daniela Vejvodová (Prague: Nomáda, 2013), 
103. 
294 Letter, Jiří Müller to Roger Scruton, August 12, 1984, JHEF. 
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funnel Western lecturers and aid to “impromptu” evening discussion sessions 
organized by people who were not established dissidents and who had the ability 
to work “above ground.”295 
The result was the drastic expansion of the reach of seminars in Brno via an 
intricate system of separated seminar organization that insulated participants from 
all knowledge of illegal activities and protected each branch of Müller’s activities 
from discovery in the event that a particular seminar was harassed or investigated 
by police.296 The Brno operation was a post-Charter development in the sense that 
while Prague’s seminars were organized directly by Charter 77 signatories and 
many of them began even before Charter 77 emerged, activities in Brno were 
directed at non-dissidents, with Charter 77 signatories being forbidden from 
participating.297 The goal was to take the Charter’s call for the creation of a civil 
society and use independent education as a means of sowing those ideas without 
                                                        
295 Interview, Jiří Müller, June 11, 2014. 
296 Separate meeting places were established for JHEF lectures from different countries, with British 
visitors—the most frequent group to visit—alternating between speaking in the homes of Petr 
Oslzý, Miroslav Pospíšil, and Rostatislav Pospíšil. French visitors spoke in the home of the Milan 
Jelínek family, and German visitors spoke in the apartment of Jaroslav Blažke. Participants were 
discouraged from “cross-visiting” seminars to preventthe StB from connecting the various groups, 
and anyone involved in Müller’s multiple samizdat operations was strictly forbidden from visiting a 
seminar and vice versa. This system of separation proved incredibly successful, and not a single 
seminar under Müller’s organization was ever raided. Moreover, Müller worked in the former StB 
archive in the early 1990s and had the opportunity to scour all relevant files from Brno, and he 
discovered no mention of seminars connected to him and found no indication that the StB had any 
knowledge of the existence of the JHEF. Interview, Jiří Müller, June 11, 2014; Interview, Miroslav 
Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. 
297 Miroslav Pospíšil, the primary translator for the British speakers, wanted to put his signature on 
Charter 77 in the mid-1980s but was discouraged by Oslzý and Müller indirectly, as that would have 
violated Müller’s policy of trying to draw as little attention as possible to the seminars and their 
organizers. Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. 
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actively claiming opposition to the regime. The seminars took place roughly once a 
month and were spread via word of mouth and billed as informal discussion 
gatherings, or “evening tea,” where by “coincidence” a foreign visitor was in town 
and decided to give an impromptu lecture. The core group of regular attendees 
soon understood that there was more behind the lectures than happenstance, but 
they learned nothing further, certainly not Müller’s name or the name of the JHEF. 
Even the seminar hosts themselves like Miroslav Pospíšil were kept in the dark 
about the extent of the organization behind it all, keeping in line with the central 
tenant of underground activity, which maintained that “you only know two people 
—the person you hear or receive something from and the person you pass it on 
to.”298 
The extent of the reach of the Brno seminars is impossible to quantify, which 
provides further testament to the growth of an underground civil society even if 
that society was not fully integrated. There was a core group of about thirty 
                                                        
298 The full extent of the operation was only known by Müller himself and the trustees of the JHEF. 
Müller enlisted Petr Oslzý to find hosts for the British visitors, but Oslzý did not know about the 
JHEF. Oslzý then visited the home of Miroslav Pospíšil, whom he knew from his involvement in 
Oslzý’s theater “Goose on a String” and asked him to go for a walk, code that he needed to discuss 
something sensitive. Pospíšil was thirty-one and teaching English at the language institute in Brno at 
the time, having been barred from post-secondary education for refusing to join the Party or to work 
for the StB as a translator. Pospíšil readily agreed to help and become one of the three hosts for 
British visitors and the primary translator for the British visitors. He was involved from the first 
visitor to Brno in 1982 and remained active throughout the decade, yet it took five years before 
Pospíšil learned Müller’s name. Pospíšil eventually assumed there must be someone higher than 
Oslzý behind it all, but this was not something one inquired about, and in actuality he only knew for 
certain that foreign visitors would arrive on certain days and he was to host or translate for them. 
Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014; Interview, Jiří Müller, June 11, 2014. 
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students that attended most British lectures, and Pospíšil estimates there was a 
larger, solid group of sixty to seventy potential participants that would regularly 
attend lectures on specific topics of their interest. This was in addition to others 
who came less frequently. Many of the core participants were also active in their 
own separate undertakings, and they often brought the lecture content and copies 
of books that the visitors provided back to their other groups for discussion and 
further dissemination, so that it was impossible to know just how far the 
information was traveling.299 
The visitor base of the Brno lectures increased significantly toward the end 
of the decade as people in the “gray zone” increasingly dared to become more 
involved and take more risks as the rhetoric coming from Moscow concerning 
censorship softened. The language school that Pospíšil worked at had an English 
Club discussion group for advanced students, and since obtaining approval for an 
official guest lecturer at a university was very difficult and brought with it its own 
oversight and regulations, Pospíšil and Oslzý had the idea of bringing foreign 
                                                        
299 Petr Fiala was one such visitor who also ran his own independent history discussion seminar 
with seven or eight other people. After the British visiting lectures became more regular, he began 
requesting materials from the JHEF lectures to introduce to his seminar. Pospíšil recalls this case as 
one of many that surprised him by how many other unknown ventures taking place in Brno. 
Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. 
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speakers to the English Club instead.300 The cooperation with the language school 
grew to encompass more from the “gray zone” to allow for the English Club to meet 
in larger halls that attracted ever larger audiences and met more frequently as the 
decade progressed.301 Pospíšil recalls of this expansion, “It became so popular that 
they had to move us into a larger room. And then into another. Between two 
hundred and three hundred people started coming to these talks.”302 Pospíšil 
similarly began bringing JHEF speakers to other official organization meetings, like 
the local youth clubs officially operating under the Czechoslovak Socialist Union of 
Youth and the unions for architects and artists, and eventually they involved the 
lecturers in more and more official groups: “I remember the day we said it,” Pospíšil 
recalled. “That was the first time we said, ‘The end is near.’ Because it started 
                                                        
300 The language school English courses already served as a forum for subversive discussion. The 
head of the English department at the language school was an Anglophile who had spent time in 
Britain during WWII involved in the war effort, and he hired his teachers strictly along anti-
Communist ideological lines. Students were mostly young, often rejected from university entrance 
on political grounds, and many of them tried to study from foreign literature on their own time and 
discuss it in class. Instructors did not only teach language, but also culture, politics, and daily life in 
Britain and the USA, and most of the courses had a resounded anti-regime atmosphere; Interview, 
Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. 
301 Pospíšil met with the director of the language school, a Party member, and convinced him to form 
a partnership with the Section of Education of the Revolutionary Trade Unions Movement (ROH) in 
Brno so that the English Club could use their larger meetings rooms and increase capacity beyond 
the twenty-five they had space for. The head of the ROH’s education section in Brno was a Party 
member, but also a childhood friend from Pospíšil’s theater group, and he happily agreed to the 
partnership. After a few sessions Pospíšil gradually introduced native speakers to the meetings, first 
from the group of four or five native speakers living in Brno, then with a writer sent through the 
JHEF. When no backlash came down, they started sending nearly all British JHEF visitors to speak at 
the English Club in addition to their evening home lectures. Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 
2014. 
302 Ibid. 
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snowballing and more and more people were involved. You couldn’t keep track any 
longer of the new initiatives starting. It was fermenting everywhere.”303 
Inside Brno’s Unofficial Education 
 The seminars in Brno provide a window through which we can broach the 
feelings, emotions, and mindset of many of those Czechs participants who thought 
very differently about Czech identity and history than the official Socialist 
narrative. Initially many participants in the seminars were disillusioned by not 
receiving the absolute truths and solutions to Czechoslovakia’s problems they 
longed for, but most quickly began understanding that they were learning critical 
thinking skills and non-partisan scholarly information, something that was absent 
from traditional public education in Czechoslovakia at the time. 304 Above all, the 
seminars provided respite from a daily life where everything else was controlled, 
from what you could read, say, what kind of music you could listen to down to what 
sorts of clothing were acceptable. Pospíšil recalled a gathering of former lecture 
participants twenty years later where they discussed what the seminars meant to 
                                                        
303 Pospíšil could recall this exact moment shared with Oslzý but not the year for certain, though he 
believed it was 1985. Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. The JHEF also became heavily 
involved in the ecological movement in Brno and the underground jazz community. These two 
fields, along with the seminars and samizdat, comprised the “four pillars” of the JHEF’s work in Brno. 
Interview, Jiří Müller, June 11, 2014. 
304 Pospíšil recalled discussing the problem of disappointment and unrealistic expectations with 
Oslzý after the first few visitors, and both worked thereafter to convey to participants that the focus 
of the education should be on expanding general knowledge and building critical thinking skills. 
Interview, Miroslav Pospíšil, June 12, 2014. 
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them, and the general consensus agreed that the biggest impact was, “the liberating 
feeling where suddenly you were in a capsule where you could discuss freely, 
something you couldn’t experience in your everyday life […] The basic feeling 
under that regime was humiliation. The regime deliberately tried to humiliate you 
from the moment you woke up to the moment you went to bed […] A return to 
simple human dignity was the strongest emotional experience.”305 
 During those gatherings beyond the confines of Party rhetoric and 
censorship, the collective feelings and sentiments about Czech identity and history 
reflected much of the cosmopolitanism seen in the expulsion debates and other 
samizdat publications. Pospíšil recalled that the collective “we” in the lectures was, 
“us in Central Europe under Soviet rule. In the political science and philosophy 
lectures the ‘us’ often meant a reference to history,” searching the past for 
traditions of liberalism, humanism, and democracy from which participants could 
draw a blueprint for the future.306 This cosmopolitan sentiment of identity and 
heritage caused a strong desire for visitors from Germany to connect and discuss 
with, and seminar organizers repeatedly pressed their Western colleagues for more 
visitors from West Germany from the early visits throughout the decade.307 In the 
                                                        
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Trip Report, Richard Rorty, June 23, 1981, JHEF; Trip Report, Alan Montefiore and Catherine 
Audard, September 3–8, 1981, JHEF; Trip Report, Roger Scruton, April 1981, JHEF; Trip Report, W.H. 
Newton-Smith, July 2, 1981, JHEF; Trip Report, Roger Scruton, January 11, 1983, JHEF; Trip Report, 
unnamed visitor to Prague, February 1987, WSA; Letter, Wolfgang Stock to Barbara Day and Roger 
Scruton, March 27, 1987, WSA. 
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early years only two visitors from West Germany came, albeit very famous ones in 
Jürgen Habermas and Ernst Tugendhat, who spoke in March 1982 at Hejdánek and 
Peter Rezek’s seminars in Prague and brought over a dozen books for their hosts.308 
Speakers from West Germany increased once Stock founded the Academia 
Copernicana and began actively recruiting visitors, and many of them came from 
outside academia from civil society organizations like human rights foundations.309 
Magdalena Kaufmann of the International Society for Human Rights in West 
Germany (IGMF) was the first AC visitor to travel to Brno and spoke in the seminar 
for German visitors. Kaufmann was surprised to hear the participants express a 
general consensus that the right to return to one’s homeland was the most 
important human right, and they requested her to organize Sudeten German 
visitors and visitors who could speak about the history of Czechs and Sudeten 
Germans, German-Czech heritage and relations. 310 
                                                        
308 Tugendhat himself was originally born in Brno and left as a child in the 1940s. He and Habermas 
had been discussing the idea of visiting Czechoslovakia together for some time when they received 
an invite to visit Czechoslovakia from Richard Rorty from Princeton University, who had already 
visited the previous year through the JHEF and came back highly impressed with the seminars. 
Letter, Ernst Tugendhat to Roger Scruton, September 27, 1981, JHEF; Letter, Ernst Tugendhat to 
Roger Scruton, January 23, 1982, JHEF. 
309 Professor Anna von Stockhausen from Freiburg University visited Prague in February, but the 
majority of the visitors concentrated on Brno, where Stock was also more involved than in Prague. 
Von Stockhausen’s trip was complicated due to a concurrent visit by Belgian Professor Herman 
Parret by a scheduling mix up with Oxford. Letter, Barbara Day to Roger Scruton, March 18, 1987, 
WSA; Trip Report, unnamed visitor to Prague, February 1987, WSA. 
310 To her surprise, her audience even included the wife of the deputy head of the philosophy faculty 
at Purkyně University (renamed Masaryk University after 1989) in Brno as well as a mixture of 
banned academics, Catholic activists, and students. Trip Report, Magdalena Kaufmann, December 
12, 1987, WSA. 
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 Stock and Müller had already been planning as early as September 1987 to 
send over Sudeten German activist Berndt Posselt. “At that point, we already 
wanted to prepare for the period after Communism and prepare for reconciliation 
between the two neighboring peoples,” recalls Stock of the decision to send 
Posselt.311 Posselt was the son of Sudeten German parents and was a member of the 
SL, where he regularly worked together with leaders of Opus Bonum and the 
Ackermann Gemeinde. He was also an active member in international societies as a 
member of the board of the Paneuropean Union—West Germany, the founder of 
the Paneuropean Union Youth organization in West Germany (Paneuropa-Jugend 
Deutschland), and a member of the IGMF, and he later became a Member of the 
European Parliament from 1994–2014, the Bavarian state head of the Christian 
Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, hereafter, CSU) party’s Union of Expellees 
since 1997, and the national chairman of the SL from 2000–2008, a position that he 
currently holds again since 2014. Posselt came to Brno in October 1989 as both a 
Sudeten German and a Paneuropean Union representative and spoke to the German 
circle as well as the English, since by fall of 1989 the threat of police intervention 
had dwindled to the point that visiting multiple seminars was no longer forbidden. 
 Posselt was originally scheduled to travel to Brno in 1988, but he postponed 
this visit after a personal phone call from the former director of the French external 
                                                        
311 Wolfgang Stock, e-mail message to author, March 9, 2016. 
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intelligence services, Alexandre de Marenches, who warned Posselt of a planned 
plot against him by the StB should he enter the country.312 His talks in Brno 
centered on three major topics: Pan-Europeanism, the immediate political future of 
Eastern Europe in light of the ongoing revolutions in Poland and elsewhere, and on 
the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and the future of German-Czech relations. He 
presented Pan-Europeanism and European integration as a solution to reunite 
Germans and Czechs that had been torn apart by nationalism during and after 
WWII, and also as a blueprint for lasting European peace after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. He portrayed the expulsion as a consequence of Nazi crimes, but not an 
inevitable one, and he stressed the need for reconciliation as a path toward 
successful European integration. Posselt recalls that his audiences were wholly 
receptive and enthusiastic about his talks and were “completely European-
minded.” He described their reception of his discussion of the expulsion as “very 
positive,” saying, “They were very open-minded to this topic. They were a very 
positive group of people. Democratically-oriented, most of them with a certain 
                                                        
312 De Marenches did not share details of the alleged plot, but shortly after Posselt cancelled his 
1988 trip, a friend of Posselt who often helped him smuggle books and materials into 
Czechoslovakia, Martin Leitner, was arrested during a trip to Czechoslovakia under suspicious 
circumstances. Police found a list of addresses of people involved in underground activities in 
Leitner’s suitcase bearing his name, although Posselt was certain that the letter was not in the 
suitcase when Leitner left West Germany. Leitner spent a few days in prison in Plzeň until Posselt 
and the Paneuropean Union secured his release through diplomatic channels via Bonn; Interview, 
Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016; Bernd Posselt, “Erstgeburtsrecht auf Europa,” http://de.paneuropa. 
org/index.php/pan/publikationen/aktuelle_beitraege/erstgeburtsrecht_auf_europa_von_bernd_pos
selt_mdep (accessed April 4, 2016). 
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[religious] moral foundation […] They were people with a clear Central European 
tradition and a Pan-European future.”313 
One of Posselt’s biggest takeaways from his visit was a strong impression of 
the level of education, intellect, and cosmopolitan European sentiment of the 
seminar participants, especially as it regarded their critical stance toward the 
expulsion. Posselt was not the only visitor to encounter Czechs who held revisionist 
views of the official expulsion narrative. British philosopher John Lucas recalled 
being “corrected” on the subject by his two young hosts that were showing him 
around Prague during his visit in 1980. As they walked through Prague’s Jewish 
quarter Lucas commented that the expulsion was a sort of requital for the atrocities 
Germans inflicted on Czechs, and his two hosts challenged his statement: “[They] 
sharply disagreed: The expulsion of Sudeten Germans had been a crime, and one 
that had damaged Czechoslovakia. They had originally come at the invitation of the 
King of Bohemia, and had greatly contributed to the cultural life of Prague in 
particular and Czechoslovakia generally. Prague had been an international city, the 
third greatest in the German-speaking world, and now was a provincial 
backwater.”314 Another host reminisced to his visitor about the German districts he 
                                                        
313 Interview, Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016. 
314 It is interesting to note that this discussion stood out in the visitor’s mind eighteen years after the 
fact, as he wrote a belated report for Barbara Day for her research on the Velvet Philosophers book, 
see: Trip Report, John Lucas, February 1980, recalled in an email sent to Barbara Day on September 
1, 1997, JHEF. 
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knew as a child in his hometown, pondering how secretly ashamed of the violence 
and massacres that older Czechs must have been as he grew up.315 
Conclusion 
 Discourses of Central European identity permeated all aspects of 
underground life in the 1980s, and the revision of the expulsion narrative was a 
common thread running throughout those discourses. This discussion was by no 
means restricted to Czechs living in Czechoslovakia, as evidenced from Milan 
Kundera’s 1984 essay written from abroad, “The Tragedy of Central Europe.”316 
Kundera’s essay expressed a way of thinking generally in line with much of the 
underground—he argued that Central Europe was, in fact, a part of the West 
“kidnapped” and held against its will by the Russian-Soviet tradition, and although 
he argued that its spirit was still alive and visible in the underground activities that 
revolted against this occupation, he lamented that the rest of the Western world 
seemed to see Central Europe as “just a part of the Soviet Empire and nothing more, 
nothing more.”317 
Yet the expulsion debates illustrated that Kundera’s image of a Central 
Europe tied to the west was not new, nor was there a singular interpretation 
                                                        
315 Trip Report, C.H. Sisson, June 3–8, 1988, JHEF. 
316 Milan Kundera, “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” New York Review of Books, April 26, 1984, 
33−38. Kundera’s article is one of the most well-known essays on Central Europe, along with 
Hungarian dissident György Konrád’s “The Dream of Central Europe.” For more on these essays and 
the Central European discourse more broadly, see: Wessel, “Die Mitte liegt Westwärts,” 325–344. 
317 Kundera, “Tragedy of Central Europe,” 37. 
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accepted for what defined Central Europe or Czech’s position within it. 318 A 
rebuttal to Kundera in Střední Evropa rejected his interpretation of Central 
European identity on the grounds that it was a secular one that disregarded the 
role of religion in Central European societies, and this and other responses to 
Kundera refuted his totalitarian perspective of a passive Central Europe being acted 
upon by the greater Soviet behemoth: “Our situation is not entirely the work of a 
usurping totalitarian power. The bed was already made by the romantic 
consciousness of a ‘Slav mutuality’ in our country. And when the Russians 
perfidiously entered the bed, we got what we had asked for.”319 This perspective 
echoed the expulsion debates in their sense of urgency in national historical self-
reflection and demonstrates that the Central European discourse was not simply 
taken at face value, but rather it was a discourse of debate and negotiation over 
how to understand the past in a way that would reflect current values and build a 
blueprint for the future. 
As with the Danubius expulsion debates, opinions and perspectives on how 
to define Central European identity were multifaceted and contested. But, also as 
                                                        
318 For discussions of Kundera’s essay and debates surrounding it, see: Donskis, Yet Another Europe; 
George Schöpflin and Nancy Woods, eds., In Search of Central Europe (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1989). 
319 Josef Hradec, unknown title (translation of an article the author published in the journal Střední 
Evropa) Salisbury Review 4 (1986): 37. For a similar perspective see the rebuttal of Milan Šimečka in, 
Milan Šimečka, “Another Civilization? An Other Civilization?,” in In Search of Central Europe, eds. 
George Schöpflin and Nancy Woods, 159. For this discussion in the context of debating 
totalitarianism, see: Jacques Rupnik, “Totalitarianism Revisited,” in Civil Society and the State, ed. 
John Keane (London: Verso, 1988), 263–289; and: Noël O’Sullivan, “The Concept of Totalitarianism 
in East-Central European Political Thought, With Some Reflections on its Post-Cold War Relevance,” 
Politeja 21 (2012): 49–64. 
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with the expulsion debates, what is most significant is the fact that these 
discussions were taking place and drew widespread interest, indicating the 
mindset of many Czechs at the time that sought to redefine Czech identity in the 
post-1968 era. The idea of Central Europe served as a way to distinguish Czech 
identity from Soviet socialism and identify it with Habsburg and West European 
Judeo-Christian traditions, while also functioning as a tool to delegitimize the 
Communist narrative. In samizdat and underground seminars Czechs young and 
old discussed and debated what exactly Central Europe was, what the nature of 
German and Czech heritage was, all debated with an eye toward a future reunited 
Europe. Defining Czech identity and German-Czech heritage was to form a 
framework for understanding past Czechoslovakian history and to build a blueprint 
to guide future action. Standing behind it was the yearning for a “Return to Europe,” 
which became the public motto in Czechoslovakia after the Velvet Revolution that 
guided international politics for the early 1990s. 
Participants in underground activities were the ones who took over politics 
and education in Czechoslovakia after 1989. They became the mayors, rectors, and 
department heads, ambassadors, ministers, cabinet men, and advisors in Havel and 
Pithart’s Civic Forum government formed after the Velvet Revolution, and many 
more of the former seminar participants moved into jobs in civil society as 
journalists, academics, and more. Many of them carried with them the desire to 
change the public narrative of the expulsion and rehabilitate German-Czech 
relations expressed in samizdat and in underground seminars. Yet, as chapter five 
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illustrates, the popularity of revising the expulsion narrative among these 
individuals did not translate into immediate and lasting acceptance by the wider 
Czech public. As former dissidents and seminar participants took over political 
reins in 1990 and followed the Central European discourse of rehabilitating 
historical German-Czech heritage, they encountered strong resistance from sectors 
of the Czech public, showing that, while expansive, the underground networks still 
only comprised a small subsection of the Czech population. The task at hand after 
1989 would be teaching and guiding the rest of Czech society to adopt the same 
value system and tenants of multicultural identity and heritage established in the 
underground. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUDETEN GERMAN IDENTITY DEBATES AND ACTIVISM, 1975–1989 
 
Czechs were not the only ones in Central Europe engaged in polemical 
identity debates during the 1970s and 1980s, nor were non-confessional dissidents 
the only group to organize underground and build an independent sub-society in 
Czechoslovakia with Western contacts. This period also saw bitter disagreement 
within the Sudeten German community over what constituted Sudeten German 
identity, and it was similarly a period of forging widespread and important contacts 
between Sudeten Germans and underground Czech clergy. The identity debates 
highlighted a conflict among Sudeten Germans over whether to identify themselves 
as a historical ethnic group distinct from Czechs and demand a right to return and 
reclaim lost property, or whether Sudeten Germans should emphasize shared 
heritage with Czechs and pursue cooperation, dialogue, and reconciliation to 
achieve many of the same ends. And during the same era when the Western 
contacts of Czech dissidents molded a generation of leaders to guide Czechs toward 
German-Czech reconciliation and European integration after 1989, so too did 
Sudeten German contacts with Czech clergy help lay the groundwork for 
reconciliation efforts and rebuilding German-Czech relations after the end of 
Communism. 
This chapter highlights these developments by focusing on the ideological 
differences that surfaced during a conflict between the SL and Sudeten German 
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academic researchers with the Collegium Carolinum (CC) and the AG, and it 
uncovers extensive cooperation and contacts between the AG and underground 
clergy in Czechoslovakia. The conflict between the SL and the CC echoed the 
expulsion debate in that it centered on competing notions of collective identity, in 
this case what it meant to be an ethnic German from the Czech lands. History-
writing was the primary battleground here as well, as the conflict manifested in a 
struggle for control of the most prominent Sudeten German research organ for the 
Czech lands, the Collegium Carolinum. Both sides wanted publications that would 
support and reinforce their particular view of ethnic identity in the Czech lands, yet 
their views were grounded in opposing notions of what constituted that identity. 
The Czech debates over the expulsion and the SL-CC conflict echoed the same wider 
European currents of emphasizing increased European integration, bridging the 
East-West divide, and promoting human rights expressed in the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords. 
At the same time, AG leaders became more heavily active in spreading their 
network of cooperation with Czechs to Czech clergy in Czechoslovakia. They forged 
a large network of contacts and helped supply materials for religious samizdat 
operations, financed dioceses, and sent travel groups of Sudeten Germans across 
the border to bridge the information and contact divide on a local level at a time 
when organized religion in Czechoslovakia was strongly repressed, underfunded, 
and understaffed, and largely isolated from the Vatican and the Western world. 
These local contacts forged a grassroots network of Sudeten Germans and Czechs 
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that laid the foundation for future initiatives after 1989 and contributed to 
understanding on both sides that would help smooth the transition toward 
European integration after 1989. 
The Sudeten German Homeland Association, the Collegium Carolinum, and 
the Struggle for the Soul of Sudeten Germans 
Leaders of Sudeten German organizations keenly followed the new 
developments in opinion expressed in the Czech expulsion debates. It was a central 
issue in discussions of the Council in preparing the annual resolution to be read at 
the 1979 Sudeten German Day, of which Stingl was a member, and the AG board 
roundly agreed with the importance of spreading its awareness among wider West 
German society.320 Later, when the StB uncovered Mlynárik’s identity behind the 
Danubius essay in 1980 and drove him into exile in West Germany, the AG and the 
Council supported him financially and invited him as a guest speaker at AG 
functions as well as the annual Sudeten German Day gathering on Pentecost.321 
The AG continued their push for increased integration with the Czech exile 
community, with Opus Bonum remaining the primary partnership in this 
                                                        
320 Vorstandssitzung der AG, January 13, 1979, AG 131; Interview, Franz Olbert, June 17, 2014. 
321 Protokoll, Vorstandssitzung der AG, January 10, 1981, AG 132. Franz Olbert was one of, if not the, 
first to receive Mlynárik upon his arrival in Munich in 1981, and paid for his hotel out of his own 
pocket. Interview, Franz Olbert, June 17, 2014. The Council also secured a 2500 DM stipend for 
Mlynárik upon his arrival in West Germany; Sitzungsprotokoll der Sudetendeutscher Rat, June 25, 
1982, BayHStA SDA NL Becher 126. 
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cooperation.322 Opus Bonum’s annual summits in Franken were the premier events 
highlighting the Opus Bonum-AG cooperation, and Olbert and other AG leaders 
were present every year for discussions that included many contributors to the 
Danubius debates, including Mlynárik in 1985, as well as papers read in absentia 
written by Havel and Josef Zvěřina, a close contact of the AG and advisor to the 
Archbishop of Prague, Cardinal František Tomášek.323 Many of these same Czechs 
as well as other prominent émigrés were featured speakers at AG national summits 
and meetings throughout the 1980s.324 
However, a difference of opinion persisted within the Sudeten German 
community between those who shared an inclusivst multicultural and multiethnic 
view of historical Sudeten German identity and those who took an exclusivist 
national view and sought to reinforce an inward-oriented Sudeten German identity 
that involved Czechs only insofar as they reinforced a distinctly separate Sudeten 
German Volksgruppe (ethnic group). Similar to the Czech debates on expulsion 
history, proponents of these two camps aired their differences out in a very public 
                                                        
322 Protokoll, Vorstandssitzung der AG, January 10, 1981, AG 132; Ernst Nitter, Bemerkungen zur 
Top 5 und 6 der Vorstandssitzung vom 4. Oktober, 1980, October 1, 1980, AG 132. AG leaders also 
sought to sponsor more prominent Czechs like Mlynář and Tigrid to speak at their own events for 
primarily Sudeten German audiences to further promote such cooperation; Vorstandssitzung der 
AG, December 22, 1979, AG 132. 
323 In addition to regular Franken summit attendees Prečan and Tigrid, the 1981 summit featured 
Danubius debate contributors Erazim Kohák, Jiří Lederer, Rio Preisner, Jan Tesař, and Ivan Medek; 
Pozvánka na 4. Setkání ve Frankenu, 13.–17.5 Franken 1981, ČSDS Opus Bonum Franken 1981. 
Havel and Zvěřina sent papers for the 1984 summit on totalitarianism; Pozvánka s předběžným 
programem Franken 1984, ČSDS, Opus Bonum Franken 1984. Mlynárik spoke in 1985; Pozvánka 
Franken 1985, ČSDS Opus Bonum Franken 1985. 
324 Raimund Paleczek, “Übersicht über die Jahrestagungen bzw. Bundestreffen (ab 1969),” in 
Paleczek, Integration und Dialog, 156–157. 
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way during a debate in the 1970s and 1980s over the academic program and future 
direction of the Sudeten German-founded research institute Collegium Carolinum 
seated in Munich. 
On the surface, the rift resembled a power struggle between the SL and the 
CC, when the latter declared its intention not to relocate its office into an SL-
conceived Sudeten German Center to be built in Munich and which was to share 
space with the SL and the Sudeten German Archive. Underlying the power struggle, 
however, were fundamentally different visions of Sudeten German identity and 
what role the research and publications of the CC should play in reinforcing those 
distinct visions. The SL called for a strict concentration on Sudeten German-only 
historical research that would foster an exclusivist heritage of Sudeten Germans as 
a historically distinct ethnic group, and they attacked the multiethnic approach of 
the CC that focused on all cultures and nationalities of Bohemian society. The CC, 
with support from leaders of the AG, argued in favor of a comprehensive inclusivist 
focus that highlighted Sudeten German as well as Czech, Slovak, Jewish and other 
histories and emphasized cosmopolitanism and multiethnicity in the historical 
Czech lands. 
This conflict, however, cannot be reduced to a simple institutional power 
struggle. AG and SL leaders of the time equally stress that these two organizations 
were not fundamentally at odds, as many AG leaders were also members of the SL 
and vice-versa. They tell instead that there were two separate camps within the 
larger Sudeten German umbrella organizations like the SL and the Council divided 
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between those with inclusivist and exclusivist views of Sudeten German identity 
and heritage.325 The only Sudeten German organization that these leaders claimed 
was too nationalistic to effectively cooperate with was the Witikobund, of which the 
SL speaker and chairman, Walter Becher326 was also member.327 
The conflict that played out between the SL and the CC in the 1970s and 
1980s, though carried out in the name of the SL, was in fact largely a product of 
Becher, who wrote a number of position pieces defining his view of Sudeten 
German identity that he and others felt the CC and its Bohemian outlook was not 
promoting. That the conflict over viewpoints and ideas took place within the SL as 
opposed to between the SL and other institutions is further evidenced by continual 
calls of the AG and Seliger Gemeinde to encourage their members to run for SL 
                                                        
325 Interview, Franz Olbert, June 17, 2014; Interview, Anton Otte, June 10, 2014; Interview, Berndt 
Posselt, March 4, 2016; Interview, Matthias Dörr, June 16, 2014. 
326 Walter Becher (1912–2005) was one of the original activists involved in organizing Sudeten 
German lobby institutions after 1945, including being a founding member of the Council and its 
general secretary until 1982. He was assistant director of the SL from 1968 onward until he 
becoming its director in 1982, and he also served in the German Bundestag from 1965–1980. For 
more on his life, see: Walter Becher, Zeitzeuge: Ein Lebensbericht (Munich: Langen Muller, 1990). 
327 Posselt and Olbert refrained from categorizing Becher as a fundamentally polarizing person or 
challenging individual to work with, and neither dismissed him as merely a radical Witikobund 
functionary. Posselt described him as a “very unique” person who was originally close to the 
Witikobund but who was a Bohemian at heart and wrote near his death that the Witikobund should 
not be allowed to be named after Adalbert Stifter’s Witikonen because they did not stand for 
German-Czech understanding; Interview, Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016; Interview, Franz Olbert, 
June 17, 2014.  
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leadership positions to offset the strong representation of exclusivist-minded 
members, especially from the Witikobund.328 
Origins of the Sudeten German Center 
The conflict between the SL and CC emerged during planning for an 
initiative between the SL and the Bavarian government to erect a Sudeten German 
Center in Munich for the preservation and promotion of Sudeten German heritage 
and history in the 1970s. An earlier discussion about establishing a permanent 
center for expellees in Bavaria began in 1951 and led to the opening of the House of 
the German East (Haus des deutschen Ostens) in 1970. Throughout its planning and 
development, various representatives of the SL pushed for a floor in the house 
dedicated solely to Sudeten Germans, or for a separate center altogether. For the 
latter idea, the concept from the SL was to create a common “house for the political 
Sudeten German institutes,” including the CC in this concept.329 
                                                        
328 AG leaders also expressed their concerns about the Witikobund having too much influence in the 
SL and their working to marginalize the AG to the West German Cardinal and future pope, Joseph 
Ratzinger, in preparation for his celebration of mass at the 1979 Sudeten German Day; 
Themenvorschlag für Gespräch mit Erzbischof Kardinal Ratzinger am 14.5.1979, AG 1586. For 
internal discussions about more AG and Seliger Gemeinde members running for SL board positions, 
see: Durchschrift, Franz Ohmann an SL-Bundesgeschäftsstelle im Hause, November 11, 1979, AG 
1586; Protokoll, Vorstandssitzung der AG, September 23, 1983, AG 132; Protokoll, Vorstandssitzung 
der AG, May 14, 1983, AG 132. See also rebuttals to accusations that the SL is overrepresented with 
Witikobund members: Letter, Walter Becher to Franz Olbert, November 15, 1979, AG 1586; and: 
Letter, Erich Kukuk to Herr Ullman, February 12, 1980, AG 1586. 
329 Betreff: Besuch von Vertretern der SL (SL) bei Herrn Staatsminister, Vormerkung von Fritz 
Wittmann für Staatsminister Fritz Pirkl, December 6, 1968, BayHStA MarbLaFlü 2186. 
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The idea for a separate Sudeten German Center altogether gained traction in 
1972 as three SL members and Bavarian ministerial employees began working 
behind the scenes to rally political support for a separate house. They found an 
open ear in Fritz Pirkl, Bavarian Minister for Employment, who was also 
responsible for overseeing the official state patronage (Schirmherrschaft) of 
Sudeten Germans that the Bavarian state declared in 1954.330 Pirkl announced the 
intention to erect a cultural house for Sudeten Germans at the 1973 Sudeten 
German Day and formed a working group to plan for its establishment, while also 
soliciting the political backing of Bavarian Minister-President Alfons Goppel.331 
Pirkl remained one of the core proponents and facilitators of erecting the Sudeten 
German Center up through its dedication, and worked closely with Becher and the 
SL, whose members comprised the bulk of the working group for the establishment 
of the house.332 
 Bavarian political support for the Sudeten German Center took place in the 
larger geopolitical context of Ostpolitik and the negotiation of the 1973 Treaty of 
Prague between the Federal Republic of Germany and the ČSSR. The treaty declared 
the 1938 Munich Agreement, the legal basis for the annexation of the Sudeten 
lands, to be void. This was something SL leaders and the Bavarian CSU party, to 
                                                        
330 Franzen, Der vierte Stamm Bayerns, 301. 
331 Ibid., 295–298. 
332 Ibid., 296–305. 
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which the overwhelming majority of SL leaders belonged, had adamantly opposed, 
and it was part of the wider decline in expellee political influence in Bonn that 
began with the election of Brandt’s SPD-led coalition government in 1969.333 The SL 
had previously held to the Munich Agreement as the legal basis for their claim to 
lost property and the right to return to their former homeland. With this basis 
effectively gone, and with expellees and their children having successfully 
integrated and largely prospered in West German society over the previous decade, 
Becher and many other Sudeten German political leaders feared that this 
integration would mean the end of Sudeten German legal claims: with the Munich 
Agreement repudiated, no representation of their claims in the Brandt regime, and 
without a strong and unified Sudeten German community, who or what would 
provide the basis for legitimizing their legal claims?334 
Thus, planning for the Sudeten German Center took place at a critical 
turning point in expellee history: Sudeten German organizations not only had to 
contend with an aging population, dwindling numbers, and concerns over how to 
preserve a strong Sudeten German identity to legitimize legal claims, but they also 
faced increased marginalization in West German society. Their political influence 
was waning, and their opposition to Ostpolitik framed expellees as out of sync with 
the rest of society as ideas of a German “East” disappeared from the political and 
                                                        
333 Ibid., 405–423. 
334 Walter Becher, “Der permanente Betrug,” Deutscher Ostdienst 28, January 23, 1986, 1–2. For SL 
reactions to the Treaty of Prague, see: Franzen, Der vierte Stamm Bayerns, 405–412. 
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cultural mindset of West Germany. This dual crisis for Sudeten Germans heightened 
a sense of imperativeness and importance in defining the mandate and purpose of 
the Sudeten German Center as well as the CC and sparked heavy debate about what 
view of Sudeten German identity these institutions should promote. 
From the beginning it was clear from ministerial discussions with the SL 
that the Sudeten German Center would serve as a symbol of defiance against 
Ostpolitik and the concessions made to Czechoslovakia in the Treaty of Prague. 
Discussions of the Sudeten German Center’s mandate reflected the SL’s continued 
insistence on the right to return to their former homes (Heimatrecht), a policy line 
that the Brandt regime abandoned, with phrases stating that the center should 
project the “spiritual and cultural emanations” of Sudeten Germans “internally and 
externally,” referring to demonstrating their assertions of Heimatrecht toward West 
Germany’s eastern neighbors.335  
Mounting Tensions between the Collegium Carolinum and the Sudeten 
German Homeland Association 
The political symbolism of the house, and being publically associated with 
the political arm of Sudeten Germans, the SL, were things that CC leaders were 
                                                        
335 Errichtung eines Sudetendeutschen Zentrums in München. Bericht über die bisherige 
Entwicklung und den gegenwärtigen Sachstand, July 4, 1975, BayHStA MArbLAFlü 2189. For similar 
statements see: Entwurf einer Ministerratsvorlage: Errichtung eines Sudetendeutschen Zentrums, 
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wary of from the initial planning stages for the Sudeten German Center. In an early 
meeting between the CC and SL discussing the concept of the Sudeten German 
Center as a site of Sudeten German identity and cultural preservation, the SL 
proceeded under the assumption that the CC would go along with the SL’s concept, 
but CC board member Ferdinand Seibt took exception to the presumption that the 
CC would fall in line and serve the SL’s agenda, raising among other objections that, 
“One cannot conduct Sudeten German research, only object-related research.”336 
This statement by Seibt drew a distinction in opinion between Becher and the CC 
concerning how to view Sudeten German history and heritage that defined the 
ensuing conflict, and it reflected the institutional and intellectual shift away from 
Sudeten German circles toward the wider West German and international scholarly 
community taken by the CC. 
The CC was founded in 1956 two years after Bavaria took over patronage of 
the Sudeten Germans, and it received annual financing from the Bavarian state with 
funds earmarked under the Schirmherrschaft. Yet from its early years, its directors 
and board members hesitated to describe it as a “Sudeten German institution,” 
opting to highlight the wording of its charter as a “research institute for the 
Bohemian lands” and directing research to issues of Czechs, Slovaks, and Bohemian 
                                                        
336 Niederschrift der Besprechung mit Vertretern sudetendeutscher Einrichtungen am 12.11.1973 
im großen Sitzungssaal des Bayrischen Staatsministeriums für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, BayHStA 
MarbLaFLü 2190. 
 185 
 
Jews in addition to Sudeten Germans.337 An overt shift to a more cosmopolitan 
scholarly approach began in 1958 when Karl Bosl took over as director and worked 
to reduce the SL and the Sudeten German Archive’s influence within the CC, 
replacing many older personnel with younger scholars of a more European outlook. 
He declared his intention to disassociate the CC with Sudeten German “revanchism” 
by the “renouncing of all ideologies” and a turn to a “strict scientific approach” to 
the CC’s work that would focus on “de-ideologization, de-mythification, 
objectification [and] Europeanization.”338 The title of the CC’s scholarly journal that 
began under Bosl, Bohemia, is telling in this regard. 
Bosl’s redirection of the CC toward a Bohemian approach began two and a 
half decades of conflict between the CC and SL that rested in ideological and 
political differences spearheaded by Bosl and Seibt on the one side, and Becher on 
the other.339 Over the next decade SL leaders often criticized that the CC “no longer 
                                                        
337 Franzen, Der vierte Stamm Bayerns, 346–349. Despite these early statements promoting 
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Hans Schütz, Johannes Strosche, Ottokar Chyla, Wolkmar Gabert, Frank Gaksch, and Richard 
Reitzner, March 28, 1958, BayHStA SDA NL Lodgman von Auen 1956–1962 XIV-10. 
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considers itself a ‘Sudeten German institution’” and complained that their 
connection to the SL was “only through coincidental relationships between 
individuals. The CC does not even invite board members of the SL to their scholarly 
presentations, conferences, and seminars.”340 SL leaders were growing 
discontented with the shift in focus of what they regarded as “their” research 
institute, and they used the creation of a Sudeten German Center as an opportunity 
to exert more influence over the CC’s research program and redirect it toward 
enhancing Sudeten German history and identity. 
The Collegium Carolinum-Sudeten German Homeland Association Conflict 
and Competing Notions of Sudeten German Identity 
The ensuing conflict was a messy affair involving attempts to coerce and 
strong-arm either side via political posturing and influencing public opinion. 
Previous scholarship has outlined some of these maneuvers elsewhere, yet the 
conflict emerges largely as a turf war between rival institutions that fails to grasp 
the deeper ideological rift between how differing camps within the Sudeten 
German community sought to remember and tell Sudeten German history and 
heritage.341 As tensions rose between the SL and the CC during the early planning 
years of the Sudeten German Center, the conflict turned to a debate about what 
                                                        
340 Memo, Fritz Wittmann, Betreff: Besuch von Vertretern des Bundesvorstands der 
Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft bei Staatsminister Fritz Pirkl, December 6, 1968, BayHStA 
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constituted Sudeten German identity—or for the CC, whether that concept was 
even useful or historically accurate. While SL leaders felt the CC should concentrate 
on Sudeten German issues for the good of the Volksgruppe, scholars of the CC 
followed wider value-driven trends in Western Europe that emphasized 
multiculturalism and European integration and identified themselves and their 
work more with the international scholarly community than with Sudeten 
Germans.342 Moreover, the conflict centered on the function of history writing to 
reinforce a specific vision of group identity. Discussion over whether the CC would 
indeed join the new Sudeten German Center and under what terms became a 
debate between two competing notions of the present and future function of the CC 
—a research institution for the Bohemian lands that promoted ethnic inclusion, or 
an institute whose research aimed at documenting and preserving a distinct vision 
of a separate Sudeten German identity and heritage. 
In a series of essays, Becher laid out his arguments for an exclusivist view of 
Sudeten German identity as he sought to coerce the CC to fall in line with his view in 
terms of their research program and to quite literally bring the CC under the roof of 
the SL. The first text was a 1975 speech published in the SL’s Sudetenland bulletin 
titled “History and Historical Consciousness” in which he argued for a historically 
fixed concept of Sudeten German-ness (Sudetendeutschtum) as spiritually and 
                                                        
342 The shift in focus was visible in the CC’s first conference under director Bosl in 1959, titled “The 
Sudeten Question in European Perspective.” 
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geographically the most central group of the German people, and “the ‘people at the 
heart of Europe’ in the true sense of the word,” referring to Sudeten Germans’ 
spiritual and political location at the crossroads of Central Europe.343 On the surface 
this statement seemed to echo views of AG leaders and other inclusivist Sudeten 
Germans that Sudeten German heritage represented modern European 
multiculturalism and integration, but here Becher intended for his statement to 
illustrate pride in Sudeten Germans as a separate group whose values and work 
ethic contributed to European progress, not as Sudeten Germans as a model for 
multiculturalism. 
In a publication aimed at rallying support of the old and younger 
generations of Sudeten Germans around pride in their identity and inspiring 
cultural work to preserve it, Becher praised the significance of Sudeten Germans for 
historical European progress, but he argued that this heritage and identity risked 
extinction without continued historical research to nourish and foster a sense of 
unified identity and heritage.344 He laid out a list of suggested themes for research 
to strengthen Sudeten German’s self-consciousness that he would repeat in future 
                                                        
343 “Es [Sudetendeutschtum] ist im echten Sinne des Wortes ‘Herzvolk Europas,’ ” cited from Becher’s 
recounting of this essay in: Walter Becher, “Identität und historisches Selbstverständnis der 
Sudetendeutschen,” presentation given at a summit at Der Heiligenhof, January 20, 1978, AG 829, 12. 
344 Walter Becher, “Identität und Geschichtsbewusstsein,” AG 829; original publication came in 
Sudetenland 17 (1975). 
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essays and speeches over the coming decade.345 Becher referred to the CC as an 
institution with a duty to Sudeten Germans to pursue these themes, though for now 
he refrained from direct criticism and simply called on them to expand on his 
suggested themes in the future. Interestingly, Becher appealed to his audience by 
connecting the plight of Sudeten Germans and that of Palestinians led by Yasser 
Arafat, a comparison which became a popular theme among Sudeten Germans 
during the late 1970s and 1980s trying to relate the struggle for Heimat to a human 
rights issue that was more popular politically in post-1968 West Germany and was 
supported by recent United Nations resolutions concerning national minority 
rights.346  
Conflict ramped up in 1977 when Bosl announced his intentions to end the 
CC’s partnership with the Sudeten German Archive for a jointly-held library and 
instead to forge a partnership with the Munich Institute of East European 
Studies.347 Becher responded to this by threatening to redirect the CC’s funding to a 
                                                        
345 These included the Sudeten German worker’s movements, the origins of the social democrats, the 
history of Sudeten German cultural centers and activism, “people without a capital,” and other 
themes that focused on the role of nationally-defined Sudeten German organizations in the 
agricultural development and industrialization of the Czech lands; Becher, “Identität und 
Geschichtsbewusstsein.” 
346 For a more in-depth look at how Sudeten Germans invoked the Palestinian cause to further their 
political aims in West Germany, see: Komska, “Heimat in the Cold War,” 1–47. For the adoption of 
human rights as a legitimization of Sudeten German claims to the homeland, see: Franzen, Der vierte 
Stamm Bayerns, 405–406. 
347 This institute has since relocated to Regensburg has been renamed the Institute for East and 
Southeast European Studies. 
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new research institute that would focus on Sudeten Germans exclusively.348 In 
1978 Becher penned his second major essay on Sudeten German identity as part of 
a larger attempt to put additional pressure on the CC to move into the Sudeten 
German Center and maintain its ties with the SL and Sudeten German Archive.349 
That January, Becher read the essay, titled “Identity and the Historical Self-
Conception of Sudeten Germans,” at a summit at the Sudeten German educational 
institute Der Heiligenhof in Bad Kissingen, in which he criticized the previous work 
of the CC and argued for a “right to identity” inherent for all Sudeten Germans that 
the CC was failing to reinforce with its scholarship.350 
Becher argued for a strict vision of Sudeten German identity that was 
distinctly separate and delineable from their Slavic neighbors in the Czech lands 
and needed to be remembered and preserved as such: “That which we call a people 
                                                        
348 The new institute would be called the Collegium Sudeticum and would hold Sudeten German 
issues as its main focus of research and publication. Becher argued that the purpose of the CC had 
always been to foster a self-consciousness and self-understanding of the Sudeten German people, 
while Bosl argued that the CC was an institute for the Bohemian lands, and he expressed concerns 
about maintaining close working relationships with the Sudeten German Archive and SL for fear of 
appearing biased to the wider academic community; Besprechung des Bundesvorstandes der 
Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft mit dem Vorstand des Collegiums Carolinum am Dezember 20, 
1977, AG 1586. The concept of the Collegium Sudeticum was realized in 1979 with separate funding 
as the Sudeten German Academy of Sciences and Arts and is seated today in the Sudeten German 
House. 
349 Besprechung des Bundesvorstandes der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft mit dem Vorstand 
des Collegiums Carolinum am Dezember 20, 1977, AG 1586; Letter, Walter Becher to CC, January 3, 
1978, AG 1586. Becher also wrote to Stingl requesting he appeal to Bosl on Becher’s behalf, though 
Stingl would remain neutral if not on Bosl’s side; Letter, Walter Becher to Josef Stingl, February 2, 
1978, AG 1586. 
350 Copies of this speech circulated widely within the various Sudeten German organs including the 
CC, AG, Seliger Gemeinde, Adalbert Stifter Verein and Witikobund; Walter Becher, “Identität und 
historisches Selbstverständnis der Sudetendeutschen,” presentation given at a summit at Der 
Heiligenhof, January 20, 1978, AG 829. 
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[Volk] or ethnic group [Volksgruppe] is a naturally given, legitimate area of life 
larger than the individual—a subdomain of humanity bestowed by the divine order 
of creation [Schöpfungsordnung] […] Whoever nourishes this conviction […] must 
prize and respect this [identity] as a requirement of its cohesion.”351 For Becher, the 
need for preserving Sudeten German identity stemmed from the Brandt regime’s 
opening of relations to the east and the political marginalization of expellees, as he 
wrote: “a general dissolution of spiritual, religious and political values also 
disassembles national consciousness and allows the liberal-social regime and [new] 
relations to the East to place the commitment to German identity in question.”352 
A central tendency of negotiating and fostering a sense of collective identity 
is to create historical narratives that reflect the values and contours of identity in 
the mind of those that hold it, and a primary emphasis of Becher’s essay argued that 
the CC was not fulfilling this function for Sudeten Germans. He wrote that, “to the 
protection of our right to identity belongs a historical consciousness that 
corresponds to this reality,” and he devoted a vast portion of his essay to the ways 
in which the CC and Bosl in particular were failing in this regard and damaging to 
Sudeten Germans. He singled out Bosl’s 1976 publication “Bohemia and its 
Neighbors” in which Bosl eschewed referencing Sudeten Germans as a distinct 
ethnic group and referred to Sudeten German-ness as “a late form of community 
                                                        
351 Becher, “Identität und historisches Selbstverständnis,” 3. 
352 Ibid., 1. 
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consciousness [Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein], which ethnologically and sociologically 
eludes classification.”353 Becher criticized Bosl for “neutralizing” the history of the 
Bohemian lands and for largely excluding the term “Sudeten German-ness” from 
the lexicon. 
Becher’s essay was a rallying call for Sudeten German unity under Becher’s 
exclusivist vision of the Sudeten German Volksgruppe and a declaration against the 
Bohemian outlook of the CC. Becher warned his audience that Bosl was 
“dangerous,” saying, “we should not indulge in the illusion that the man that has 
stood at the top of the CC founded by us [Sudeten Germans] is hereby declaring as a 
requirement of his historical writing the disappearance of Sudeten German-ness 
from the consciousness of our fellow men and the loss of his identity.”354 Becher 
ended his essay by praising Sudeten Germans’ role in developing the agriculture 
and economy of the Sudetenland that bound them as a distinct ethnic group, and he 
called on “all landsmen, but especially the framers of our history writing, to praise 
the truth as the eye of our history and to never allow it to be distorted!”355 
This highlighting of Sudeten Germans’ role in transforming the economic 
landscape of the Sudetenland was part of a redefinition of the basis for legitimizing 
Sudeten Germans’ claim to the homeland to fill the void left by the renunciation of 
the legal terms of the Munich Agreement in the 1973 Treaty of Prague. The 
                                                        
353 Karl Bosl, ed., Böhmen und seine Nachbarn (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1976); Becher, “Identität 
und historisches Selbstverständnis,” 6–7. 
354 Becher, “Identität und historisches Selbstverständnis,” 7–10. 
355 Ibid., 17. 
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“Manifesto ’79”—a joint statement of goals by the SL and the Council presented at 
the 1979 Sudeten German Day gathering—encoded this new basis for legitimizing 
Sudeten Germans’ claims. It adopted Becher’s assertion of a “right to identity,” and 
it also highlighted Sudeten Germans’ historical role in tilling the countryside, 
developing the economy, and in the industrialization of the Czech lands. Next, the 
manifesto declared as a separate, single-sentence paragraph: “These 
accomplishments constitute the legitimate claim of Sudeten Germans to their 
ancestral homeland, irrespective of agreements and treaties.”356 
The redirection to a historical-moral basis for legitimizing Sudeten Germans’ 
claim to the homeland helps explain the importance that Becher and others placed 
on preserving a distinct Sudeten German identity and heritage and why Becher 
fought so hard against the CC, which he felt was weakening the foundation for this 
claim. In Becher’s eyes, a CC that promoted a cosmopolitan, Bohemian outlook of 
society in the Czech lands and downplayed the historical existence of a distinctly 
separate Sudeten German ethnic group obfuscated the formative role that Sudeten 
Germans as a distinct minority group played in developing the Sudetenland and 
presented a direct threat to the (newly defined) legitimacy of Sudeten Germans’ 
claim to their homeland. 
                                                        
356 “The right to one’s homeland includes an inherent right to identity. The right to foster and 
preserve this [identity] is the right of all who avow themselves to a shared homeland.” Manifest ’79 
der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft und des Sudetendeutschen Rates, 1979, full text can be 
found in: Becher, Zeitzeuge, 465–467. 
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The CC’s response to Becher’s and other SL leaders’ campaigns against it 
came primarily from Ferdinand Seibt, who was a former student of Karl Bosl, an 
active member of the AG since 1949, and the new head of the CC beginning in 
1980.357 He exchanged a series of unproductive letters with Becher in the summer 
of 1980 where both gave arguments and accusations and reiterated their 
previously stated positions concerning the mandate of the CC and its research.358 
Seibt also forwarded copies of this correspondence to Stingl, who circulated it 
among other AG leaders to find a common stance.359 
Seibt then took his position to the pages of the Sudeten German periodical 
Volksbote and the Sudetendeutsche Zeitung in a seven-page essay titled “The CC and 
                                                        
357 Articles by Becher and other SL leaders at this time against the research outlook of the CC 
include: E.M., “Die Eigenkraft der Volksgruppe SL-Bundesvorstand tagte in München,” Volksbote, 
May 2, 1980, 1; Walter Becher, “Die Gründungsintentionen des ‘Collegium Carolinum,’ ” Volksbote, 
July 4, 1980, 10. Meanwhile, Becher had already begun pressing the relevant Bavarian ministries to 
have the CC’s funding redirected to a new Collegium Sudeticum if the CC refused to move into the 
Sudeten German Center and align their research program with Becher’s vision. The Bavarian 
Ministry of Employment’s office under Pirkl supported Becher, while Hans Maier of the Bavarian 
Ministry of Culture felt the CC was operating within its mandate; Letter, Walter Becher to Alfons 
Goppel, February 24, 1978, AG 1586; Letter, Walter Becher to Fritz Pirkl, February 24, 1978, AG 
1586; Letter, Walter Becher to Hans Maier, February 24, 1978, AG 1586. 
358 Becher criticized the CC’s Bohemia journal as “cheap, third-class pamphlets” that “distorted 
Sudeten German-ness from Czechoslovakian and Marxist perspectives,” while Seibt challenged 
Becher to provide evidence of his accusations and asserted confidence in the public and 
international support and respect for the CC’s body of work; Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to the SL 
Bundesvorstand, May 13, 1980, AG 829; Letter, Walter Becher to Ferdinand Seibt, May 19, 1980, AG 
829; Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to Walter Becher, June 12, 1980, AG 829; Letter, Walter Becher to 
Ferdinand Seibt, June 12, 1980, AG 829; Letter, Walter Becher to Ferdinand Seibt, June 19, 1980, AG 
829. 
359 Letter, Josef Stingl to Ernst Nittner, August 1, 1980, AG 829. Stingl cc’ed his letter to Nittner with 
copies of the correspondence between Seibt and Becher to Erich von Hoffmann, Paulus Sladek, 
Franz Olbert, Angelus Waldstein, and Seibt. 
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the Independence of Scholarship.”360 In this rebuttal to Becher, Seibt laid out an 
alternative vision of the role of the CC in presenting the history of the Czech lands 
grounded in historical research. Quoting the 1956 CC mandate which called for an 
institute for “the Bohemian lands,” Seibt argued that the need to encompass the 
entire scope of Bohemia was due to the historical reality that before the 19th 
century, “Sudeten German history” was actually a history of a multiethnic, non-
nationally-delineated middle class. The attempt by Becher to focus on Sudeten 
German history was a mere projection of Becher’s idea of a culturally-distinct 
ethnic group onto a past whose reality did not reflect those views, with Seibt 
clarifying, “there is a long history of Sudeten Germans” but a “short Sudeten 
German history.”361 
In this essay and letter exchanges with Becher, Seibt articulated the 
interconnections between Sudeten Germans and wider Bohemian society that 
eschewed national separation, and he likened Becher’s desire to isolate Sudeten 
Germans in history to the political postulates and history writing of the National 
Socialists.362 Seibt and the CC’s view was of historical multiculturalism and 
intertwined ethnicities in the Czech lands, and “Sudeten German history” was a 
study of the roots of nationalist conflict and the end of peaceful cohabitation 
                                                        
360 Ferdinand Seibt, Letter to the editorial board of Volksbote, May 12, 1980, AG 829; Ferdinand 
Seibt, “Das CC und die Unabhängigkeit der Wissenschaften,” AG 829; Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to Josef 
Stingl, July 18, 1980, AG 829. 
361 Seibt, “Das CC.” 
362 Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to Walter Becher, June 12, 1980, AG 829. 
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between Germans and Czechs. Stingl echoed this sentiment in a letter to Pirkl 
where he wrote that the SL’s push for “unity at any price” within the Sudeten 
German community was a “repeat of the developments back home before 1938.”363 
In this letter Stingl advocated for the CC and AG’s alternative view of an inclusive 
stance toward German-Czech history, heritage and relations, saying the AG had 
achieved much reconciliation and understanding between Germans and Czechs 
through their outreach and their cooperation with Opus Bonum. 
AG leaders took a tempered approach to the conflict that supported the CC 
and expressed their opposition to certain views of Becher while being sure not to 
generalize his ideas to the SL as a whole. Privately, they spoke of a “hardening” 
stance of the SL leadership that was not accepting the changing political and social 
times and that aspired to coerce all Sudeten German institutions under the SL and 
drown out opposing views.364 Publically, they published a resolution which spoke 
in favor of the CC in the conflict and praised their work. Their official statement was 
that the SL’s calls to create a separate “Collegium Sudeticum” research institute to 
focus solely on Sudeten German history was “worthy of discussion” but that it 
should not turn into an opposing institute to the CC and should not divert any 
funding from the CC whatsoever.365 
                                                        
363 Letter, Josef Stingl to Fritz Pirkl, August 12, 1980, AG 829. 
364 Ernst Nitter, Bemerkungen zur Top 5 und 6 der Vorstandssitzung vom 4. Oktober, 1980, October 
1, 1980, AG 132. 
365 Entschließung zur SL Diskussion über die Gründung eines Collegium Sudeticums, Führungskreis 
der AG, AG 829. 
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In July 1981 the AG published a longer statement that spoke to the heart of 
the identity debate that was behind the conflict between Becher and the CC. They 
expressed support for allowing a plurality of opinion among Sudeten Germans 
while also justifying the AG’s support for promoting an inclusive, Bohemian identity 
of Sudeten Germans over the SL’s desire to define Sudeten Germans as an exclusive 
group. Based on AG board member Ernst Nittner’s observations in an internal 
memo called “Critical Remarks on Tendencies within the SL” and signed by the 
managerial board of the AG, the AG statement posed the questions of what exactly 
all Sudeten Germans supposedly had in common with each other, whether they 
were a cohesive group, and importantly, whether their historic situation in 
Bohemia had not bestowed them with a special duty to serve a bridging function to 
bring Germans and Czechs together into a common community.366 Whereas Becher 
sought to rally Sudeten Germans around an exclusivist identity for political ends, 
the AG saw promotion of an inclusive, multicultural Sudeten German identity as a 
tool, indeed even an obligation of Sudeten Germans, to promote reconciliation 
between the two peoples. The AG’s viewpoint emphasized the plurality of 
philosophies, beliefs, and social interests among German inhabitants of the Czech 
lands over centuries which were nationally homogenized through “fervor and 
fanaticism” in the 19th and 20th centuries to the detriment of the region.367 
                                                        
366 Ernst Nitter, “Kritische Bemerkungen zur Tendenzen in der SL,” AG 132. 
367 “Stellungnahme des Vorstands der AG,” Sonderdruck aus Mitteilungsblatt der AG, Juli/August 1981 
32. Jahrgang, Folge 4, AG 132. 
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The AG furthered this point by noting that the AG’s own history of 
inclusivism and outreach followed wider European trends of the decades since 
1945 that brought strong arguments against the nationalist model, and they 
warned that the SL’s discourse on Sudeten German identity threatened to restrict a 
complex, multi-faceted history of relations stretching over centuries to the handful 
of problematic decades before World War II. The narrow term “Sudeten German,” 
they wrote, cannot encompass the complex interconnectedness of Bohemian 
society and culture. Recent SL tendencies, they argued, brought insecurity, unrest, 
and hysteria to legitimate discussions of identity, turned off the younger and 
scholarly circles of Sudeten Germans, and brought unwanted negative press. 
Signaling their impression of a power struggle on the part of Becher, the AG 
reaffirmed that they were not questioning the importance of the SL, however they 
asserted that, “the [SL] cannot view itself as a superior organization or an authority 
for making value judgements” for all Sudeten Germans.368 
Relations between the SL and the AG, as well as the entire conflict between 
the SL and the CC, exposed a path that Becher took to expand the SL’s authority 
over the non-political Sudeten German organizations. Becher and other SL leaders 
often spoke in presumptuous terms of assuming a monopoly over Sudeten German 
voices internally when discussing taking a harder stance against the CC, and they 
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described themselves as the “legitimate representative of the Volksgruppe” in their 
letters to the AG, CC and Bavarian ministries on the CC conflict.369 According to 
their mandate they were indeed the legitimate political representative to 
government organs, but here Becher was attempting to claim a monopoly over all 
Sudeten German voice and opinion concerning identity and the CC.370 
When the AG spoke out during the CC-SL conflict, Becher tried to reign them 
in and align them with the SL’s position. Becher wrote to Stingl that he was “able to 
accept” the AG’s statement on the CC conflict only if the AG publically held to their 
position that the idea of creating a Collegium Sudeticum was worthy of discussion. 
Still, Becher discouraged the AG from publically disagreeing with the SL: “I do not 
find it very useful when the AG—for whatever reason—raises objections here, 
because the state regime must then draw the impression that the Sudeten German 
side is of split opinion.”371 To avoid this, Becher asked Stingl to task his colleagues 
in the AG with educating themselves on the conflict and attached a copy of his 1978 
essay “Identity and the Historical Consciousness of Sudeten Germans.” 
                                                        
369 Niederschrift über die 9. Sitzung des VI. Bundesvorstandes der Sudetendeutschen 
Landsmannschaft on 2.2.79, November 12, 1979, AG 1586. See also the collection of correspondence 
between Becher and the AG, CC and Bavarian ministries in AG 829. 
370 These institutional power moves played out in regional AG offices as well, with the North Rhine-
Westphalia office reporting that they had to remind SL representatives directly that they AG was an 
independent organization and did not blindly follow the SL’s lead; Protokoll, Vorstandssitzung der 
AG, December 22, 1979, AG 131. 
371 Letter, Walter Becher to Josef Stingl, May 16, 1980, AG 829. 
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The Collegium Carolinum-Sudeten German Homeland Association Conflict 
Comes to Resolution 
As the public relations campaigns of both Seibt and Becher ramped up in 
1981 and 1982, two major changes finally resolved the conflict.372 The first change 
was political, and involved Hans Maier of the Bavarian Ministry of Education and 
Cultural Affairs, whose office was responsible for administering state funds under 
the Schirmherrschaft to the CC.373 After years of maintaining that the CC was 
operating within its mandate as a research institute for the Bohemian lands 
independent of the SL, Maier switched to Pirkl’s and the SL’s position and warned 
the CC that they would face significantly reduced state funding were they not to 
move into the Sudeten German Center.374 
However, after nearly a decade the conflict would not be easily resolved. 
Pirkl had been increasingly active in attempting to bring both sides together since 
                                                        
372 Stefan Dietrich, “Die ‘Bekenntnisgeneration’ löst die ‘Erlebnisgeneration’ ab,” Die Welt, May 25, 
1982; Oskar Hatz, “Blick hinter die Kulissen,” Passauer Neue Press, May 22/23, 1982; Hermann 
Rudolph, “ ‘Es gibt unheilbare Versehrungen.’ Sudetendeutsche wollen das CC umfunktionieren,” Die 
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Josef Stingl, September 18, 1981, AG 1618. 
374 Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to Josef Stingl, February 2, 1981, AG 1618. For previous reports of Maier’s 
support for the CC’s position, see: Report, Kießling to the bayrische Staatskanzlei, October 8, 1979, 
AG 829; Letter, Hans Maier to Josef Stingl, September 18, 1981, AG 1618. 
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1980, with minimal success.375 Newly-elected Bavarian Minister-President Franz 
Josef Strauß also proposed a resolution that same year in which the CC would not 
join the Sudeten German Center but would preserve the jointly-held library with 
the Sudeten German Archive, and the SL would gain representation in the CC’s 
decision-making process. Becher refused this offer, though Seibt agreed to it.376 In 
1982 Maier proposed a set of guidelines for the CC’s entry into the center that 
contained a number of provisions that the CC board found unpalatable, including 
creating a separate Sudeten German department within the CC that would receive 
half of the CC’s overall budget. If the SL was not willing to compromise on this 
point, Seibt threatened a mass exodus of the CC’s administrative board as well as a 
majority of its researchers who were prepared to resign their posts in protest.377 
A second major development helped resolve the conflict and bring the CC 
into the center with all its members. In 1982 Becher stepped down as chairman of 
the SL and Franz Neubauer was elected as his successor. Neubauer was also a 
                                                        
375 Letter, Josef Stingl to Fritz Pirkl, August 12, 1980, AG 829. Pirkl appeared resigned in 1981, 
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member of the AG, and Stingl referred to him as a friend.378 Although Becher had 
internal support within the SL in the conflict and many of his supporters still 
remained, he nevertheless was the driving force within the SL and their voice and 
face to the public, and much of the tension with the CC rested in personal animosity 
toward Becher and his narrow view of Sudeten German identity that had developed 
over the preceding years. While his succession by Neubauer did not bring any 
major platform changes for the SL, private correspondence indicates that Becher‘s 
absence at the negotiating table had reduced tensions significantly and enabled a 
reset of discussions.379 
The increased intervention and ultimate decision of the Bavarian ministries 
as well as Strauß’s more active role took place during an important turning point in 
West German politics. The 1982 election brought the Christian Democratic Union 
(Christlich Demokratische Union, hereafter, CDU) back as the ruling party in Bonn 
with Helmut Kohl as chancellor, ending more than a decade of expellee issues being 
ignored in Social Democrat-led coalition governments. Strauß and Kohl had been 
embroiled in a fierce leadership battle within the CDU/CSU coalition for much of 
the 1970s, which included Strauß temporarily annulling the CDU/CSU alliance in 
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the Bundestag after Kohl’s failed 1976 bid as the union‘s chancellor candidate, and 
Strauß managed to displace Kohl as the union’s candidate for the 1980 election. 380 
The power struggle remained after Kohl’s rise as chancellor in 1982, and Strauß 
was shut out of nominations for prominent positions in the regime as head of the 
Ministry of Finance, the Foreign Office, and Ministry of Defense.381 
One of the legacies of Ostpolitik for expelees was their marginalization by, 
and widespread abandonment of, the liberal SPD and Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei, hereafter, FDP) parties, and over the course of the 1970s 
Sudeten Germans formed a stronger partnership with the Bavarian state majority 
party, CSU, than the CDU, which was now in the national minority.382 But after the 
1982 election Kohl began courting expellee support in Bavaria by appearing at 
rallies and pandering to expellees by questioning the permanence of Germany’s 
Eastern borders for a future reunified Germany.383 This made the Kohl-Strauß 
rivalry a continuing issue in the struggle over the support and partnership of 
Sudeten Germans during Strauß‘s tenure as Minister-President of Bavaria. Also 
                                                        
380 Manfred Behrend, Franz Josef Strauß: Eine politische Biographie (Cologne: ISP Verlag, 1995), 
175−179 and 210–216; on the budding rivalry in the early 1970s, see also: Geoffrey Pridham, 
Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977), 221–231. 
381 Behrend, Franz Josef Strauß, 239–246. 
382 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 255; Hopp, Machtfaktor auch ohne Machtbasis, 124–125. 
383 In one example, Kohl said in a speech to expellees that the official recognition of Poland’s borders 
by West Germany did not necessarily apply to “a future reunited Germany”; Helmut Kohl at a Bund 
der deutschen Vertriebenen rally, September 2, 1984, in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Mieczyslaw 
Tomalka, eds., Bonn—Warschau 1945–1991: Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen. Analyse und 
Dokumentation (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1992), 368. 
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interesting is the possibility that Strauß may have felt a need to make up lost 
ground with the SL, since there was SL protest against Strauß during his 1980 bid 
for chancellor due to a belief that SL members were inadequately represented in 
his list for Bundestag members and cabinet positions.384 
It was in this context that the Bavarian regime took on a more active role in 
negotiating the CC-SL conflict to resolution in a way that left both sides happy and 
with Strauß in their good graces. The increased action from the Bavarian 
government, along with the important absence of Becher from the negotiating 
table, led to negotiations that enabled the CC to move into the Sudeten German 
Center largely on its preferred terms. It secured assurances that the SL would cease 
its campaign to push the CC to align with the exclusivist view of Sudeten German 
identity that Becher promoted, while consenting to SL representation in the CC 
board’s decision-making process. 385 With the overt conflict over identity and the 
CC’s research program effectively over, Seibt was more willing to move the CC 
under the same roof as the SL, though he still had to fight SL attempts to create a 
sub-department of the CC specifically for Sudeten German research.386 
                                                        
384 Letter, Unnamed AG member to Walter Becher, May 12, 1980, AG 829. 
385 Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to Josef Stingl, February 24, 1981, AG 1618; Letter, Gerhard Hanke in the 
name of Ferdinand Seibt to Josef Stingl, August 31, 1982, AG 1618. In a 1981 letter to Hans Maier 
Bosl wrote that the CC would “never in any way profess itself to any form of ‘Sudeten German 
identity’ ” if it joined the Sudeten German House; Letter, Karl Bosl to Hans Maier, August 8, 1981, AG 
1618.  
386 Letter, Ferdinand Seibt to Josef Stingl, April 19, 1983, AG 1618. 
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 The Sudeten German House (renamed from “Center” at the request of the 
CC) was opened in 1985, and Strauß was able to present himself as a champion of 
Sudeten German interests during its inaguration, saying, “The free state of Bavaria 
has taken a legal, political and moral obligation to represent the issues of the 
Sudeten German ethnic group by all possible means and to protect the existence of 
the Volksgruppe […] and to defend their Heimatrecht.”387 The SL-CC conflict over the 
CC’s inclusion, though over, remained testament to the differing currents of opinion 
within the Sudeten German community concerning how to portray Sudeten German 
heritage and identity. For Becher and his supporters, the exclusivist view was 
intertwined with their political goal of restitution and a right to return to their 
former homeland. Given Sudeten German’s declining influence in national politics 
since the late 1960s, these were political demands which they could only hope to 
realize through strength in numbers, solidarity, and a unity of opinion. To this end 
they sought to exert their influence over the CC to create a program of historical 
research that would reinforce their version of Sudeten German identity and 
legitimize their political claims. 
Conversely, the CC and AG held a vastly differing view of what it meant to be 
Sudeten German. While the AG still held to the idea of a right to return, this right 
rested in shared heritage with Czechs, and they sought to achieve it through 
                                                        
387 Quote on display at the Sudeten German House, cited from: Franzen, Der vierte Stamm Bayerns, 
305. 
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dialogue and reconciliation, not political demands. AG leaders had spent the 
entirety of their existence building an institutional culture and identity that 
emphasized pluralities of opinion and highlighted the peaceful cohabitation of 
Germans and Czechs in centuries past as grounds for future reconciliation. Thus, 
they supported the Bohemian outlook of the CC and spoke out in their favor when 
that institution faced the threat of becoming a research mill for the SL. 
 In some respects this conflict was born from two different reactions to the 
crisis of existence that Sudeten German organizations were facing in the 1970s as 
the older generation with firsthand memories of the homeland steadily declined. 
The SL sought to meet this crisis by rallying Sudeten Germans and their 
descendants around a proud identity, but this identity needed historical 
reinforcement. One aspect of the research that Becher called for was recording 
testimonies of eye witnesses to the former homeland before they passed away.388 
But the most important theme for the SL in combating the membership and 
legitimacy crisis was the oft-stated cry to “preserve the identity of the Volksgruppe.” 
The AG faced the same membership crisis since the late 1960s, but their reaction 
was radically different, moving away from terms like Volksgruppe and even 
                                                        
388 Becher, “Die Gründungsintentionen des ‘Collegium Carrolinum.’ ” 
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“Sudeten German” and focusing on outreach to Czechs, European integration,389 
and cultural exchange. 
 This outlook mirrors the discourses found in the Czech identity and history 
debates taking place at the same time. Czechs faced a set of monumental social and 
political changes and challenging circumstances that were vastly different from 
those facing Sudeten Germans in West Germany, yet the responses found in the 
rewriting of expulsion history mirrored the same values of understanding and 
cooperation that the AG and CC showed. Actors on both sides adopted a 
multicultural, inclusive approach to the identity of former inhabitants of the Czech 
lands as a foundation for future integration in the European community, and both 
sides worked to create history-writing that would reflect those values. What 
resulted from these concurrent events was the manifestation of a cosmopolitan 
identity based on a particular vision of historic German-Czech relations in Central 
Europe. As the following section illustrates, outreach associated with this vision 
was not restricted to AG members or the CC, but also included many other activists 
within the SL and other West German institutions. 
                                                        
389 A symbolic example of this difference can be found in the same Volksbote edition. On the same 
page that Becher was arguing about the founding intentions of the CC and defending the right to 
identity of the Volksgruppe, there was a report of an AG-organized youth trip to Luxemburg and 
Trier to learn about the European Community, local monuments, and historical sites as “origin[s] of 
Europe” and sites of German-French reconciliation, because it was ”important to strengthen the 
historical consciousness to be able to better understand [one’s] neighbors.,” see: F.B., “Kurz 
berichtet: Aus der AG Bamberg und Eichstätt,” Volksbote, July 4, 1980, 10. 
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The Paneuropean Union and Sudeten German-Czech Cooperation 
 The CC-SL conflict and Becher’s exclusivist view of Sudeten German identity 
did not define the entire SL or its members. For starters, his replacement, 
Neubauer, was an AG member who helped maintain positive relations on an 
institutional level by speaking at AG engagements as the SL’s leader.390 Many more 
SL members were involved in various levels of contact and cooperation with Czech 
émigrés and Czechs in Czechoslovakia, but much of these activities took place 
outside the official program of the SL through organizations like OB and the 
Paneuropean Union. The Paneuropean Union—West Germany played an important 
role in cooperating with OB and bringing Sudeten Germans, particularly younger 
ones, into activism directed at Czechoslovakia, and this took place largely through 
the personality of Bernd Posselt. 
 Posselt was a friend and colleague of Otto von Habsburg, president of the 
International Paneuropean Union since 1973, during whose campaigns for the 
European Parliament Posselt also worked closely with Wolfgang Stock. Posselt 
describes himself as a “European” from his early life onward, and as both an 
expellee child and a Catholic, he worked closely together with the AG and Opus 
Bonum, especially Opus Bonum leaders Milan Kubes and Richard Belcredi. For 
                                                        
390 Neubauer was one of the principle speakers at the AG’s national summit in Limburg in 1982; 
Paleczek, “Übersicht,” 156. 
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Posselt, Sudeten German-Czech reconciliation and the drive toward European unity 
and were “two sides of the same coin.”391 
 Because of his work with von Habsburg, whom as the former last crown 
prince of Austria-Hungary the ČSSR declared an enemy of the state, Posselt was 
denied visas to Czechoslovakia for most of the 1980s until his planned 1988 trip to 
Brno. Despite this, he was involved in assisting underground operations there long 
before he visited Müller’s seminars in 1989. From the end of the 1970s onward 
Posselt organized a weekly courier service to Prague with the help of Kubes. They 
operated by sending a courier to Prague via direct bus connection, and a third 
person would place a suitcase in the cargo room that the courier had never seen, 
usually filled with messages, books and manuscripts, printers, binders, or other 
technical equipment. The courier would wait to be the last off the bus at its final 
stop and would simply take the last remaining suitcase and be on their way. 
Because they did not know what the suitcase looked like and there was no chance 
of their fingerprints being on it, they were (usually) safe from reprisals in the event 
border police searched the suitcase.392 
                                                        
391 Posselt was often invited to dinner at the Belcredi’s during his younger years, and he describes 
Kubes, Belcredi, Opasek, Olbert, Stingl, and himself as a very close group who were constantly 
together; Interview, Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016. 
392 On at least two occasions Posselt’s couriers were arrested and detained. One was a young SL 
member, Daniel Langhans, and the other was Martin Leitner, whose temporary detention under 
suspicious circumstances is referenced in chapter three; Interview, Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016; 
Bernd Posselt, “Erstgeburtsrecht auf Europa,” http://de.paneuropa.org/index.php/pan/ 
publikationen/aktuelle_beitraege/erstgeburtsrecht_auf_europa_von_bernd_posselt_mdep (accessed 
April 4, 2016). 
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 The couriers were one avenue that involved young Sudeten Germans from 
the AG and the SL in clandestine operations assisting the Czech underground, as 
Posselt and Kubes used many volunteers from both those institutions. Olbert was 
always cautious in keeping official shipments in the AG’s name from transporting 
anything blatantly illegal like contraband items, but this did not mean that he did 
not approve of individual members of the AG or Junge Aktion engaging in such 
activities.393 Posselt recalls Olbert often referring young, adventurous Sudeten 
Germans to him and Kubes to travel as couriers and working behind the scenes to 
help with organization and ensure safe and successful trips.394 Posselt’s work also 
overlapped with some of the same people in Prečan’s smuggling channels. The two 
often met at Opus Bonum meetings and Kubes also worked closely with Prečan, yet 
Posselt and Prečan both kept their courier organization separate for security and 
redundancy reasons.395 
 Over the course of his activism before 1989 Posselt built a network Czech 
contacts that included émigrés like Tigrid, Opasek, Karel Schwarzenberg, and Kubes 
as well as Czechs at home like Vaclav Malý, Václav Havel, and Rudolf Kučera. 
Beginning in 1984, Posselt was responsible for coordinating Paneuropean Union 
contacts with civic opposition groups in Eastern Europe, but because he could not 
obtain a visa for Czechoslovakia most of his contacts with Czechs took place in 
                                                        
393 Interview, Franz Olbert, June 17, 2014. 
394 Interview, Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016. 
395 Ibid.; Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
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Hungary where he frequently traveled to. His extensive contacts with Hungarian 
dissidents later enabled Posselt to organize the August 1989 Paneuropean Picnic 
on the Hungarian-Austrian border. During the picnic the border was symbolically 
opened for a few hours and over six hundred East Germans crossed the border into 
Austria, paving the way for a larger exodus of East Germans to the West via 
Hungary in the months before the final collapse of the Berlin Wall. 
Kučera was an important contact for Posselt and Kubes which proved 
lucrative for both sides in the long run. Kučera received a steady supply of printing 
machines and materials from the Paneuropean Union which enabled the 
widespread proliferation of his Střední Evropa journal.396 When Stock recruited 
Posselt to visit Müller’s seminars in Brno in October 1989, Posselt used the 
opportunity to travel to Prague afterwards to meet Kučera in person and recruit 
him to form an underground Paneuropean Union branch in Czechoslovakia. Happy 
to finally be meeting the man who had helped his operations so much, upon 
Posselt’s arrival Kučera ceremoniously placed a five-liter gas canister filled with 
South Moravian white wine on the table in preparation for a long night. The two sat 
until the morning discussing the Paneuropean Union, Kučera’s journal and other 
activities, and the future of Central Europe. Kučera readily agreed to begin a 
Czechoslovak Paneuropean Union branch, which later became a branch for 
                                                        
396 Interview, Rudolf Kučera, August 21, 2014; Interview Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016. The JHEF 
supported Kučera primarily with stipends as well as books and essays from the West.  
212 
Bohemia and Moravia after 1993 and whose president Kučera remains in 2016. At 
around five o-clock in the morning, with the wine gone and Kučera due at work, 
Kučera left for his job at the cement factory and Posselt boarded a train back to 
Munich, having successfully made a new friend and important contact that he 
would capitalize on for German-Czech relations after 1989.397 
Sudeten Germans Visit the Homeland: The Ackermann Gemeinde’s 
Heimatsreisen 
The 1980s were characterized by the extensive travel of people, books, and 
materials back and forth across the Czechoslovak border, and Sudeten Germans 
were no exception. Early AG-organized trips to Czechoslovakia began in the late 
1960s, but the Warsaw Pact invasion and a tightening of visas in the 1970s 
temporarily halted these trips. They picked up again in the late 1970s and 
expanded through the course of the 1980s. Trips ranged in size from a handful of 
travelers to tourist groups of twenty to thirty. The trips typically served the dual 
purposes of assisting and expanding the AG’s large network of contacts with 
Catholic parishes in Czechoslovakia, while also serving as pilgrimages for Sudeten 
Germans and their children visiting their homeland and create opportunities for 
interaction and discussion with Czechs. Some trips were organized under the guise 
of vacations for young AG and Junge Aktion members but were in fact coordinated 
397 Interview, Rudolf Kučera, August 21, 2014; Interview Bernd Posselt, March 4, 2016. 
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with Czech youth groups who would coincidentally be leading youth retreats at the 
same camping grounds and other installations.398 Trips were often very emotional 
and educational experiences for participants. After passing the Czechoslovakian 
border, one visitor in a large tour group turned to her elderly mother, both with 
tears in their eyes, and said, “it has finally come. We are back in Czechoslovakia 
now,” and she wrote that this simple sentence meant more to both of them than she 
could ever convey in words.399 In addition to personal emotional experiences, these 
trips provided an opportunity to meet and befriend Czechs living in their former 
villages and regions, often provoking tearful and emotional goodbyes when they 
had to part ways again.400 
 Olbert was a frequent participant in these trips, having finally been able to 
secure a visa in the late 1970s after nearly a decade of annual visa rejections. Olbert 
typically drove separately to have more freedom to meet with contacts during 
official tour visits. On one occasion Olbert was leading a student group and skipped 
an afternoon tour to meet secretly with Czech priests to discuss their samizdat 
operations and what assistance the AG could provide, and during the 1980s Olbert 
remained the most frequent AG traveler and builder of relationships with Czech 
clergy.401 
                                                        
398 Junge Aktion Festschrift, 74–75. 
399 Trip Report, unsigned, Vertriebene in die alte Heimat, June 17, 1989, AG 1129. 
400 Trip Report, unsigned, Studien-und Wanderfahrt in die Tatra und Zips, September 2–10, 1989, 
AG 1129. 
401 Trip Report, Franz Olbert, Streng vertraulicher Aktenvermerk für Herrn Prälaten Prof. Dr. Josef 
Rabas, May 23–28, 1983, AG 1152. 
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Olbert and the AG had an important contact in the figure of František 
Tomášek, who was secretly ordained as a Cardinal by Pope Paul VI in 1976 and 
appointed Archbishop of Prague in 1977. Tomášek was a vocal supporter of the 
Prague Spring reforms and remained a critic of government policies, including the 
formation of the regime-sponsored organization for the Catholic clergy, Pacem in 
terris, which lasted from 1971 to 1989 and pushed its priests to take instruction 
from the Party over the Vatican. Tomášek had to walk a fine line between following 
his faith and loyalty to Rome while not provoking unnecessary punitive action of 
the regime against the clergy and parishes in Czechoslovakia he presided over. 
After the publishing of the Charter 77 petition, Tomášek penned a statement on 
behalf of the Catholic Church that only said, “We do not belong to the signatories of 
Charter 77” while not denouncing the document itself. He then went on to clarify 
that only he as the archbishop could speak for Czech Catholics, a statement aimed 
at delegitimizing the critical statements against Charter 77 that were swiftly issued 
by the Czech and Slovak Pacem in terris organizations.402 
 Tomášek was instrumental in helping the AG build an expansive network of 
contacts, as previous AG practices of identifying and contacting clergy directly ran 
                                                        
402 Erklärung der Ordinarien der Tschechischen Sozialistischen Republik, AG 506; “Bischöfe und 
kirchliche Institutionen zu Erklärung gegen Charta genötigt,” Katholische Presse, February 3, 1977, 
3–4, AG 506. 
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the risk of endangering the recipient.403 He gave Olbert a list of 200 clergy in 
desperate need during Olbert’s first meeting with him in the late 1970s/early 
1980s, and the list of AG contacts with Czech clergy swelled to 1,258 by 1989.404 
Tomášek remained a regular contact person for Olbert and other AG visitors, and 
he helped spread the AG network to include other prominent dissident Catholics 
clergy like Vaclav Malý and Josef Zvěřina as well as non-clergy dissidents like Havel 
and Václav Benda.405 All of these figures visited the AG in Munich after 1989 and 
became important partners in AG summits and events aimed at promoting 
understanding and reconciliation during the 1990s.406 
 During their trips to Czechoslovakia, Olbert and other AG leaders travelled 
extensively to meet with as many contacts as possible to deliver stipends, aid, 
materials, and to discuss the concerns of the parishes. The most common requests 
from the Czech side were religious books (by far the most frequent and heavily 
                                                        
403 An internal AG memo from 1976 warned all AG members to refrain from contacting any Czech 
clergy directly or from visiting them in person, citing day- and week-long interrogations that were 
taking place for clergymen with contacts to the West; Memo, Sozialwerk der AG, February 3, 1976, 
AG 667. 
404 Olbert could not recall the exact year of his first encounter with Tomášek and the author could 
not find specifc evidence establishing this year in the archives; Interview, Franz Olbert, June 17, 
2014; Namenskartei-Priesterkartei des Sozialwerks der AG, index of names for the Ackermann 
Gemeinde archive in Munich. 
405 Josef Zvěřina was a theologian who had been a prisoner of both the National Socialist and 
Communist regimes. He was a signatory of Charter 77 and later became one of the founding 
members of the Civic Forum in November 1989. 
406 For reports on these individuals’ first official visits to the AG in Munich after 1989, see AG file 128 
in the AG archive. 
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stressed request), copiers, binders, printers, Tusex money407, medications, and the 
occasional car for transporting religious samizdat.408 Most of the support the AG 
organized was technically legal, even if the reasons behind some of the requests 
were not. 
There remained an element of danger for AG visitors, since trips frequently 
combined smuggling with official visits. On one occasion, an unmarked box 
containing a brand new copy machine hidden underneath the suitcases was 
discovered by the border police, but the tour guide convinced the guard not to open 
it, saying it contained her dirty laundry and pressed him as to why he absolutely 
had to see it.409 On another occasion all the travelors had to deboard the bus and 
transfer to a train due to the driver’s visa being expired. The border guard at the 
train station was unprepared to thoroughly search the belongings of some forty 
people now at his station, and travelors managed to pass the bags containing 
contraband back and forth behind their backs to keep them away from the 
overwhelmed guard. This prompted one of the children on board to ask his mother, 
“Mommy, I thought we’re not supposed to smuggle?” She replied, “We’re not 
smuggling for our own profit. We’re smuggling for the dear lord.”410 
                                                        
407 Tusex money was currency which could be used to buy otherwise unobtainable imported goods 
at special Tusex shops. 
408 Trip Report, Franz Olbert, Streng vertraulicher Aktenvermerk für Herrn Prälaten Prof. Dr. Josef 
Rabas, May 23–28, 1983, AG 1152; Trip Report, unsigned, Aktenvermerk, ČSSR-Reise vom 23. Bis 
25. Juni 1989, AG 1129. 
409 Dieter Salomon, “Schmugel für den lieben Gott,” in Paleczek, Integration und Dialog, 56. 
410 Ibid., 56–57. 
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Those traveling outside of the groups naturally faced even more danger. On 
one occasion Olbert was searched at the border and interrogated about papers he 
carried with him, but he was able to convince the border guard, who did not read 
German well, that they were innocuous official correspondence to the Husák 
regime and had to be allowed through due to diplomatic protocol. Olbert later 
recalled slyly, “They were actually letters of protest, but if he doesn’t read 
them…”411 Another early visitor had a small amount of legal gifts confiscated at the 
border under suspicious circumstances that involved high-ranking officials being 
called out to interrogate her for several hours about who she knew and where she 
was going. Upon learning of this, her contact person for the gifts, a nun, would only 
speak to her in a public park and recommended that the she leave immediately and 
meet with no one else in order to protect the network.412 
The Underground Church and the “Parallel Polis” 
Occasions like these and others where discussions only took place with loud 
music playing, in public places, or were entirely written down and then burned, 
gave Olbert and other AG visitors a personal glimpse of the very real danger of 
reprisals that church organizers and parishioners faced.413 The Czechoslovak 
                                                        
411 Interview, Franz Olbert, June 17, 2014. 
412 Trip Report, unsigned, Bericht über meine diesjährige Reise in die ČSSR im Oktober 1982, AG 
1152. 
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Fahrt, November 3, 1986, AG 1048. 
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regime strongly repressed religious education and practice from the Stalinist era 
onward, and although imprisonment and persecution of clergy drastically reduced 
during Normalization compared to the 1950s, clergy were still routinely subjected 
to house searches, interrogations, and harassment. Clergy were very happy to 
receive visitors and gifts from the West, with one group of priests telling Olbert that 
his visit was the best Christmas gift they had in years, saying, “You must 
understand, we are trapped here. We live like in a prison.”414 Religious education 
was heavily suppressed, and harassment at work or being barred from university 
studies and forms of employment, like teaching, were regular occurrences for those 
participating in church activities.415 
New enrollees at seminaries were interrogated at length, harassed, and 
otherwise discouraged from becoming priests, leading to a dire lack of ordained 
priests. In 1982 there was roughly one priest for every four parishes in 
Czechoslovakia, and although seminary enrollment increased somewhat in the 
following years, Tomášek estimated in 1987 that he would still need one thousand 
new priests to adequately staff all the dioceses.416 Much of the church was driven 
underground in order to survive and continue to provide pastoral care for 
                                                        
414 Trip Report, Franz Olbert, Aktenvermerk, Gespräch mit Erzbischof František Tomášek am 19. Mai 
88 in Prag, AG 1129. 
415 Reban, “The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia,” 151–152. See also personal accounts of Catholic 
parishioners harassed for church attendance in: Miroslav Vaněk and Pavel Mücke, Velvet 
Revolutions: An Oral History of Czech Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 36–37. 
416 Pedro Ramet, “The Czechoslovak Church under Pressure,” The World Today 38 (1982): 355–360; 
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parishioners. Rites like baptisms and marriage ceremonies were often performed 
secretly in private homes to protect the parents and children alike from reprisals, 
whether from authorities, employers and co-workers, or to spare children from the 
ridicule of fellow schoolmates. Priests also reported to the AG a growing movement 
of “home churches,” or private religious discussion groups and mass celebrations 
held secretly in apartments much the same way that academic seminars were 
driven underground.417 The underground church included hundreds of secretly 
ordained priests, including a number of female priests.418 
The underground experience of Catholic and Protestant churches led to a 
similar unifying process between clergy and dissidents that took place among 
Czech émigrés. Persecuted clergy sat in the same prisons, worked the same menial 
factory jobs, and experienced the same repressed status and general police 
harassment as non-confessional dissidents, which helped to build a level of 
solidarity and community between two groups which otherwise would not have 
                                                        
417 Trip Report, Maria Weiß, Bericht über meine Aufenthalt in Mähren: 29.4–9.5.84, AG 1048. 
418 Felix Corley, “The Secret Clergy in Communist Czechoslovakia,” Religion, State and Society 21 
(1993): 171–206; Petr Fiala and Jiří Hanuš, “Women’s Ordination in the Czech Silent Church,” The 
Month, July 1998, 282. While the Vatican was aware of some sixty-five of the secretly ordained 
priests, hundreds more were ordained outside of their control, including women and married men. 
The women priests, as well as many of the men secretly ordained, were not recognized by the 
Vatican at the end of the Cold War; “Czech Hierarchy Bars Some Priests,” The New York Times, 
December 8, 1991, 19; Burton Bollag, “Vatican Rejects Secret Priests Ordained in Czechoslovakia,” 
The New York Times, April 12, 1992, 1. For more on Ludmila Javorová, the first women ordained 
priest in Czechoslovakia in 1970, see: Miriam Therese Winter, Out of the Depths: The Story of 
Ludmila Javorová Ordained Roman Catholic Priest (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2009). 
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interacted.419 They found common ground in mutual beliefs in human rights and 
democracy, and Charter 77 reinforced this solidarity with a general policy that one 
of its three designated speakers would always be an active Christian. 
Integrating a religious element to Charter 77 extended religious moral 
authority to Charter 77’s calls for human rights. It also reciprocally enhanced the 
status of organized religion in the eyes of non-confessional Czechs as a progressive 
oppositional group pushing for political and social change—a stance not commonly 
associated with the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia given its centuries-long 
association with German-Habsburg repression of the Czech nation.420 The 
Charter 77-founded “Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted” 
regularly included sections for persecuted clergy in their periodic reports on 
individuals suffering from government repression.421 Thus, the “parallel polis” of 
underground society that expanded in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s 
included non-confessional dissidents and clergy alike, all of whom were bound 
                                                        
419 Tomáš Halík, “Verantwortung für die Untergrundkirche in der Tschechoslowakei,” article found 
copied in AG archive with no indication of the originating publication but was written post-1989, AG 
550. 
420 Tomáš Halík, “Tschechien: Kirchen als Faktoren des Umbruchs 1989,” in Kirche und Revolution: 
Das Christentum in Ostmitteleuropa vor und nach 1989, eds. Hans Joachim Veen, Peter März, and 
Franz-Josef Schlichting (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 112; R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of Czechs 
and Slovaks (New York: Hutchinson & Co., 1943), 130–151 and 161–170. 
421 “Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných.” The committee was founded in 1978 by Charter 77 
members, though it remained a separate initiative from other Charter publishing activities. The AG 
followed these reports, many of which can be found in AG files 85 and 1270. 
 221 
 
together by mutual repression and activism in pushing the regime to support 
human rights and democracy.422 
It is interesting to note that involvement in religious activities increased 
over the course of the 1980s as religion became a means of defiance and 
empowerment for more and more Czechs. In 1985 over 300,000 Czechoslovak 
citizens gathered in Velehrad423 and Levoča to celebrate the 1100th anniversary of 
the death of St. Methodius despite strong warnings of the regime and a heavy police 
presence.424 The large swell of participation in this event, especially by younger 
people, inspired Tomášek to take a more vocal stance against the regime and 
turned him into one of the great religious heroes of Czech opposition during the 
1980s.425 
Attempting to keep the parishes under his wing afloat and operational was a 
tasking job that took a heavy toll on Tomášek’s health, though he insisted to 
concerned AG visitors that he “had no right to be tired” from his efforts and always 
                                                        
422 Václav Benda, Milan Šimečka, Ivan M. Jirous, Jiří Dienstbier, Václav Havel, Ladislav Hejdánek, Jan 
Šimsa, and Paul Wilson, “Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe: An 
Inquiry,” Social Research 55 (1988): 211–246. 
423 Velehrad is one of the oldest stone churches in Moravia. According to Czech lore, Saints Cyril and 
Methodius celebrated mass here during their pilgrimage to promote Christianity in the Kingdom of 
Great Moravia, and it has been an important pilgrimage site since the 13th century. 
424 The gathering saw pilgrims spontaneously chanting “We want religious freedom!” at on-looking 
authorities. Despite the strong uniformed police and StB presence and barricades, the gathering 
proceeded without major incident; David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests: Religious-based 
Activism and Its Challenge to State Power in Socialist Slovakia and East Germany (Budapest: Central 
European University Press, 2013), 232–234; Trip Report, unsigned, Kurze Anmerkungen zu meiner 
ČSSR-Fahrt vom 25.09. bis 03.10.85, AG 1048. 
425 Reban, “The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia,” 152–153; Doellinger, Turning Prayers into 
Protests, 232–234. 
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pointed to all the work that remained. Concerning police harassment, Tomášek 
responded to Olbert in 1985 that, “whoever works for the Church works a lot; 
whoever prays for the Church works more; whoever sacrifices themselves and is 
persecuted does the most.”426 Tomášek pursued a more public role in opposing the 
regime as best as his health would allow, but Olbert observed in 1988 that the 
Cardinal was aging quickly, and in 1989 one of Tomášek’s advisors disclosed to 
Olbert that Tomášek had been unable to effectively make decisions since the 
previous autumn and that his memory was failing badly.427 Tomášek passed away 
in 1992 at the age of 93, though not before living to see the end of Communism in 
his country and being able to finally fulfill his dream of receiving Pope John Paul II 
in Czechoslovakia during his first papal visit in 1990.428 
Conclusion 
Increased religious participation during the mid- to late-1980s led to a 
gradual, though still woefully inadequate, rise in the number of priests ordained 
                                                        
426 Trip Report, unsigned, Kurze Anmerkungen zu meiner ČSSR-Reise vom 25.09. bis 03.10.85, AG 
1048. 
427 Trip Report, Franz Olbert, Besprechung mit Kanonikus Matejka am 10. April 1989 in Innsbruck, 
AG 1129; Trip Report, Franz Olbert, Aktenvermerk, Gespräch mit Erzbischof František Tomášek am 
19. Mai 88 in Prag, AG 1129. 
428 Havel met with Tomášek’s advisors in December, 1989, before he was even elected president to 
discuss inviting the pope as quickly as possible. He hoped the pope’s visit would help calm the 
atmosphere and provide additional religious moral authority to the revolution; Tomáš Halík, Alle 
meine Wege sind Dir vertraut: Von der Untergrundkirche ins Labyrinth der Freiheit (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2014), 253–254. 
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before 1989.429 The AG forged close contacts to the underground church and 
greatly assisted them during a time of dire need.430 This brought the AG into 
common activism with Charter 77 dissidents in cases where both appealed to the 
Husák regime and international institutions on behalf of imprisoned Catholic and 
Protestant clergy.431 AG trips and support earned them the goodwill of the clergy 
and non-confessional dissidents alike, creating a trusting band of allies that could 
extend their moral authority and support to future AG reconciliation initiatives in 
the 1990s. 
The AG trips and support of Czech parishes comprised a different level of 
cross-border cooperation that assisted the underground church, which was an 
important underground sector largely untouched by the JHEF, Paneuropean Union 
and many other organizations that focused on assisting the internationally-known, 
non-confessional dissidents. To be sure, the AG’s cooperation with Opus Bonum 
and their close contact with émigrés and dissidents Havel showed that the AG’s 
network reached much further than Catholic circles. These contacts became 
instrumental in adding legitimacy and a moral imperativeness for the AG’s work 
                                                        
429 Trip Report, Wolfgang Schwartz, Noch eine Fahrt in die alte Heimat: Sudetenland vom 23. Juni bis 
8. Juli, 1989, AG 1129. See also: Reban, “The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia,” 152–154. 
430 Tomášek was always very grateful toward his AG visitors and expressed on a number of 
occasions that the Church would not be able to survive without AG support; Trip Report, Franz 
Olbert, Kurzbericht von einer ČSSR Reise vom 11. bis 13.01.87, AG 1048. 
431 Two large cases were the imprisoned evangelical priest Jan Šimsa and Protestant priest Jan 
Litomiský, who sat with Havel in a Plzeň prison; Jiří Müller, “Brief einer Gruppe ehemaliger 
politischer Gefangene an den Präsident der Republik in Angelegenheit von Jan Šimsa,” December 7, 
1978, AG 85; Letter, Jan Dus to Philip Potter, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, 
April 25, 1984, JHEF. 
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toward reconciliation after 1989, as these dissidents-turned national political 
leaders spearheaded efforts to confront Czechs with the new moral interpretation 
of the expulsion, and these same people were regular participants in AG events 
promoting German-Czech reconciliation. 
But the contacts the AG forged on a local level with churches and parishes 
later provided a crucial lynchpin in the AG’s reconciliation efforts by enabling 
grassroots initiatives like Sudeten German groups helping rebuild churches and 
cemeteries, bilateral educational trips (Studienreisen), and engaging in local 
discussion forums. These initiatives added a local dimension to compliment the 
higher-profile events with Czech leaders aimed at promoting understanding, 
reconciliation, and overcoming the mistrust of the Czech public after forty years of 
the socialist expulsion narrative and threats of an impending re-invasion of 
Germans. SL leaders fueled these fears in the first half of the 1990s with continued 
demands for a right to return, to reclaim lost property or sue for damages, and 
other concessions from Czechs. It took AG-sponsored initiatives from the local level 
up to bilateral state meetings to quell these fears and enable peaceful reconciliation 
between Czechs and Germans and to pave the way for eventual Czech accession to 
the European Union. 
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CHAPTER V 
OLD PARTNERS AND NEW PROBLEMS: THE ACKERMANN GEMEINDE AND ITS 
ALLIES IN THE 1990S 
Have we managed to say everything that ought to be said from our side? I am 
not sure. 
– Václav Havel, 1990432 
 
By mid-December 1989 much of the initial euphoria of the former dissidents 
at the collapse of the old Czechoslovak regime had given way to the sobering reality 
that they now bore the responsibility of ensuring a peaceful transition to 
democracy and guiding the country out of over four decades of authoritarian 
Socialism. For many in the Civic Forum like Pithart, Havel’s televised comments 
calling for the moral reappraisal of the expulsion were hasty, ill-advised, and 
threatened to engender a public backlash that might discredit the dissidents and 
endanger Havel’s election as president. Early the next morning the Civic Forum 
assembled a crisis team to figure out how to spin Havel’s comments in a way that 
they would not provide fodder for the remaining Communists to drum up fear of an 
impending German threat and paint the dissidents as naïve intellectuals who would 
                                                        
432 Václav Havel, Speech on the Visit of West German President Richard von Weizsäcker in Prague, 
March 15, 1990; text taken from: http://www.Václavhavel.cz (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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inadvertently deliver Czechoslovakia into the hands of the revanchist Germans.433 
When they could find no realistic way to do this, they then turned their focus to the 
voting procedures.434 
Constitutionally, the task of electing the president fell to the Federal 
Assembly, but in the atmosphere of political change and democratization, the 
method of electing the president was very much under debate. Opinion polls 
conducted during the demonstrations suggested that over four-fifths of the 
population favored a vote via general referendum, which the Communists 
incidentally also supported, believing that Havel’s name was unknown enough in 
the countryside to make his defeat a possibility.435 The Federal Assembly itself was 
split nearly in half between support and opposition for a public referendum, and 
young student activists were converging on the capital by the hundreds and 
demanding transparency outside the Federal Assembly.436 
Pithart and many in the Civic Forum were previously confident that Havel 
would easily win in either form of vote, but after his television appearance on 
December 23 the majority of the Civic Forum suddenly became very concerned that 
                                                        
433 Indeed, there were many reports of communists in the border regions spreading flyers and 
rumors that Sudeten Germans were preparing to invade and force everyone from their homes in 
December 1989, and these rumors continued for the next several months; Franz Olbert, 
Aktenvermerk, Anruf von Abt. Dr. Anastáz Opasek, January 4, 1990, AG 1129; Kurzbericht ČSSR 
Reise vom 11. bis 14. Januar 1990” AG 1129; Bericht über Erfahrungen und Beobachtungen 
anläßlich einer Fahrt nach Mähren in der Osterwoche 1990, AG 1129. 
434 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015; Pithart, “Über Gesten in der Politik,” 70. 
435 Petr Holubec, Kronika sametové revoluce II (Prague: Pragopress—ČTK, 1990), 4. 
436 Holubec, Kronika sametové revoluce, 6; Wheaton and Kavan, Velvet Revolution, 109. 
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Havel could lose a referendum, and the deadline was fast approaching. Pithart and 
the Forum worked frantically and ultimately persuaded reluctant members of the 
Federal Assembly to a compromise wherein the Assembly would vote to elect the 
president, but those votes would be made public to appease concerns of 
transparency.437 The Federal Assembly elected Havel unanimously on December 
29, though this episode proved merely a foreshadowing of the troubles to come 
with calling for a moral reevaluation of the expulsion. 
And yet Havel’s early missteps on the path to German-Czech reconciliation 
were not over. On January 2, 1990, Havel and the new foreign minister Jiří 
Dienstbier, who no less than two months prior was employed as a furnace stoker, 
took their first official diplomatic visit to West Germany. Since the 1919 unification 
of Czechoslovakia, newly-elected Czech presidents would first travel to Slovakia as 
a symbol of respect and solidarity. However, Havel, being a playwright with a 
penchant for the dramatic, wanted to make a grand statement that German-Czech 
reconciliation was a top priority and granted this issue the respect of deserving the 
first official visit of the new democratic Czechoslovak president. Pithart recalls the 
Slovak dissidents then in the Federal Assembly feeling slighted by this lack of 
respect at a time when Czech and Slovak relations were already on rocky ground: 
                                                        
437 Pithart credits the hard work of the interim prime minister, Marián Čalfa, for helping sway the 
Federal Assembly to vote itself instead of calling for a referendum; Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 
2015; Wheaton and Kavan, Velvet Revolution, 108–112. 
 228 
 
“Havel thought he would travel to Munich as a great dramatist as catharsis to heal 
the feelings of vengeance against the Munich Agreement and expulsion […] but for 
the Slovaks it was simply insulting. There are many people today who believe that 
this marked the beginning of the separation of Czechoslovakia.”438 
This chapter follows the main actors of the previous chapters as they 
worked to guide Germans and Czechs toward reconciliation in the post-1989 era. 
Since the rise of Willy Brandt’s SPD government in the late 1960s the political arm 
of the Sudeten Germans (the SL) steadily lost political influence in Bonn. Despite 
having the ear of Kohl and being able to influence his foreign policy toward the 
Czech Republic in the early 1990s, the SL ultimately faced disappointment and 
rejected the two major bilateral documents of the decade dealing with the 
expulsion: the 1992 German-Czechoslovak Treaty on Neighborly Relations and 
Friendly Cooperation and the 1997 German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations 
and Their Future Development. 
For the AG, the 1990s saw their domestic and international relevance and 
political and social influence reach new heights. Beginning in 1990 the AG suddenly 
found itself with friends and partners holding the highest of public offices in the 
Czech Republic. Both the AG and the new Czech leaders shared a sense of Central 
Europeanism built over the previous two decades and sought to promote 
reconciliation between Germans and Czechs as part of a greater vision of restoring 
                                                        
438 Interview, Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
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multiculturalism and national inclusion, in contrast the SL’s continued nationalist 
rhetoric of “Czech” crimes inflicted upon “Germans.” Together, the AG and their 
Czech partners helped established a host of partner organizations and cooperations 
that built bridges between Germans and Czechs, contributed to mutual 
understanding and friendly neighborship and helped guide both governments 
toward official rapprochement. They also brought together young Sudeten Germans 
and Czechs in ways that helped build a new network of Germans and Czechs to take 
over the reins of cooperation and dialogue from the now-aging pre-1989 
generation. While the SL attempted to influence Czech politics and society from the 
outside and failed, the AG slowly expanded its presence and influence on the inside, 
and in this way the AG became more relevant than ever before. 
Although the AG and its growing network of Czech allies were dedicated to 
cooperation between the two peoples, narratives of the expulsion continued to be a 
stumbling block toward friendly German-Czech bilateral relations. For over four 
decades, the majority of the Czech public only heard the Socialist narrative that 
painted the expulsion as the last victorious step in defeating fascism and warned of 
a perpetual threat of reinvasion from the West. Unlike their new political leaders, 
most Czechs were never exposed to the revisionist narratives that emphasized the 
human rights aspect of mass suffering and the immorality of the collective guilt 
thesis and, thus, were surprised and confused by the sudden onslaught of calls by 
the new Czech elite to reappraise the previous expulsion narrative. The lack of 
alternate information of the expulsion that focused on these issues of morality as 
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well as the economic, social and political ramifications of the expulsion was a 
problem that persisted through the decade and hampered acceptance and 
understanding of the expulsion narrative that the former dissidents-turned new 
Czech elites propagated.439 
After 1989 Czechs also began a process of defining and understanding 
themselves in the post-Communism context of wider European integration, and one 
of the historical constants in Czech national self-conceptions was defining the Czech 
nation in relation to Germans.440 Calls to morally condemn the expulsion presented 
a stark rewriting of the previous juxtaposition of an aggressive German threat 
versus morally justified Czechs in a way that challenged the foundation on which 
Czech national history and identity rested and provoked an impassioned 
backlash.441 
Further inhibiting an openness toward moral reevaluation for the Czech 
public was a perceived lack of reciprocity on the German side to Havel, Dienstbier, 
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and other Czech representatives’ early gestures of reconciliation toward 
Germans.442 Kohl remained mute to these gestures, and the voices from across the 
border that did emerge in Czech media were primarily from the SL. In 1990 Czech 
press organs routinely published SL letters, articles and statements that rejected 
Havel’s reconciliatory words and demanded property reclamation, monetary 
compensation for suffering and lost property, and a right to return with guaranteed 
national minority rights.443 In one such widely-circulated statement the spokesman 
of the SL, Fritz Wittman, insisted that Sudeten Germans would not be “bought off” 
with a mere apology and demanded that, “whoever condemns the expulsions as 
deeply immoral must also search for means to rectify the resulting injustice and 
losses” as a necessary step in the “return to Europe.”444 With Kohl remaining silent 
on the issue to pander to Sudeten Germans, many Czechs feared that the West 
German (and later reunified German) government was playing dishonestly and 
coaxing the Czechoslovak (and later Czech) government into making apologies to 
                                                        
442 Witte, Entfremdung, 83; Kučera, “Zwischen Geschichte und Politik,” 174–175. Havel made 
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serve as legal groundwork for levying financial and property restitution, which the 
overwhelming majority of Czechs were: A 1990 poll suggested that 70% of Czech 
citizens were against all forms of material compensation for Sudeten Germans, 
while 10% supported monetary compensation only, and a mere 3% were for the 
return of property, with many believing these steps might pave the way for a mass 
return of Sudeten Germans and possibly even border revisions.445 
A fiery Czech public debate ensued where Czech citizens voiced deeply 
emotional opinions and overwhelmingly rejected Havel’s perceived apologies and 
took the view that the expulsion was not revenge, but a justified action based on the 
war experience and legalized by the Allies at the Potsdam Conference. The 1992 
treaty was meant to embody a fundamental turning point in bilateral relations. 
However, it failed to find common language to define the expulsion in a way that 
pleased both Czechs and Sudeten Germans, and it also failed to address important 
questions like property reclamation and restitution for expellees and victims of the 
Nazi occupation. 446 It left both sides largely disappointed and necessitated a 
separate declaration in 1997 dedicated solely to addressing these unresolved 
                                                        
445 From a survey undertaken December 12, 1990, by the Institute for Opinion Research; cited from: 
Kučera, “Zwischen Geschichte und Politik,” 178–179; Houžvička, The Sudeten German Question, 
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Witte, Entfremdung, 310–311. 
 233 
 
issues. While the bulk of previous scholarship on German-Czech relations 
emphasizes missteps and conflicts in the 1990s, it is the goal of this chapter to 
illustrate how the extensive groundwork of grassroots relations forged by the AG 
over many decades helped lay out a path toward reconciliation and allowed the 
moderate voices to win out in bilateral relations even in a climate that did not seem 
to favor moderation.  
The Ackermann Gemeinde in the ČSSR: Early Contacts and Early Troubles 
 In November 1989, Pithart had never heard the name of the AG, and this was 
not uncommon for many of the non-Catholic Czech dissidents and even some in the 
underground church.447 In the decades of secrecy under Socialism, names of foreign 
individuals or organizations engaged in illegal assistance and activities were kept 
secret for obvious reasons. If the AG had not previously worked directly with a 
certain individual then it was likely that that person’s information about Sudeten 
German organizations only comprised of the behemoth bloc of aggressive 
“Landsmannschaften” (Sudeten German organizations) as part of the Socialist 
rhetoric of revanchist Sudeten Germans. This presented the AG with the 
monumental task of convincing partners and the Czech public that they as a 
Sudeten German organization came in the name of peace and reconciliation; 
however, it was precisely here that the AG’s existing network was instrumental in 
                                                        
447 Both Rudolf Kučera and underground priest and activist Tomas Halík had never heard of the AG 
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helping them make initial contacts and forge partnerships. 
On January 2, 1989, the now-deputy chairman of the Senate and soon-to-be 
Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Pithart, received a telephone call from 
renowned émigré Pavel Tigrid—a frequent attendee of the Opus Bonum-AG 
summits and friend of Olbert—who informed Pithart that he should organize a 
meeting as soon as possible between the new Czech leadership and a group of 
Sudeten German Catholics called the Ackermann Gemeinde.448 Nine days later 
Pithart met Olbert and other representatives of the AG. He was very impressed by 
their previous work and public statements on German-Czech relations and based 
on this and the recommendation of Tigrid he immediately became a willing AG 
partner moving forward. 
Pithart and the Forum were very concerned that the Czech Communist Party 
would use the Sudeten German issue against Havel and the Civic Forum candidates 
in the upcoming election, and he proposed a joint conference of AG representatives 
and Czechs to discuss the expulsion and enlisted the help of fellow former-dissident 
historian, Bohemus author and Pithart’s future spokesman, Petr Příhoda, to 
organize a Czech delegation. On that same trip the AG met with another hero of the 
Velvet Revolution demonstrations, Václav Benda, and he expressed similar concern 
about the lack of accurate knowledge on the expulsion among Czechs and offered 
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his support for future cooperation and conferences to address.449 Olbert also had 
the opportunity to meet with all these contacts and more on January 14 at an 
international conference in Prague hosted by Kučera’s Paneuropean Union and the 
British Conservative Council on Eastern Europe. This meeting brought together 
many of the Czech dissidents and representatives of the SL, where Czechs like 
Příhoda, Benda, and Dienstbier roundly condemned the violent excesses of the 
expulsion and the faulty assumption of collective guilt behind them and affirmed 
their desire to reflect these beliefs in official Czech policy and statements toward 
Germany.450 Kučera also first learned of the AG in 1990, but he quickly formed a 
partnership with them both as a private scholar soliciting funds for historical 
publications as well as official cooperation between his Paneuropean Union—
Bohemia and Moravia and the AG.451 
 Two months later AG representatives met with Czech Christians in March in 
Marktredwitz, West Germany for what would be the first of many annual meetings 
with the newly established Czech Christian Academy (Česká křesťanská akademie, 
hereafter, Christian Academy). The Christian Academy was founded in 1990 by 
                                                        
449 Trip Report, unsigned, Kurzbericht ČSSR Reise vom 11. bis 14. Januar 1990, AG 1129; Interview, 
Petr Pithart, July 16, 2015. 
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long-time AG and Opus Bonum contact Josef Zvěřina, and through the AG’s contacts 
and the help of Příhoda (who could not attend the meeting) German and Czech 
Catholic leaders met in March along with Kučera representing the Czech 
Paneuropean Union to discuss German-Czech relations and future cooperation in 
Europe. However, the meeting did not run smoothly despite the goodwill built 
between leaders on both sides in the preceding decades. They found common 
ground in their Bohemian perspective on German-Czech heritage and culture and 
agreed it was destroyed by the nationalisms of both sides. But they stumbled over 
language and phrasing of the expulsion during attempts to formulate a common 
declaration so much so that Pithart and Olbert both wondered if the meeting would 
simply be cancelled amid the contentious impasse.452 The meeting continued to its 
scheduled end, and though they could not conclude a declaration, all sides agreed to 
meet continually in the future and to initiate formal correspondence between the 
Catholic Bishop Conferences of both countries.453 
 In April 1991 the AG and the Czech Christian Academy met again, this time 
just across the border in Mariánské Lázně, Czechoslovakia, but the meeting again 
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Halík, Alle meine Wege sind Dir vertraut, 283–284. 
 237 
 
ended without the desired lengthy declaration on German-Czech relations. This 
time, however, it was not for lack constructive dialogue but rested in practical 
concerns. Both the AG and the Christian Academy had been preoccupied over the 
previous year with a range of expanded activities and were learning how to adapt 
to the new political and social changes since 1989, and the bishop conferences were 
only able to exchange one letter apiece since the meeting the previous year.454 
Instead of prioritizing the writing of the declaration, the 1991 meeting focused on 
exchanges of perspective through presentations and discussion groups. The group 
published a small press release at its conclusion where both sides acknowledged 
victims and perpetrators in the long history of the Czech lands and expressed 
mutual dedication to overcoming this troubled past through open dialogue and 
understanding.455 The good will was present on both sides, and both had common 
ground in viewing the Czech lands as home to a shared cosmopolitan heritage, but 
even for them the act of agreeing on a joint declaration necessitated lengthy 
dialogue and showed the complicated and sensitive nature of dealing with this 
particular episode in German-Czech history. 
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The 1992 German-Czech Bilateral Treaty 
 The meetings and progress toward the declaration of the AG and the group 
of Czech Christians were hampered by the growing unrest in Czech society, as 
official negotiations on a German-Czechoslovak bilateral treaty stumbled over how 
to deal with issues of reconciliation and restitution surround victims of the Nazi 
regime and the expulsion as well as how to narrate the expulsion. Negotiations 
began just days after German reunification on October 3, 1990, but complications 
stemming largely from issues related to the expulsion drew the talks out for an 
entire year. During this time Havel, Pithart, Dienstbier, and other representatives of 
the new Czech government made repeated statements calling Czechs to confront 
the immorality of the expulsion over the first two years after 1989, but they met a 
largely skeptical Czech public that did not readily accept the new moral evaluation 
that the dissidents had over a decade before. The actual progress of negotiations as 
well as the terms of the treaty were shielded from the public, although Czech and 
Slovak press organs reported on the scant statements from the foreign ministry and 
general speculations on their progress, or lack thereof. 
However, as Czechs wondered what sort of deal their government was 
striking with the Germans, they received a steady stream of statements from SL and 
CDU/CSU political leaders that complicated Czech public sentiment on the 
negotiations. Czech media regularly published SL demands for direct inclusion in 
the state-level negotiations to push for material restitution for Sudeten Germans, a 
right to return with minority rights, and a repealing of the Beneš Decrees. Through 
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these demands and statements the Czech public began fearing that an outright 
apology for the expulsion and a repeal of the Beneš Decrees would render the 
expulsion illegal and pave the way for a flood of returning Sudeten Germans to the 
border region and could even result in Germany’s annexing of the Sudetenland 
again, and this began to foster a growing anti-German sentiment among the Czech 
populace.456 
Meanwhile, Olbert returned to Czechoslovakia in July 1991 in the midst of 
the public discussions on the expulsion to make the rounds among Czech Catholic 
leaders and political contacts to gauge support for a draft declaration he carried 
with him for the German and Czech Christians on bilateral relations. His contacts 
widely described the political situation as “heating up” and expressed disdain for 
inflammatory comments by expellee politicians and the Bavarian government 
against Czechs for not acceding to Sudeten German demands. The Czech 
Ambassador to Germany, Jiří Gruša, expressed his concern with the widespread 
fear of Germany and misunderstanding among Czechs at the time and suggested to 
Olbert to expedite the translation of German historical works to offer a different 
perspective on the expulsion and historical German-Czech relations for Czech 
consumption.457 
                                                        
456 These demands and their echo in Czechoslovak press have been treated at depth elsewhere and 
will not be re-hashed here. For good overviews in German and English, see: Witte, Entfremdung, 
132–140; Kunštát, “German-Czech Relations,” 149–172; Kunštát, “Deutsch-tschechische 
Beziehungen?” 20–29; Kučera, “Zwischen Geschichte und Politik,” 174–187; Pauer, “Moral Political 
Dissent,” 173–186. 
457 Aktenvermerk, Gespräch mit Botschaftler Gruša am 16. Juli 1991 in München, AG 1129. 
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The German Ambassador in Prague expressed to Olbert that the negative 
Czech press on the SL and expellee politicians were making it very difficult to find 
dialogue partners, and that Pithart himself had recently cancelled a planned lunch 
with Bavarian Minister-President Max Streibl in protest of his recent inflammatory 
comments against Czechs. In July of the previous year Pithart reported having had a 
positive meeting with Neubauer and the SL where both underscored that contact 
between the Czech government and Sudeten Germans needed to expand, yet his 
public spurning of Streibl in the summer of 1991 showed just how much the 
situation had deteriorated in the course of one year.458 The situation even 
threatened domestic Czech attitudes towards the Catholic Church, as multiple 
priests reported to Olbert that the growing anti-German sentiment was turning 
Czechs against the Church for its positive stance toward Germany and Sudeten 
Germans. Nevertheless, Olbert’s contacts remained firm in their commitment for 
positive relations and were optimistic about finding Czech signatories for the draft 
declaration.459 
 The official bilateral German-Czech treaty was concluded in October 1991 
and ratified by both governments the following year. When its terms became public 
in 1991, it was a disappointment to many Czechs and Sudeten Germans in that it 
did not address the major issues relating to the expulsion like attributing blame or 
                                                        
458 See: Witte, Entfremdung, 103–104. 
459 Gedächtnisprotokoll, Besprechung am 21.–22.07.1991 in Prag (Olbert und Otte), AG 1129. 
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providing for restitution for WWII victims on either side. The SL and the national 
expellee organization the Federation of Expellees were very vocal in their desires 
for restitution concessions and a formal apology in the treaty, whereas Havel and 
many Czechs were hoping the treaty would end those Sudeten German demands 
and provide compensation for Czech victims of the Nazi regime. During the treaty’s 
signing ceremony Havel lauded the treaty as the dawn of “a new era […] of 
understanding, mutual trust and fruitful cooperation [in the] thousand-year history 
of cohabitation in Central Europe,” but in a later description of the treaty he echoed 
the widespread Czech disappointment on the property issue by describing it as 
simply “what we could agree on for the moment.”460 
The treaty did take the very symbolic step in its use of the word “expulsion” 
(vyhnání) instead of “transfer” (odsun), and this in itself was a monumental shift in 
previous official Czech descriptions of the expulsion, but in the compromise over 
formulation it was used in a non-descript phrasing that did not attribute specific 
blame to one side or the other.461 Still, the inclusion of the word “expulsion” 
outraged many Czechs and stalled the ratification process in parliament due to 
accusations its usage implied an unlawful act that would pave the way for legally 
justifying Sudeten Germans to reclaim property and force Czechs out of the border 
                                                        
460 Rzepka, Zukunft trotz Vergangenheit, 45; Hoffmann, “Vom Kanzler kein offenes Wort.” 
461 The specific passage read, “in remembrance of the many victims that tyranny, war and expulsion 
claimed.” Full German text can be found in: Witte, Entfremdung, 297–309. 
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region.”462 
 There was also opposition to the treaty in Germany. The SL and the CSU 
rejected it outright as not enough, and it also became a political tool for 
demonstrators of Germany’s resurging right-wing nationalist movement that 
emerged in the wake of reunification, increased immigration, and political and 
economic uncertainty. Images of German demonstrators calling for Havel’s removal 
and chanting, “Heim ins Reich!” [Back to the homeland!] in Czech media only 
inflamed Czech anti-German sentiment further and gave the impression that the 
SL’s political position in Germany was much stronger than it actually was.463 
Conversely, much of the mainstream West German media criticized Kohl for 
allowing relations with the Czechs to deteriorate by not reciprocating Havel’s 
multiple gestures of reconciliation and contributing to the drawn out negotiations 
by allowing the SL too much influence over terms in the process.464 
Kohl’s closeness to the SL and their CSU allies reflected their continued 
political importance to his chancellorship. With the percentage of the CDU/CSU 
union’s vote in national elections slowly eroding from its high point of 48% in 1983 
                                                        
462 Kučera, “Zwischen Geschichte und Politik,” 180–181; Kunštát, “German-Czech Relations,” 
155−156; Pauer, “Moral Political Dissent,” 175. Czech parliamentarians delayed the ratification 
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sides provided; see: Witte, Entfremdung, 148. 
463 “CSU/CSFR,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 28, 1992. For contemporary commentary of the 
rising German nationalist movement, see: Jürgen Habermas, “Die zweite Lebenslüge der 
Bundesrepublik: Wir sind wieder ’normal’ geworden,” Die Zeit, December 11, 1992. 
464 Witt, Entfremdung, 141–147. 
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and ceding ground to the SPD and Green parties through the 1980s and early 
1990s, Kohl continued to court the expellee voting bloc in the negotiations to buffer 
his political position. This resulted, among other contentious points that slowed 
negotiations and raised Czech suspicions of the German side, to the Kohl 
government insisting that compensation for Sudeten Germans accompany any 
reparations for Czech and Slovak victims of National Socialism. Kohl also called for 
a repeal of the Beneš Decrees that stripped Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovak 
citizenship, nationalized their property and absolved non-ethnic Germans from any 
crimes committed in the removal of the German population in 1945.465 
Working to alleviate tensions surrounding the announcement of the treaty, 
the AG and Seliger Gemeinde published a joint-statement in support of the treaty 
and pled to disgruntled Sudeten Germans to be understanding and patient. The 
statement called on Sudeten Germans to appreciate the weakness of the current 
political and economic situation in Czechoslovakia and Czechs’ current inability to 
issue a formal apology or initiate large sums of monetary restitution, and they 
pointed out the positive steps included in the treaty such as acknowledgement of 
the suffering inflicted upon Sudeten Germans through the expulsion and a call for 
grassroots cooperation in preserving cultural relics like cemeteries and 
                                                        
465 Ann L. Phillips, “The Politics of Reconciliation Revisited: Germany and East-Central Europe,” 
World Affairs 163 (2001): 180–181. 
 244 
 
churches.466 The AG’s Junge Aktion later published an open letter criticizing 
Bavaria’s CSU-led government for voting against the treaty’s ratification.467 The AG 
received positive echo in the German press for their positive role in German-Czech 
relations. One national article noted the AG’s long history of helping Czechs and 
forging contacts that was now bearing fruit in terms of building grassroots good 
will, and they praised the AG’s program in contrast to the SL: “They no longer 
consider themselves an expellee organization. Neighborliness is now the task.”468 
 In December 1991, the AG and the Czech Christian Academy published their 
long-planned joint declaration on the “Shape of German-Czech Neighborship.”469 
This declaration showed an ability among German and Czech Catholics to find more 
consensus and common ground than the official treaty and to strike a much more 
reconciliatory tone. They noted that the future required Germans and Czechs to 
recognize their centuries-long history of peaceful cohabitation of the Czech lands, 
abandon common stereotypes of each other, and recognize that the past horrors of 
                                                        
466 Ackermann Gemeinde and Seliger Gemeinde, Erklärung zum deutsch-tschechoslowakischen 
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murder and expulsion could not stand in the way of future cooperation. 
Its German signatories called on all Sudeten Germans to work as a unifying 
force between Germans and Czechs and warned that any return of confiscated 
property would only be disappointing, because the expulsion of people to achieve 
this end was simply out of the question. Instead, they pled to Sudeten Germans that, 
“in these circumstances we advocate voluntary personal sacrifice as a contribution 
to a peaceful new beginning.”470 Not all AG members and leaders held the same 
personal opinion on the topic of property restitution, thus the non-committal 
stance toward stating definitively that Sudeten Germans and their offspring should 
abandon all claims to property reclamation and compensation for their and their 
ancestors’ suffering. Moreover, as an institution the AG was concerned with 
reconciliation and building positive relations, and property issues were out of their 
purview and a topic belonging to the SL. Olbert recalled that such internal 
compromises were simply as part of the AG’s general modus operandi: “We always 
did what we could do at the moment in the specific circumstances. That was how 
we operated before 1989, and that was how we operated after. We took what was 
in front of us and used it to build upon for the future.”471 
The Czech signatories attempted to calm the anti-German sentiment by 
appealing to Czechs to understand that the radical voices coming from Germany 
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were a minority and should only be viewed as expressions of freedom of opinion in 
a healthy democratic society. They further stressed that Sudeten German tourists 
that come to visit the countryside are not revanchists scouting out their former 
property for reclamation but are reconnecting with their family history. Both sides 
advocated using every opportunity to build diplomacy from “person to person” 
through meetings and talks to overcome misconceptions and stereotypes.472 
The Ackermann Gemeinde and Initiatives with Czech Elites 
 The joint declaration of Sudeten German and Christians on bilateral 
relations provided a breath of fresh air and encouraging steps toward 
reconciliation in an otherwise hostile public discourse, and the AG continued to 
expand its initiatives for further reconciliation. To facilitate the enhancement and 
expansion of cooperation with Czechs, the AG opened an office in Prague in 1992 
headed by Anton Otte. Otte was a decades-long AG member who emigrated to West 
Germany from Czechoslovakia in 1960 and joined a seminary in Königstein 
established by priests of varying nationalities who immigrated from Eastern 
Europe after the war, and there he quickly came into contact with the AG and 
served on the board alongside his regular duties as a priest. After November 1989 
he joined Olbert on trips to Czechoslovakia where many of their Czech contacts 
brought up a desire to see an AG office in Prague to expedite cooperation and 
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planning.473 Otte was unable to obtain a visa under the old Czechoslovak regime, 
and his first trip back came in 1990. Thus, he moved to Prague in 1992 to head the 
small office armed only with the AG’s list of church and priest contacts as well as 
the handful of relationships he built during his trips over the previous two years. 
However, the reputation of the AG preceded him, and Otte had little trouble in 
establishing relationships once he arrived: “I always had an open door when I said I 
was from the Ackermann Gemeinde. No one was afraid that I wanted something 
from them.”474 
 Otte always followed a general rule that the AG would not organize any 
events or gatherings without Czech partners, and he found willing collaborators 
through a number of organizations established after 1989 by Czechs friendly to the 
AG. The Czech Christian Academy mentioned above was a major partner with 
which the AG organized many events, including annual gatherings in Mariánské 
Lázně that continue to the present.475 The gatherings there in the 1990s were 
comprised of speeches, talks, and round-table discussions on social-political and 
historical topics of German-Czech history and relations and included leaders from 
the AG, Seliger Gemeinde, Adalbert Stifter Verein, and Collegium Carolinum as well 
as regular Czech speakers like Pithart, Petr Příhoda, and the vice-chairman of the 
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Czech parliament Jan Sokol.476 
 Pithart also founded the Bernard Bolzano Society in 1991 to serve as a non-
confessional partner organization to the AG for organizing events and increasing 
the reach and range of contacts between Sudeten Germans and Czechs through 
both organizations’ networks. The most significant of their events were the so-
called “Jihlava Discussions” held annually in the Czech town of Jihlava.477 The 
conferences attracted around 150 Sudeten Germans and Czechs per year from 
many of the same organizations as the Mariánské Lázně gatherings but also 
included many Czech academics and political leaders. Whereas the Mariánské 
Lázně gatherings had a strong religious component to them, the Jihlava Discussions 
were purely academic in nature.478 
During a time where anti-German sentiment was rising among the Czech 
population, the Jihlava Discussions offered a forum for leading German and Czech 
historians of Central Europe to gather and discuss historical topics, current public 
perceptions and how and what to research to best educate the publics of both 
countries. Many of these participants were part of the joint German-Czechoslovak 
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Historian’s Commission established in 1990, including Ferdinand Seibt, Jiří Pešek, 
Rudolf Kučera, Jan Křen, and Miroslav Kunštát.479 The Bernard Bolzano Society also 
helped bring Czechs to conferences across the border such as the 1992 conference 
in Reichenberg, “Germans and Czechs—Neighbors in Central Europe,” which 
attracted mayors, deputy mayors, state political representatives, and citizens from 
across Bavaria to participate in mixed discussion panels of Sudeten German and 
Czech participants that included the directors of the AG and SL (Neubauer) and 
Czechs like historian Křen, Kučera, Sokol, and Jaroslav Šabata.480 
 Others in the AG émigré network like Prečan were also expanding the AG’s 
network into Czech academic institutions and spearheading efforts for 
reconciliation. In January 1990 at a meeting of the historian’s section of Civic 
Forum and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Prečan was enlisted to found a 
new Institute for Contemporary History in Prague, where he was later joined by his 
friend and Bohemus co-author Milan Otáhal. For the next few years he split his 
efforts between building up that institute and his continued work collecting more 
writings at his documentation center for independent Czech and Slovak writing at 
Schwarzenberg Castle in Saxony, where he also organized annual conferences for 
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Czech and Slovak authors.481 
In light of the surge of public Czech debate about the expulsion and rising 
anti-German sentiment, Prečan planned the 1993 conference at Schwarzenberg 
Castle around the theme “Czech and Slovak Authors in Dialogue with their German 
Neighbors” and co-organized it with Olbert and the AG.482 The attendees were a 
who’s who of prominent Czech former dissidents, émigrés and current political 
leaders, including Ludvík Vaculík, Pavel Tigrid, Milan Šimečka, Milan Uhde, 
Ambassador Gruša, and representatives from the Czech president and prime 
minister’s offices. German attendees included Olbert and other AG board members, 
the heads of the Adalbert Stifter Verein and Seliger Gemeinde as well as many of 
their board members, Collegium Carolinum researchers, journalists, newspaper 
editors, and Wolfgang Scheuer who was the former West German diplomat in 
Prague and one of Prečan’s primary previous contacts for smuggling literature.483 
The gathering was positive and productive and received wide echo in German and 
Czech televised and printed press. It was much in the spirit of the 1992 declaration 
of German and Czech Christians, and this declaration was meant to be circulated at 
the conference and made part of the discussion program but delays in the printing 
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prevented the copies from arriving in time.484 
Czech Politics and Anti-Politics 
Such conferences and gatherings offered forums for dialogue and free 
exchanges of opinions and perspectives that ran parallel to a persistent contentious 
political situation between Germany and the Czech Republic, which formally split 
from Slovakia January 1, 1993. Preceding the “Velvet Divorce” of Czechoslovakia 
was another divorce of the short-lived alliance of dissidents and technocrats in the 
Civic Forum Party in 1991 and the rise of Václav Klaus’ Civic Democrat Party. Klaus 
did not come from a dissident background but was an economist formerly working 
in the “grey zone.” He was part of a larger generation of economists before 1989 
that believed in neo-liberal free market principles known as the “young 
economists.” These young economists held posts at places like the Institute of 
Economics of the Academy of Sciences in the 1970s and 1980s and promoted veiled 
critiques of the Czechoslovak economy and tenets of free market principles through 
conferences and domestic publications while not moving fully into the realm of 
openly denouncing Socialism.485 After 1989, the dissidents allied with many of 
these technocrats to occupy ministerial posts and use their expertise to help run 
the country. 
                                                        
484 Vilém Prečan, Dankesbrief an Teilnehmer des II Schwarzenberger Schriftsteller Treffens vom 
11.−13. Juni 1993, AG 128; Interview, Vilém Prečan, July 17, 2015. 
485 Seán Hanley, The New Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics, 
1989–2006 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 57–59. 
 252 
 
Klaus orchestrated economic policy as the Minister of Finance, but in 1991 
he helped lead a split of technocrats from the dissidents within the Civic Forum by 
forming the Civic Democrat Party, which included almost no dissidents. In the 1992 
elections Klaus’ Civic Democrats replaced the former dissidents like Havel, 
Dienstbier, and Pithart who had reorganized into the Civic Movement Party, and 
Klaus took over Pithart’s position as Prime Minister of the Czech Republic in the 
Czechoslovak Federative Republic (ČSFR).486 The rise of Klaus marked a removal 
from power of the dissidents as well as a wide scale abandonment of their 
reconciliatory stance toward Germany in Prague. The dissidents in the Civic 
Movement Party fought to maintain their party’s existence after managing less than 
5% of the vote in 1992 and ultimately dissolved and merged into other parties by 
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1996.487 
The morality-driven dissidents like Havel and Pithart were hampered in 
their political competencies by a history of discussing only to each other in the 
“dissident ghetto” of small and enclosed circles kept hidden from those who were 
not dissidents and who did not read samizdat. 488 When they assumed political 
positions after 1989 they found themselves unable to speak effectively to a vast 
majority of the population. The dissidents’ philosophy of “living in the truth” and 
placing human rights above all other political issues had made them the heroes 
during the late years of Socialism and earned them the trust of the Czech public to 
take control of the country after 1989. But after the democratic transition they 
faced a public that was more concerned with immediate problems of the present 
than abstract self-reflections and moral reappraisals of the past.489 
Their moral calls to the Czech public to reevaluate the expulsion and the 
anti-German sentiment this helped engender was a prime example of this 
disconnect, as Pithart reflected: “Havel and the Civic Movement quickly lost 
popularity every time they mentioned the past and settlement with it. They 
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themselves came to terms with this demand although it was rejected by most 
others. I do not know if the larger, more vociferous part of the public typically 
wants to hear that law and justice are not always identical.”490 The “anti-politics” of 
the dissidents that had formed the root and origins of dissident philosophy and 
activity against the prevailing political institutions in the 1970s and contributed to 
the fall of Socialism in that country thus proved a hindrance those same individuals’ 
successful political activity after 1989.491 Havel’s critics and even sympathetic 
friends like Timothy Garton Ash noted the problems in balancing intellectual 
morality with politics, arguing that one could be a politician attempting to influence 
people, or an intellectual striving for truth, but not both.492 
In addition to the disconnect between the anti-political Czech leaders and 
their general populace, calls to reappraise the past were taking place during a 
general crisis of Czech national identity and a time of great uncertainty which 
engendered rising nationalist sentiments. In 1992 in the wake of public discontent 
over the treaty, Pithart commented that Czech nationalism was still contained in a 
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bottle but “the cap is open,” and in reflecting on his party’s disappointing defeat at 
the polls later that year he attributed it in part to a lack of historical perspective, 
saying that “wrong illusions […] result in disappointment. And mass 
disappointment results in mass movements. Today’s new nationalism is one of 
those movements.”493 
The rise of Czech nationalism paralleled, and was in part stoked by, a 
renewal of the old perception of a German threat facing the Czech nation sparked 
by German unification, increasing German economic expansion in the Czech 
Republic, and statements by the SL demanding a right to return and reclaim 
property.494 Adding to this reaction was a feeling of vulnerability after the 
dissolution of the Czechoslovak state that had marked their independence from 
German hegemony for the first time since the 17th century.495 This climate of 
uncertainty enabled a resurfacing of the trauma of Munich and self-conception of 
Czechs as a nation threatened by Germans and unable to rely on the help of foreign, 
making reevaluating their relationship to Germans and their narrative of the 
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expulsion all the more emotional and complicated.496 Havel summarized Czech’s 
problematic connection of their national identity to Germans in a 1995 speech at 
the Carolinum in Prague: 
 
One can say that the Czechs define themselves both politically and 
philosophically through their attitude toward Germany and Germans, and 
that it is through the nature of this attitude that they determine not only 
their relationship to their history but also the actual form of their national 
and state self-image. (…) Germany is our inspiration and our pain, a source 
of intellectual traumas, various prejudices and false beliefs as well as the 
standards we reference ourselves to; some see Germany as our greatest 
hope, others as our greatest danger.497 
 
Czech Politics of Europe 
Returning to Europe was the banner of the Civic Forum and was carried by 
the Civic Democrats as well as almost every other Czech political party, but Klaus’ 
Civic Democrats and the dissidents held two very distinct visions of that return. For 
the morality-driven dissidents the emphasis was on integrating with the values, 
morals, and culture of Europe, and viewing Europeanness as a cosmopolitan 
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identity akin to, and encompassing, Central Europeanism. This differed strongly 
from Klaus’ focus on practical integration into the political institutions and markets 
of Europe and the Atlantic realm.498 A clear example of this difference was the Klaus 
government’s rejection of the “Visegrad Cooperation” that Havel established 
between Czechoslovakia (and later Slovakia), Hungary, and Poland. 499 Klaus’ stance 
was “Eurosceptic” in comparison to the dissidents in that he stressed the 
importance of preserving Czech cultural diversity and national sovereignty on the 
road to joining the European Community. While he supported practical forms of 
integration, he also reinforced national ways of thinking and encouraged Czechs to 
hold onto a sense of national identity, arguing that Czechs had to “find their identity 
and not lose it on the path to Europe” and manage “how to be European without at 
the same time dissolving into Europeanism like a lump of sugar in a cup of 
coffee.”500 
The juxtaposition of the two forms of “returning to Europe” manifested in 
different approaches toward German-Czech relations. For the dissidents, critical 
moral self-reflection and reconciliation with Germany was an important and 
necessary step toward joining Europe deserving of the highest priority, as Havel 
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demonstrated by taking his first official visit to West Germany in January 1990. 
Klaus, on the other hand, did not concern himself with German reconciliation and 
placed primary interest on economic and political alliances like NATO and joining 
the European Union. Klaus also did not shy away from drawing on the anti-German 
sentiment juxtaposing German and Czech values and interests in critiquing the 
European Union as a threat to Czech sovereignty for its supposed dominance by 
Germany, playing into popular fears of German dominance and Czech 
vulnerability.501 The rise of the Civic Democrats in Czech politics did not remove all 
political allies of the AG and supporters of reconciliation with Sudeten Germans 
from public offices and Klaus was not openly hostile toward Germany, but there 
was a notable lack of enthusiasm for dialogue and a de-prioritizing of Sudeten 
German issues once he took office in 1992. While this would hamper the SL as an 
institution promoting Sudeten German political interests of restitution and 
compensation, the AG had institutional aims of German-Czech dialogue and 
reconciliation and thus were not as impeded by the less-than-friendly Klaus 
government in pursuing these ends. 
German-Czech Encounters from Below 
The Czech dissidents, though largely removed from prominent political 
offices under Klaus, continued their pursuit of the moral reevaluation of the 
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expulsion and German relations through the many non-governmental organizations 
they created to work together with the AG and other Sudeten German cultural 
groups.502 Meanwhile, the AG was actively expanding its grassroots network and 
forging positive relations with Czechs on a local level to compliment the high-
profile encounters. 
Far from slowing down after 1989, the AG’s support and sponsorship of 
local Czech Catholic communities ramped up with the new freedom of mobility of 
people, money, and goods. During his visits across the border after 1989, Olbert 
met with the same rounds of priests and nuns as his earlier trips, and their 
immediate needs hat not fundamentally changed. They still requested literature 
above all, now adding Czech translations of German works to the requests, and they 
continued to need clothing, food, medicine, and technical equipment. To these 
requests also now came needs for money for church renovations, educational 
seminars, and intercultural events.503 With the restrictions of the former 
government now gone, the AG was free to move large amounts of capital for 
assistance. In 1991 the AG earmarked 50,450 DM for literature, 65,000 DM for 
educational events and German-Czech encounters, and over 1 million DM for 
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church renovations.504 To help pay for these ventures the AG capitalized on Kohl’s 
closeness to expellees and garnered a personal meeting with him to request federal 
funding.505 
 Over the next few years, Olbert continued to travel regularly to the ČSFR in 
1991 and 1992 to help coordinate the various projects along with Otte, who, before 
the opening of the official AG office in Prague in 1992, was staying at the Břevnov 
monastery on the outskirts of Prague on the invitation of their new head since 
1989, Anastáz Opasek.506 The churches and religious buildings the AG helped 
renovate worked to establish positive attitudes toward Sudeten Germans in their 
local communities, and many also played larger roles in German-Czech encounters. 
Rebuilding the historical Teplá Abbey outside Mariánske Lázně was one of the AG’s 
early priorities in 1990, and every year thereafter it served as symbol of the 
rebuilding of German-Czech relations with communal masses held there to open 
and close the annual gatherings of the AG and the Czech Christian Academy.507 The 
abbey observed its 800th anniversary in 1993 with a large celebration around the 
theme of German-Czech heritage and understanding. This occasion saw AG and 
Czech political and religious leaders offering mutual apologies for their role in 
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violence during and after WWII, including the vice-chairman of the lower house of 
parliament Pavel Tollner, who was a member of the Christian Democratic Party in 
Klaus’ coalition government, calling for all Czechs to confront the expulsion “as 
such,” referring to calling it explicitly an expulsion and not “transfer.”508 
 Local renovations also provided an opportunity for encounters and 
exchanges to build bridges between young Germans and Czechs, and the AG’s Junge 
Aktion became increasingly active in the Czech Republic over the 1990s. Although 
the Junge Aktion had its roots with the AG, it followed a trend since the late 1960s 
of distancing itself from association as an “expellee organization,” and by the 1990s 
it included members without Sudeten German heritage and considered itself a 
German-Czech youth organization rather than a Sudeten German organization.509 
The first official Junge Aktion event in the Czech Republic took place in 1994 in the 
former hunting castle at Chudenice, under renovation at the time, and brought 
together over one hundred Junge Aktion members and Czech youths from the Pax 
Christi organization in Prague. There, they laid the cornerstone for a new youth 
center that would host annual gatherings between the Junge Aktion and the youth 
of the Pax Christi—Prague every year thereafter.510 A similar encounter took place 
the following year in Skoky in northwestern Bohemia, where fifty German and 
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Czech youths spent a weekend camping in tents and renovating the local church 
and cemetery. 
 The young Germans and Czechs that gathered to renovate Skoky were 
brought together by a grassroots cooperation between the Junge Aktion branch and 
local Catholic diocese in Würzburg and Catholic youth in the Czech city of Tanvald. 
This cooperation started organizing three annual gatherings beginning in 1995, and 
they are an example of the many German-Czech city and diocese partnerships and 
other grassroots cooperatives that sprang up from local initiatives after 1989. One 
of the Junge Aktion leaders from Würzburg, Matthias Dörr, was 19 at the time and 
remembers the “excitement” he felt about traveling to the Czech Republic for this 
first of many gatherings in Skoky and meeting young Czechs who were also 
interested in getting to know young Germans: “It was exciting to discover 
something new […] an adventure. And the partnerships, it was a bit of euphoria 
meeting for the first time and discovering the feeling of togetherness […] We 
camped together, renovated the church and cemetery together, and we also had 
many very candid and substantive discussions as part of our evening program. That 
was a very formative experience for me.”511 Dörr later went on to take a leadership 
position in the Junge Aktion, assumed Olbert’s position as the head of the AG’s 
Sozialwerk office, and eventually became the national secretary general of the AG. 
 These grassroots initiatives ran parallel to the political debates and conflicts 
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of the 1990s, but contrary to the latter were characterized by cooperation, 
community, and a desire for understanding, not conflict. Otte, whose AG office in 
Prague focused primarily on coordinating the larger, high-profile conferences and 
events, nevertheless praised the efficacy and meaningfulness of the lower-level 
encounters: “[In contrast to the political discord at the higher levels] the meetings 
on the lower level always worked smoothly. The local and regional chapters [of the 
AG and Junge Aktion] had contacts with their former communities and they 
renovated churches and cemeteries and so on. But the large meetings… there one 
started looking for a new model to bring people into dialogue.”512 
 The youth encounters helped to forge a new network of German and Czech 
partnership to take over the reins from the older generation as they began to pass, 
as Dörr recalled: 
 
Of course you make a lot of friends when you are over there so often. You 
grow together and grow up together. Many people from this friendship 
circle have come to take important positions in Czech society, and the circle 
is still growing. This is a new network, meaning not the one from before 
1989, which isn’t as large as it used to be. We notice this more and more 
each time we get together and look back. There’s just not many of them 
left.513 
 
The contacts created in the nineties comprised many of the high-level AG contacts 
in later years and up to the present. Dörr was just one of many young Sudeten 
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Germans to make friends and build networks with young Czechs, but alone the 
friendships he made that evolved into partnerships included future employees at 
the European Parliament, the Bernard Bolzano Society, a Schools Minister of the 
Czech Republic and chairman of the Czech Green Party, an associate director at the 
Prague Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, the director of the AG’s 
Czech sister organization “Sdružení Ackermann-Gemeinde,”514 and many others 
who work in Czech media or political foundations.515 
In this way, though difficult to quantify, the importance of the AG and Junge 
Aktion’s many events and encounters in the 1990s for laying the groundwork for 
reconciliation, understanding, and partnership cannot be emphasized enough. 
Official treaties and carefully crafted public statements often provide the easiest 
sources for historians to locate and evaluate, but as the history of the AG forging 
individual contacts over the 1970s and 1980s that bore fruit in the 1990s showed, 
it is the small encounters and the personal relationships created through them that 
were the true catalysts of change and reconciliation behind the curtains of the 
official stages. 
The 1997 German-Czech Declaration516 
 Despite the many successful grassroots meetings, anti-German sentiment 
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persisted into the mid-1990s and showed a propensity to flare up and dominate 
Czech headlines.517 On a political level, Prime Minister Klaus took a cooler approach 
toward Sudeten German reconciliation than the previous Czech premier Pithart, 
opposing continued calls from Kohl and the SL for direct dialogue as well as any 
form of Czech apology for the expulsions.518 While not hostile to Germany or 
expellees, the expulsion issue was simply not of particular concern for Klaus: 
“German-Czech relations are what they are. We can’t artificially improve them, but 
we shouldn’t artificially make them worse either.”519 In opposing talks with the SL, 
Klaus also had the backing of the majority of the Czech population, with a 1993 
survey suggesting that 61% were opposed to direct dialogue with Sudeten 
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Germans, with 39% being “strongly opposed.”520 
The left parties of the Czech Republic, primarily the Communists and many 
of the Social Democrats, continued to warn that any steps or statements that might 
imply that the expulsion was unjust or illegal would open the flood gates for legal 
claims and a mass return of Sudeten Germans to the border region. For this reason, 
in the same 1993 survey 82% believed if Sudeten Germans were allowed to return 
they would threaten the property ownership of residents in the border region, and 
62% even feared it would lead to a revision of the Czech border.521 As one leading 
Social Democrat critic of revision of the expulsion narrative put it, “if an attempt is 
now made to interpret the transfer as an expulsion, then we cannot be surprised 
that the Sudeten Germans raise legal claims to property, because expulsion is an 
unlawful and illegal act. A return must logically come with every expulsion, because 
every illegal act substantiates a right of those affected to compensation.”522 
Klaus’ disinterest in actively pursuing reconciliation was complimented in a 
negative sense by Kohl’s sharp tones toward Czechs concerning expellee issues, 
with Kohl even joining the chorus of SL leaders and expellee politicians in 1993 
calling for the Czech Republic’s admission to the EU to be stalled if it failed to 
include the SL in direct talks.523 Kohl remained close to the SL and expellees 
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through the mid-1990s and allowed them to influence his policy stance toward the 
Czech Republic in such cases as calling for a repeal of the Benes Decrees and 
insisting on some form of compensation of expellees before giving Czech victims of 
the Nazi regime compensation. This closeness reflected his weakening national 
political base and the increasing importance of the expellee voting bloc for his 
political survival over the course of the decade. In the 1994 election the SPD 
surpassed Kohl’s CDU in total votes for the first time since his initial election, 
garnering 38% of the vote to the CDU’s 37%. It was the small but critical 7% of 
Bavarian CSU votes in the CDU/CSU union that allowed Kohl to continue his 
coalition government with the FPD’s 6.9% of the vote and achieve a very narrow 
simple majority in the Bundestag to retain his office as chancellor.524 Thus, the 
years between the concluding of the 1992 German-Czech treaty and 1995 were 
characterized by bilateral tension and political impasse as the leaders of both 
countries played to their political bases and stalled the reconciliation process, 
although the vast AG network of Germans and Czechs were working outside 
political confines to promote reconciliation and a coming-together of politicians at 
the national level. 
 It was allies of the AG that helped set into motion the negotiation of a 
German-Czech declaration to finally address the major outstanding issues standing 
in the way of reconciliation. At the turn of the year 1994–1995, Bavarian Minister-
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President Edmund Stoiber sent a letter to the German and Czech ambassadors 
outlining a set of points that would contribute to rapprochement. The letter 
included a number of points the Czechs saw as constructive and were willing to 
engage, but Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec was initially skeptical. His advisors, 
particularly Ambassador Gruša, an AG ally, persuaded him to take advantage of the 
opportunity and respond constructively to Stoiber’s proposal instead of simply 
rejecting the untenable points. Zieleniec met with Havel in early 1995 and together 
they came up with the idea for a joint declaration. Zieleniec planned to use Havel’s 
international prestige and contacts to help set negotiations into motion and ensure 
they did not stumble over suspicion and animosity, and he also intended to raise as 
much public support as possible and bring all the major parties on board to prevent 
any single party from torpedoing the negotiation process. 525 
To begin rallying public and political support for the declaration they made 
use of a series of lectures at the Prague Carolinum titled “Speaking of Neighbors,” in 
which prominent Czech and German politicians spoke on German-Czech relations 
and history, and offered potential solutions. Havel opened the lecture cycle with a 
widely praised speech that outlined the major Czech opinions and positions on the 
expulsion issues. He spoke of past and future German-Czech relations and laid out a 
nuanced perspective toward the expulsion that recalled the ongoing process of 
reconciling with the past while setting clear limits on the revisionist and restorative 
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demands of Sudeten Germans. The Czech media reacted exceptionally positive 
toward Havel’s speech, and it resonated with much of the Czech public and helped 
create space for political maneuvering to begin negotiations.526  
 With Havel having set the stage for sensible public Czech dialogue the AG 
and their Czech allies took another step in publishing a declaration of solidarity and 
call for dialogue that March titled “Reconciliation ’95.’” This declaration echoed 
previous AG-Czech statements in recalling past peaceful cohabitation that was 
ended by mistakes and violence by both sides, but it called for immediate talks 
between the Prague government and Sudeten German political representatives to 
find a common position on the historical “problem of decisions in the past” and to 
allow Sudeten Germans to return to the Czech Republic “on the condition of the 
equal status of returnees as the rest of the [Czech] population.”527 This was a 
carefully worded phrase to allow Sudeten Germans to obtain equal rights while 
precluding any special status from which to raise legal claims to property. The 
declaration had over one hundred signatories (thirty-eight Sudeten Germans and 
sixty-seven Czechs), including politicians, journalists, academics, and 
representatives of Sudeten German organizations including the AG, some from the 
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SL, the Adalbert Stifter Verein and Seliger Gemeinde, as well as Czechs who worked 
together with these institutions, like Kubes, Opasek, Kučera, Malý, Příhoda, Pithart, 
Sokol, and Otáhal.528 
 The public reaction in the German press and Chancellor’s office and Foreign 
Ministry was positive, but the official publications of the SL ignored it and the SL 
leadership actively blocked its approval in the Council, presumably because it 
threatened to undermine their demands for compensation and restitution. The 
immediate reaction to the proposal in the Czech press, however, was 
overwhelmingly negative, with much of the outcry directed at the Czech signatories 
whom the press accused of stabbing the Czech government in the back by openly 
calling for direct dialogue with Sudeten Germans.529 Pithart took to the pages of 
Lidové noviny to defend the declaration, saying, “Talks at government level with the 
political representatives of SGs would indeed be a non-standard step, but what 
happened was not standard either.”530 
 With the Klaus government once again rejecting the idea of direct dialogue 
with Sudeten Germans, the proposal failed in its objective of opening talks with 
Sudeten Germans. (Klaus’ response was, “if 105 people on both sides think that a 
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dialogue is necessary then let them lead this dialogue themselves.”).531 However, it 
contributed to the public discussion in the Czech Republic that Havel began in his 
Carolinum speech on beginning negotiations for a joint German-Czech declaration. 
Although most Czechs were against direct talks with Sudeten Germans, public 
opinion swayed increasingly in favor of finally resolving issues with Germany, and 
Klaus was finally persuaded to allow negotiations for a joint declaration with 
Germany in May 1995.532 
The hope was to agree on a declaration by the end of the year, but 
negotiations stumbled over many of the same obstacles as the 1992 treaty.533 To 
the SL’s annoyance, it was once again shut out of negotiations, as Klaus was 
insistent on making the declaration with the German government and not with 
Sudeten Germans. Among the political low-points during negotiations was Klaus 
requesting the former Allied powers for confirmation on the legality of the Potsdam 
Declaration to calm Czech public uproar following German Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel’s ill-timed comments in an interview, affirming Germany’s longtime stance 
that the Potsdam Declaration was a political statement with no legal bearing on the 
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expulsion of Germans.534  
 Despite a year and a half of tensions surrounding the negotiations, the final 
treaty was inked in December 1996 and ratified that January and February by the 
Bundestag and both houses of the Czech parliament, respectively. The AG and its 
network had a hand in the official bilateral declaration and its aftermath. 
Formulations from the correspondence between the German and Czech Bishop’s 
conferences initiated by the AG and the Czech Christian Academy found their way 
into the text of the declaration itself, and many individuals played central roles in 
the Future Fund and Dialogue Forum created through the treaty to address the 
issues of compensation for Czech victims of the Nazi regime and dialogue between 
Czechs and Sudeten Germans.535 Pavel Tigrid was the first Czech representative for 
the coordinating council for the Discussion Forum and helped guide it into 
existence until 1999, when he was replaced by Otto Pick, an émigré who in the 
1980s was the director of the Czechoslovak section of Radio Free Europe in Munich 
and a friend of the AG and frequent participant in their major events.536 Others who 
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536 “10 Jahre Deutsch-tschechischer Zukunftsfonds. Tätigkeitsbericht 1998-2007 und Jahresbericht 
2007,” 70; full text found at: http://www.fondbudoucnosti.cz/getFile.aspx?itemID=2681 (accessed 
July 11, 2016). 
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held leadership roles in the Future Fund include Franz Olbert, Josef Stingl, Herbert 
Werner (AG chairman from 1991-1998), Walter Rzepka (AG), Ferdinand Seibt, Petr 
Příhoda, Miloš Rejchrt, and Pavel Smetana (partners of the AG in the Czech 
Christian Academy), Franz Neubauer,537 and Berndt Posselt.538  
The Junge Aktion also used the new institutions created through the 
declaration to further expand its activity and reach. The Junge Aktion already 
became more active on a political level in 1996 by taking part in the first German-
Czech youth gathering and the German-Czech Theater Festival in Prague, which 
included a discussion forum with the Czech and German presidents, Havel and 
Roman Herzog.539 The Junge Aktion was specifically invited by the organizing 
committee of the youth gathering, and the chairman of the Junge Aktion at the time 
saw the gathering of over 250 youths as the “high point” of the decade and viewed 
their invitation as an acknowledgement of their previous work.540 They sent a 
delegation of twelve participants and used the opportunity to promote the Junge 
Aktion’s work to others and seek out more partners.541 Dörr recalled the 
excitement of meeting Havel and Herzog and gathering with so many Czechs at a 
                                                        
537 As chairman of the SL, Neubauer’s presence on the coordination council led to a political conflict 
with newly-elected Czech Social Democrat Prime Minister Miloš Zeman in 1998, when Zeman led a 
temporary boycott of the forum protesting that the head of the SL should not sit on the council 
because the SL rejected the 1997 declaration; see: Phillips, “The Politics of Reconciliation,” 182. 
538 “10 Jahre Deutsch-tschechischer Zukunftsfonds,” 80–96. 
539 Witte, Entfremdung, 208; Interview, Matthias Dörr, June 16, 2014.  
540 Lüffe, “Die 90er Jahren,” 75. 
541 Postilion: Info-Blatt des deutsch-tschechischen Jugendtreffens, Issue No. 2, September 3, 1996; H. 
Burger, “Klassenziel Versoehnung: Deutschen und Tschechen proben die Annaeherung,” Die Welt, 
September 5, 1996. 
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time when German-Czech relations were a major political issue, and the feeling of 
being part of history and active in contemporary politics inspired the Junge Aktion 
to think bigger and more politically.542 In 1998 they successfully petitioned to 
establish a formal youth German-Czech dialogue forum under the organizational 
umbrella of the forum created through the 1997 declaration and remained a 
primary organizational force behind the annual youth discussion forum meetings in 
the future.543 
The treaty was meant to put to rest the ambiguity and differences between 
the two states’ official narratives of the expulsion, and sections two and three of the 
treaty took significant steps toward this end. In recognition of their guilt, the 
German side, for the first time, officially acknowledged a causal link between the 
events of 1938/39 and those of 1945/46, declaring that “the violent policies of 
National Socialism against the Czech people contributed to laying the groundwork 
for the flight, expulsion, and forced evacuation that took place after the war’s 
end.”544 
On their part, the Czechs “regretted that the dispossession, denaturalization, 
expelling, and forced evacuation of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, (…) 
inflicted great suffering and injustice on innocent people given the collective 
                                                        
542 Interview, Matthias Dörr, June 16, 2014. 
543 Dörr, “Jung und Aktiv!” 66. 
544 “Die deutsch-tschechische Versöhnungserklärung vom 21. Januar 1997,” cited from: Witte, 
Entfremdung, 325. 
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character of attributing blame.”545 Taking direct blame for the expulsion and 
delegitimizing those acts by associating it with collective guilt was a monumental 
step from the Czech side, even if it only referred to the so-called “wild expulsions” 
that took place before the conclusion of the Potsdam Declaration.546 Still, it was the 
product of heavy negotiation that resulted in using a variation of the word 
“expulsion” that had a less accusatory connotation, and thus less legal implications, 
than the direct word “expulsion” used in the 1992 treaty.547 Although they stopped 
short of denouncing or repealing the Beneš Decrees relating to the expulsion, the 
Czech side provided the “distancing” from them the Kohl government insisted on by 
regretting “that the law No. 115 of May 8, 1946, made it possible that these 
excesses were not considered as illegal and that, as a consequence, the acts were 
                                                        
545 “Text Česko-Německé Deklarace,” cited from: Witte, Entfremdung, 329. 
546 “Forced evacuation” was the declaration’s term for the expulsion after the Potsdam Declaration 
and was included to emphasize the legality of the decision to remove the German population made 
at Potsdam; Witte, Entfremdung, 266. 
547 Although the Czech term for expulsion (vyhnání) was used in the 1992 treaty, it was used non-
descriptly without attributing blame specifically to Czechs. Due to the Czech outcry at its usage in 
that treaty and the subsequent parliamentary statement that it only applied to the so-called “wild 
expulsions” of the initial months, its usage in the 1997 declaration was heavily debated. The 
compromise struck in the 1997 declaration rested in using the word “expelling” (vyhánění) instead. 
The meaning of “vyhánění” is closer to “driving out” in English and does not imply a wholesale illegal 
act that the direct translation of expulsion, “vyhnání,” does; Witte, Entfremdung, 149; Tampke, Czech-
German Relations, 148. 
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not punished.”548 In return, the Czechs received their desired assurance that the 
German government would cease insisting that the Decrees be repealed with the 
declaration affirming that “each side remains bound by their legal system and 
respects that the other side has a different legal opinion. Both sides therefore 
declare that their relationship will not be burdened with political and legal 
questions of the past.”549 
Conclusion 
 The 1997 joint declaration was a watershed document in that it allowed 
both the German and Czech governments to move past the expulsion issue in 
bilateral relations and largely calmed the polemical and inflammatory discussion in 
the Czech press for the rest of the decade.550 Both sides declared that previous 
injustices “belong to the past,” but this did not stop the SL from continuing to raise 
objections and levy demands on the Czech government.551 Yet the SL was 
                                                        
548 “Die deutsch-tschechische Versöhnungserklärung vom 21. Januar 1997,” 325. Decree #115 
retroactively made all acts committed against Germans during the expulsion legal by declaring, “Any 
act committed between September 30, 1938 and October 28, 1945, the object of which was to aid 
the struggle for liberty of the Czechs and Slovaks or which represented just reprisals for actions of 
the occupation forces and their accomplices, is not illegal, even when such acts may otherwise be 
punishable by law.” Pressure in the Bundestag from the Green and SPD parties ultimately pushed 
Kohl to drop his insistence for Czechs to repeal the Decrees and to compensate Sudeten Germans as 
a prerequisite for providing German compensation for Czech victims of the Nazi regime; Kunštát, 
“German-Czech Relations,” 162, 164–166. See, for example, the fierce responses to Foreign Minister 
Kinkel’s update to the Bundestag on the negotiations by SPD and Green party members in: 
Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll 13/125 vom 26.09.1996: 11,260. 
549 “Die deutsch-tschechische Versöhnungserklärung vom 21. Januar 1997,” 325. 
550 Kolář, “Vertreibung,” 226. 
551 “Die deutsch-tschechische Versöhnungserklärung vom 21. Januar 1997,” cited from: Witte, 
Entfremdung, 325. 
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increasingly isolated, as even the CDU and CSU party chairmen declared their 
official support for the declaration, and by 1997 the SL found itself marginalized by 
its own political allies and by a German populace that was sharply critical of its 
rejection of the monumental declaration that had taken so long to achieve. 552 
Chancellor Kohl alluded to this during his address to the Bundestag in 1997 on the 
new declaration: “No one can be excluded [from German-Czech dialogue]. But the 
opposite is also true: no one should exclude themselves. […] Today the Sudeten 
Germans are called to provide a new example. They can build bridges in the future, 
bridges between the German and Czech people. And it is true: Many among them 
have already been doing this for many years.”553 
 As a political institution, the inability of the SL to attain many of their aims in 
the 1990s constitutes a decided decline in influence and a growing weakness to 
achieve their goals. The AG, however, was an institution with aims of reconciliation, 
partnership, and establishing larger and deeper bonds with the Czech people, and 
in this regard the 1990s was a resoundingly successful decade that saw the AG’s 
status enhanced in the eyes of the German and Czech publics. This success was built 
upon decades of work, outreach, and the forging of an international network of 
Czech partners and friends. The AG continued to expand its reach and widen its 
network during the 1990s and occupied many of the leadership positions in new 
                                                        
552 “Ja aus München zur Erklärung mit Prag,” Die Welt, December 16, 1996; “Wir lehnen diese 
Erklärung ab,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 11, 1996; Witte, Entfremdung, 294. 
553 Deutscher Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 13/6787, January 22, 1997, 13811. 
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cooperatives created in the 1997 declaration, and they also created a new network 
of young Germans and Czechs to take over leadership of these efforts as the older 
AG members and allies retired and passed. Thus, the 1997 declaration that was 
meant to put an end to the political and moral struggles over the expulsion history 
was not an end for the AG in any way, but simply a new beginning of partnership in 
a long line of new beginnings going back to 1989, 1968, and even 1945. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF EXPULSION REMEMBRANCE 
 
The 1997 treaty was a victory for moderate voices and the result of 
partnership and activism between Czechs and Sudeten Germans forged over three 
decades, and it marked a turning point away from allowing WWII history to 
hamper German-Czech political relations. However, it was not the last time this 
issue would challenge the political future of the Czech Republic in Europe, nor was 
it the end of debates about expulsion remembrance in Europe. The early 2000s saw 
expulsion history resurface during Czech accession to the European Union (EU), 
and it subsequently sparked a Europe-wide debate about how to write and tell 
histories of collective violence on the continent in a way that promoted European 
integration. EU expansion in 2004 marked a monumental geographical shift that 
transformed “Europe” from something that resembled Charlemagne’s empire to a 
new creation that stretched from Portugal to Estonia.554 With this restructuring 
came a need to recast old histories in a way that provided historical legitimation for 
the expanded geography of the new Europe. In many ways, the grassroots activism, 
cooperation, and cosmopolitan ways of thinking about identity and expulsion 
                                                        
554 The countries that joined the European Union in 2004 were the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Bulgaria and Romania were 
part of the same round of negotiations but only joined in 2007 after instituting additional internal 
reforms required by the European Commission. 
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history told in the pages above serves as the origins of the history of the Europe-
wide debates in the 21st century. 
While tensions between Germans and Czechs surrounding the expulsion 
calmed significantly following the 1997 treaty, conflict resurfaced again in the early 
2000s as the SL and their political allies brought the expulsion to a European level 
during the run-up to Eastern expansion of the European Union. Specifically, they 
sought to halt the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU until it formally 
repealed the Beneš Decrees (hereafter, Decrees) that concerned the expulsion and 
confiscation of property.555 Yet despite the SL’s best efforts to muster political 
support, the reconciliation achieved in the 1990s had resulted in a changed political 
landscape, wherein support for Czech EU-entry was now unequivocal at the highest 
                                                        
555 For more on the campaigns against the Beneš Decrees and the ensuing debates, see: Christian 
Domnitz, Die Beneš-Dekrete in parlamentarischer Debatte: Kontroversen im Europäischen Parlament 
und im tschechischen Abgeordnetenhaus vor dem EU-Beitritt der Tschechischen Republik (Berlin: Lit 
Verlag, 2007); Frank Spengler and Anneke Müller, “Debatte um die Beneš-Dekrete weitet sich aus,” 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Report, August 24, 2002, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.644/ (accessed 
January 7, 2017); Samuel Salzborn, “Die Beneš-Dekrete und die EU-Osterweitern,” Zeitschrift für 
Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik 2 (2003): 45–52; Ina Gamp, “Die deutsch-tschechischen 
Beziehungen im Strudel der Vergangenheit: Ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte um die sog. Beneš-
Dekrete,” in Integration als Aufgabe—Polen, Tschechien und Deutschland vor der Osterweiterung der 
Europäischen Union, eds. Dierk Hoffmann and Thomas Lämmer (Göttingen: GFPS, 2002), 27 Hanley 
42; Arnold Suppan, “Austrians, Czechs and Sudeten Germans as a Community of Conflict in the 
Twentieth Century,” Working Paper, Center for Austrian Studies (October 2006), 6; full text can be 
found at: http://www.cas.umn.edu/assets/pdf/wp061.pdf (accessed January 7, 2017); Seán Hanley, 
“A Nation of Skeptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13–14 June 2003,” West European 
Politics 27 (2004): 691–715; Hans Henning Hahn, “Sudetendeutsche: Wo ist ihre Heimat?” Der 
Spiegel, June 1, 2002. 
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levels of the German government.556 Due to 2002 being an election year in the 
Czech Republic, it was an especially inviting time for politicians to attempt to drum 
up political support by taking a strong stance against Sudeten Germans who were 
threatening Czech entry into the EU. Seeing the potential for an escalation of 
bilateral tensions and seeking to maintain positive relations, Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder delayed a bilateral meeting to discuss Czech EU-entry until after the Czech 
elections.557 
 The Czech Republic succeeded in joining the EU despite the SL’s campaign 
demanding a repeal of the Decrees, but some reactions in the Czech Republic to the 
SL’s campaign showed that national ways of thinking persisted and could be 
                                                        
556 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer maintained their support for 
Czech entry into the EU despite several occasions of inflammatory comments against Sudeten 
Germans made by Czech politicians. On one occasion Czech Prime Minister Miloš Zeman referred to 
Sudeten Germans as Hitler’s “fifth column” whose penalty should have been death, and another 
involved him saying of Sudeten Germans “they wanted ‘back to the Reich’ so we let them go.” While 
Schröder was allegedly “livid” at these comments he did not criticize them publically or threaten any 
change in Germany’s support for Czech entry into the EU; see: Hans-Joachim Noack, “Die Deutschen 
als Opfer,” Der Spiegel, March 25, 2002; Salzborn, “Die Beneš-Dekrete,” 46; “Benesch-Dekrete: Schily 
wirft Stoiber Scharfmacherei vor,” Die Welt, May 21, 2002. 
557 In addition to Zeman’s controversial “fifth column” remarks, one Czech member of the Civic 
Democrat Party, Milošlav Bednár, spoke of an “axis of evil” during a roundtable discussion in Berlin, 
referring to calls for repealing the Beneš Decrees in Munich, Vienna, and Budapest; Frank Spengler 
and Anneke Müller, “Debatte um die Beneš-Dekrete weitet sich aus,” Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung 
Report, August 24, 2002, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.644/ (accessed January 7, 2017). Even in 
debates about the economy images of a perennial German enemy resurfaced, and economic woes 
were frequently personified with discourses like, “what the Germans couldn’t do with the 
Wehrmacht they’re doing now with the economy,” see: Christian Habbe and Hans-Ulrich Stoldt, 
“Sudetendeutsche: Tief in jedem Hinterkopf,” Der Spiegel, June 1, 2002; Ulrike Ackermann, “Die 
gespaltene Erinnerung,” Die Welt, November 8, 2002. 
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inflamed by perceived external threats to Czech sovereignty.558 A 2002 poll showed 
an increase in views of the expulsion as “just” to 60%, up from the 47% of 2001, 
and support for the Decrees had also threatened public support for joining the 
European Union if their repeal was made contingent upon accession.559 The 
political pushback against the Decrees had the result of engendering embrace of a 
positive legacy of the man Beneš himself as a show of nationalism and resistance to 
foreign pressure.560 This led to the passage of several resolutions in the Czech 
National Assembly aimed at defending the Decrees and Beneš’ legacy, including the 
2004 single-sentence resolution stating “Edvard Beneš rendered outstanding 
                                                        
558 On the recommendation of a specially assigned investigative legal commission the European 
Commission declared that the Decrees were antiquated and no longer relevant, and after a lengthy 
debate the Czech EU-entry recommendation passed the European Parliament on April 9, 2003, with 
489 votes in favor, 39 against and 37 abstentions—the lowest number of votes in favor out of the 
ten countries up for candidacy; Domnitz, Die Beneš-Dekrete in parlamentarischer Debatte, 13; “The 
Committee’s enlargement activities during the 5th Legislature (1999–2004),” European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy: Notice to 
Members, No. 08/2004, 7, full text at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/afet/enlargement 
_5leg_en.pdf (accessed January 7, 2017). 
559 Survey conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research at the Czech Academy of Sciences; 
cited from: “Im Spiegel der tschechischen öffentlichen Meinung,” Publication of the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation, May 20, 2002, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.647/ (accessed January 7, 
2017). Two polls conducted in 2002 attributed recent declines in support for Czech entry to the EU 
to the politicization of the Decrees, and a separate poll even showed a clear majority of Czechs 
opposing EU entry if repealing the Decrees were made a requirement; Seán Hanley, “Europe and the 
Czech Parliamentary Elections of June 2002,” RIIA/OERN Election Briefing No. 5, 2002: 9–10, full 
text available at: 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242681817_THE_POLITICAL_CONTEXT_ 
OF_EU_ACCESSION_IN_THE_CZECH_REPUBLIC (accessed January 7, 2017). 
560 For more on the political embrace of Beneš as a statement of patriotism and resistance to 
international pressure, see: Kolar, “Vertreibung,” 927; Frank Spengler and Petr Blazek, “Reaktionen 
der tschechischen Medien über die 53. Sudetendeutsche Tage,” Country Report of the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation, May 18, 2002, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.707/ (accessed January 7, 
2017); Bohumil Doležal, “Analyse: Ein neuer Nationalheiliger,” Prager Zeitung, March 3, 2004; 
“Parliament zeichnet Beneš aus,” Der Spiegel, February 25, 2004. 
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service to the state,” and it also manifested in later debates about erecting a statue 
in Beneš’ honor.561 
At the same time, many others rallied against these political moves and 
showed that cosmopolitan ways of thinking European and rejecting nationalist 
paradigms were stronger in the Czech Republic then than they had been in 1989. 
These reactions demonstrated the progress that the former dissidents and 
European-minded Czechs had achieved since 1989, particularly in the Czech press 
which had predominantly played an antagonistic role in the expulsion debates of 
the early 1990s. One author in the newspaper Mladá Fronta Dnes criticized that 
Czech politicians could not realize that supporting the Decrees made “ethnic 
cleansing a part of their legal system,” and others condemned those politicians for 
playing the “German card” to rally political support.562 Tigrid wrote “I am 
ashamed!” of the current political discourse, and the German-Czech Historians’ 
Commission also declared that they were “against reducing German-Czech relations 
to the Beneš Decrees” and warned that “history is not a weapon.”563 A group of over 
                                                        
561 Karl Peter-Schwartz, “Das Beneš-Gesetz als Schutzwall,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 13, 
2004. An earlier resolution in April 2002 asserted the inviolability of the legal and property 
relationships that resulted from the Decrees; Suppan, “Austrians, Czechs and Sudeten Germans,” 6. 
For more on the statue debates, see: Zahorán Csaba, “Edvard Beneš: A Man of Contradictions,” 
Central European Political Science Review (Fall–Winter 2005): 68–72; Luboš Palata, “Analyse: Ein 
tschechischer Kriegsheld,” Prager Zeitung, May 18, 2005; Emanuel Mandler, “Kann Schröder einen 
Konflikt verhindern?” Prager Zeitung, May 20, 2005. 
562 Spengler and Müller, “Debatte um die Beneš-Dekretec; Hans-Jörg Schmidt, “Das Volk ist weiter als 
seine Politiker,” Die Welt, March 25, 2002. 
563 Gamp, “Die deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen,” 39; “Deutsch-Tschechische 
Historikerkommission gegen Verkürzung der deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen auf ’Beneš-
Dekrete’,” Declaration of the German-Czech Historians’ Commission, March 16, 2002; full text at: 
http://www.bohumildolezal.cz/texty/u074-07.htm (accessed February 11, 2017). 
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250 Czech intellectuals, many of whom like Petr Pithart were veterans of the earlier 
reconciliation efforts, published the following statement in critique of the ongoing 
polemics: 
 
The presidential decrees of the republic and the forced evacuation of the 
Germans out of the ČR present a painful problem which requires open 
debate in Czech society and on a political level. Instead, we are witnessing an 
attempt to exploit a storm of national emotions to demonstrate false 
national unity […] Doing this threatens to restrict political freedom and the 
freedom of opinion of the Czech society, aggravate relations with our 
neighbors and possibly block our entry into the EU.564 
 
The result of this episode showed progress of the revisionist moral narrative of the 
expulsion in the Czech Republic on the one hand, yet it also illustrated the 
persisting tension between national and European ways of thinking concerning 
expulsion history. 
 Expulsion memory also underwent a transformation of its own in Germany, 
as remembrance of the suffering of expellees gained traction in public and political 
discourse from the mid-1990s into the 2000s. A key factor in the reintroduction of 
expellee sympathy into German public consciousness were the wars and ethnic 
violence in the Balkans during the 1990s.565 The conflicts in the Balkans that 
                                                        
564 Ulrike Ackermann, “Vergessen zugunsten der Zukunft? Zur Debatte über Vertreibungen,” Merkur 
11 (2002): 7. 
565 Goschler, “Versöhnung und Viktimisierung,” 881; Dietmar Neutatz, “Vertreibung und 
Zwangsaussiedlung—eine historische notwendige Lösung der sudetendeutschen Frage?” in Dietmar 
Neutatz and Volker Zimmermann, eds., Die Deutschen und das östliche Europa: Aspekte einer 
vielfältigen Beziehungsgeschichte (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2006); Haslinger, “Von der Erinnerung zur 
Identität und zurück,” 483–485. 
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continued throughout the 1990s served as a rude awakening for Europe and indeed 
the world that horrors resembling WWII could happening again. Mass murder, 
violent expulsions, and concentration camps were once again European realities, 
and live images and reports of the humanitarian suffering of victims of expulsion 
were broadcasted daily into homes around Europe. A new term “ethnic cleansing” 
came into use during the Balkan conflicts to describe the forced removals of entire 
local populations there, and although the origins of the term have deservingly been 
criticized as a euphemism for genocide, it remained in use and by the end of the 
decade had come to evoke widespread condemnation of forced population transfer 
in all its forms and practices.566 
                                                        
566 Many observers noted the inaction of European countries to mount a unified response to the 
conflict in the Balkans despite televised broadcasts of forced population transfers, war, and suffering 
less than a days’ drive from Vienna. “Ethnic cleansing” served as a convenient way to reclassify 
atrocities on par with genocide there in a way that absolved European countries and international 
organizations like the United Nations from having to take action. Initial Western inaction in the 
Balkan wars served as a damning indictment of the professed ideals of modernity, Western 
humanism, and a post-1945 world order whose foundation rested in “never again” standing by 
while atrocities on par with genocide take place. For a pointed indictment of modernity over 
inaction in the Balkans, see: Akbar S. Ahmed, “Ethnic Cleansing: A Metaphor for Our Time,” in The 
Conceit of Innocence. For other critical perspectives on Western inaction there, see: Meštrović, 
Genocide After Emotion; Meštrović, The Conceit of Innocence; and Meštrović and Cushman, This Time 
We Knew. 
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Scholars disagree over when exactly “ethnic cleansing” came to hold the 
moral weight that it did by the millennium’s end,567 but a clear step in this direction 
came at the 1998 Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court, when 
expulsion and ethnic cleansing were made war crimes and crimes against humanity 
on par with genocide.568 Two years later at the Intergovernmental Conference on 
the Holocaust in Stockholm, historians, politicians, and heads of state from forty-six 
countries signed a declaration asserting a global ethic that placed ethnic cleansing 
next to genocide as deserving of the highest moral opprobrium. This declaration 
argued that collective memory of the Holocaust constituted the basis for a common 
global value system, and this value system necessitated remembering the evils of 
ethnic cleansing in addition to genocide in order to prevent their future 
                                                        
567 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider assert that this shift came at the time of NATO intervention in 
1995. From this perspective, the invocation of the Holocaust is what drove NATO to action by 
serving as a bond of universal morality across Western nations that inspired NATO’s response, 
including German’s first combat deployments since WWII. In contrast, others like Stjepan Meštrović 
point out that European nations like Britain, France, and Germany remained bogged down in 
bickering and inaction and that the real catalyst for NATO’s involvement came despite Europe, not 
because of it, from the increased involvement of the United States. From this perspective, the story 
of Western intervention constitutes a failure of European morality, not an example of European 
moral unity. For Levy and Sznaider’s position, see: Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 97–100; 
Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, 92–94. For Meštrović’s and other more critical 
analyses, see: Meštrović, Genocide After Emotion; Meštrović, The Conceit of Innocence; and Meštrović 
and Cushman, This Time We Knew. 
568 For a full summary of the Rome Conference, see: Michael P. Scharf, “Results of the Rome 
Conference for an International Criminal Court,” ASIL Insights 3, August 11, 1998, https://www.asil. 
org/insights/volume/3/issue/10/results-rome-conference-international-criminal-court (accessed 
February 10, 2017). 
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occurrence.569 From this point onward, ethnic cleansing joined genocide as evils 
that Europe was morally bound to universally condemn in all forms and practices.  
At the same time, the moral universalization of ethnic cleansing engendered 
critical historical investigations of expulsions in modern history, and several major 
works sought to trace histories of ethnic cleansing in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
including the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe in these 
histories.570 While the methodology of these studies was received with some 
criticism by German and Czech scholars of the expulsions in German-Czech 
relations for their one-sided portrayal of victimhood without causation or pretext, 
they paralleled a trend of growing sympathy for expellees in Germany and the 
reintroduction of expulsion memory into public discourse. 571 German politicians 
from parties without a recent history of public support for expellees like the SPD 
                                                        
569 Dubiel, “The Remembrance of the Holocaust” 68–69; Declaration of the Stockholm International 
Forum on the Holocaust, January 28, 2000; full text can be found online at: hmd.org.uk/page/ 
stockholm-declaration (accessed January 15, 2017). 
570 Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” 110–121; Naimark, Fires of Hatred. For later 
publications in the same vein, see: Bernd Faulenbach and Andres Helle, eds., Zwangsmigration in 
Europa: Zur wissenschaftlichen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen um die Vertreibung der 
deutschen aus dem Osten (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2005); Anje Kruke, ed., Zwangsmigration und 
Vertreibung—Europa im 20. Jahrhundert (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 2006). 
571 Many scholars of the ethnic German expulsions and German-Czech and German-Polish relations 
objected to the blanket portrayals of all ethnic cleansings as being similar, which neglected the 
context of Nazi occupation and WWII atrocities as a catalyst. Seeing the whole picture of wartime 
violence and occupation from both sides of the debates had long been a central focus of German-
Czech dialogue on the expulsion, and for many calling them an act of “ethnic cleansing” threatened 
to cloud mutual understanding and reconciliation with a one-sided moral narrative of victimhood 
without inclusion of the pretext of Nazi occupation. For example, see the critical review of Hans 
Henning Hahn in: Hans Henning Hahn, “Zu Neuerscheinungen über ein europäisches Erinnern an 
Zwangsmigration und ethnische Säuberung,” Bohemistik, http://www.bohemistik.de/erinnern.html 
(accessed January 11, 2017). 
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and Green parties began speaking out about the need to remember German victims 
of the expulsion from 1995 onward, and Gerhard Schröder become the first SPD 
chancellor to speak at the Federation of Expellees’ (Bund der Vertriebenen, BdV) 
annual Tag der Heimat gathering in 1999.572 However, this newly discovered 
sympathy for expellee suffering within the Green and SPD parties took place in the 
same political context as the ongoing reconciliation with Czechs, and there were 
limitations to the extent of that sympathy. These new voices of support were clear 
in distinguishing between expellee sympathy and the political aims of expellee 
organizations, which they saw as divisive and bad for European unity, and they 
remained adamantly opposed to SL and BdV calls to tie Czech EU accession to 
repealing the Decrees and their continued demands for establishing legal 
frameworks to sue for property restitution.573 
                                                        
572 Green Party representative Antje Vollmer gave a much-publicized speech in 1995 in which she 
apologized for her party had historically met expellees with “unsympathetic disinterest and an 
incapability to listen, sympathize and mourn collectively”; “Frau Vollmer ruft Tschechen und 
Deutsche zu einem mutigen Neuanfang auf,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 6, 1995. For 
more on the rise of sympathy for expellees, see: Karoline von Oppen and Stefan Wolf, “From the 
Margins to the Centre? The Discourse on Expellees and Victimhood in Germany,” in Germans as 
Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany, ed. Bill Niven (New York: Palgrave 2006), 
194–209. Gerhard Schröder, Address at the “Tag der Heimat” of the Federation of Expellees in 
Heilbronn, September 5, 1999, cited from: Moeller, “Sinking Ships,” 172. 
573 Green Party representative Antje Vollmer and SPD representative Peter Glotz, two newly vocal 
proponents for remembering expellee suffering, both publically opposed property restitution and 
demanding a repeal of the Beneš Decrees despite their increased calls for remembering expellee 
suffering; Sonja Zekri, “Tiefe Resignation: Bundestagsvizepräsident Antje Vollmer zur Vertriebenen-
Frage,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 9, 2002; Peter Glotz, Address at the “Tag der Heimat” 
gathering of the Federation of Expellees, Berlin, September 1, 2001; full text can be found at: 
http://www.mitteleuropa.de/zgv04.htm (accessed January 7, 2017). 
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In the early 2000s, articles began appearing in German print media recalling 
the suffering of expellees, including a special 2001 issue of Der Spiegel on the 
Holocaust that placed the Nazi Jewish deportations and German expulsions next to 
each other as part of a larger statement on the evil of ethnic cleansing.574 The doors 
to public discussion blew wide open in 2002 with the publication of Günter Grass’ 
novel Crabwalk which unleashed a flood of new public discussion about 
remembering expellee victims and suffering.575 The story dealt with the history of 
the deaths of some 9,000 ethnic German refugees during the sinking of the ship 
Wilhelm Gustloff in 1945 in the Baltic Sea, and the novel traced one man’s journey 
toward understanding the importance of retelling that history out of moral 
necessity and to prevent it from being politically hijacked by right-wing 
nationalists. Grass’ long tradition of emphasizing German perpetrators and 
culpability in the Holocaust gave legitimacy to the idea that the time had come to 
remember German victims, and many observers credited him with “breaking 
taboos” and allowing Germans to remember their own suffering in WWII. 
Subsequently, German print and television media were saturated in 2002 and 2003 
                                                        
574 Götz Aly, “Das Prinzip Vertreibung,” Der Spiegel, May 28, 2001. 
575 Günter Grass, Im Krebsgang: Eine Novelle (Göttingen: Steidl, 2002). 
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with tales of flight, expulsion and tragedy of ethnic German civilians during and 
after WWII.576 
Yet these discourses of a resurgent German remembrance of the expulsions 
in 2002 were not a throwback to the nationally divisive forms of expulsion forms of 
remembrance of the 1950s. Instead, they showed a strong tendency for 
cosmopolitan ways of thinking about German history rooted in the later rejection of 
those discourses in the 1960s and the push for peaceful relations with Eastern 
Europe. The 21st century discussions over expulsion remembrance soon turned to 
discussing ways in which Germans could remember victims of expulsion in a way 
that Europeanized victims and perpetrators and fostered integration and a 
common European identity. 
The impulse for wider European discussions about a site of remembrance of 
expulsion had already arisen in 1999, when the head of the BdV Erika Steinbach 
announced plans to erect a Center Against Expulsions (Zentrum gegen Vertreibung, 
hereafter, ZgV) in Berlin to document the history of forced population transfer in 
modern history. The proposed vision of the ZgV was to include documentation of 
                                                        
576 For a comprehensive overview of the discussions Grass’ novel unleashed, see: Moeller, “Sinking 
Ships,” 147–181. Grass’ book also garnered international responses, with reports in Great Britain 
and the United States noting the new shift toward remembering Germany’s WWII victims; see: 
“Grass breaks German taboos,” BBC News, February 8, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
1808768.stm, (accessed January 15, 2017); Carol J. Williams, “We, the Victims too,” Los Angeles 
Times, 18 March 2002; Alan Riding, "Günter Grass, Still Intrigued by Shadows," International Herald 
Tribune, April 11, 2003; Peter Schneider, “In Their Side of World War Two, the Germans also 
Suffered,” New York Times, January 18, 2003; Daphne Merkin, “Cordoning Off the Past,” New York 
Times Book Reviews, April 6, 2003. 
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expulsions worldwide, but the focus would be primarily on portraying the history 
of the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and their postwar 
integration.577 Although the proposal did not immediately spark widespread 
controversy, this changed in 2003 after the BdV launched a public relations 
campaign through a series of highly publicized podium discussions following the 
failure of a bill to provide federal funds for the ZgV in the Bundestag.578 
The debates over the ZgV proposal represented a continuation of the 
struggle between national or cosmopolitan approaches to remembering expulsion 
history. They took place at the same time as the renewal of expulsion remembrance 
in Germany and EU expansion, and, with European integration being a paramount 
contemporary issue, public discussions shifted toward how best to remember and 
tell expulsion history in the context of breaking down national barriers and 
promoting European integration. In the coming years various initiatives emerged in 
                                                        
577 Salzborn, Geteilte Erinnerung, 92–93. 
578 “Es geht um Heilung,” Die Zeit, July 23, 2003; “Steinbach: Schröder hat Angst vor Nachbarn,” Die 
Welt, August 17, 2003. For summaries of the Center debates and positions see: Salzborn, Geteilte 
Erinnerung, 91–104; Jürgen Danyel, “Deutscher Opferdiskurs und europäische Erinnerung: Die 
Debatte um das ’Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen,’ ” Zeitgeschichte-Online, Januar 2004: 2, full text at: 
http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/thema/deutscher-opferdiskurs-und-europaeische-erinnerung 
(accessed January 13, 2017); Jakub Jedras et al., “Old Foes Face Off over Expulsion Memorial,” 
Transitions Online, August 6, 2003, full text at: http://www.tol.org/client/article/10378-old-foes-
face-off-over-expulsion-memorial.html (accessed January 13, 2017). For the rise of Polish concerns 
about German expulsion remembrance stemming from the ZgV debate, see: Pawel Lutomski, “The 
Debate about a Center Against Expulsions: An Unexpected Crisis in German-Polish Relations?, 
German Studies Review 27 (2004):449–468; and: Claudia Kraft, “Die aktuelle Diskussion über Flucht 
und Vertreibung in der polnischen Historiographie und Öffentlichkeit,” Zeitgeschichte Online 
(January 2004), full text at: http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/thema/die-aktuelle-diskussion-
ueber-flucht-und-vertreibung-der-polnischen-historiographie-und (accessed January 13, 2017). 
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Germany and in organs of the European Union about finding a way to present 
expulsion history that moved beyond victim-perpetrator dichotomies and allowed 
Europeans of all nationalities to remember flight and expulsion as a European 
tragedy and not simply a way to levy blame and guilt on one nationality or 
another.579 Opponents of the BdV-proposed ZgV in the Bundestag argued that a 
German-focused center for expulsion remembrance would damage relations 
between Germany and Central Europe and promote the very kinds of nationalist 
thinking that caused the expulsion of the past, and they argued instead that any 
center should be European-oriented and emphasize human suffering over any 
particular nationality.580 
These debates illustrated new discourses of remembrance that argued for a 
cosmopolitan approach to expulsion remembrance in a way that universalized guilt 
and suffering similar to the universal moral narratives of the Holocaust.581 The 
expulsion remembrance debates illustrated many of the problems of creating forms 
of remembrance for traumatic violence evident in the concurrent debate 
surrounding the design and conception of the Holocaust memorial in Berlin. 
                                                        
579 One such initiative was a 2003 proposal in the Council of Europe sponsored by Great Britain, 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Slovakia, and Lichtenstein for the establishment of a European 
remembrance center for victims of forced migration and ethnic cleansing as a consequence of 
totalitarianism in the 20th century. This resolution failed in multiple votes in the European 
Parliament, but it illustrated early interest in forging a common European memory of expulsion. 
Brandes, Sundhaussen, and Troebst, Lexikon der Vertreibung, 734. 
580 See the arguments of Markus Meckel (SPD) and Antje Vollmer (Green) during the Bundestag 
debates: Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokoll 14/236, May 16, 2002. 
581 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Memories of Universal Victimhood: The Case of Ethnic German 
Expellees,” German Politics and Society 23 (2005): 1–27. 
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Disagreement over the Holocaust memorial abounded over whether it should 
mourn the victims, address the perpetrators (and if so, the perpetrators of the past 
or their descendants [Nachfolger der Tätergesellschaft]) or some combination of 
both; whether Jews should be the center of the victim group or if all other groups of 
victims should be included, and what purpose exactly should the memorial serve: 
should it create a site of remembrance of a tragedy of the past, or should it enshrine 
a legacy of the Holocaust to serve as a reminder to warn future generations?582 
These questions of the forms and aims of remembrance entered the ZgV debate 
with similar diversity of opinion and emotion and illustrated the very complicated 
nature of remembering violence in the context of an expanding and integrating 
Europe. 
Some objected to the ZgV’s emphasis on victims over historical context, and 
international opposition to the ZgV proposal was loudest in Poland, where some 
observers claimed tensions between Poland and Germany reached their lowest 
levels since WWII.583 The outcry there was also due in part because the ZgV 
proposal came on the eve of their accession to the EU and at the same time as the 
founding in Germany of the private organization the Prussian Claims Society, whose 
                                                        
582 For more on the debates, see: Michael S. Cullen, ed., Das Holocaust-Mahnmal: Dokumentationen 
einer Debatte (Zurich: Pendo, 1999); Gerd Knischewski and Ulla Spittler, “Remembering in the Berlin 
Republic: The Debate about the Central Holocaust Memorial in Berlin,” Debatte 13 (2005): 25–43; 
James Young, “Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial,” German Politics and Society 17 (1999): 54–70. 
583 Lutomski, “The Debate about a Center Against Expulsions,” 449. 
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sole purpose was to sponsor legal claims for expellees against Poland.584 In contrast 
to Poland, Czech politicians were largely mute on the proposal despite the ongoing 
controversy over the Beneš Decrees in the European Parliament. Chancellor 
Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s unwavering support for Czech EU 
entry and their desires to keep tensions of the past from harming bilateral relations 
went a long way toward keeping relations stable, and both foreign ministers 
declared that relations were better than they had ever been before. 585 The timing 
of the SL and BdV’s campaigns against the Decrees was perhaps a positive 
coincidence here, as it seemed that Czech politicians were not eager to instigate 
more conflict by picking a fight over the ZgV proposal.586 
Others objected to the ZgV’s proposal to emphasize German victims of 
expulsion more than other nationalities who were also victims of ethnic cleansing 
in Europe. As a counteraction to the ZgV proposal, SPD representative Markus 
                                                        
584 Lutomski, “The Debate about a Center Against Expulsions,” 460–462. Making matters worse, the 
ZgV proposal came from Erika Steinbach who was also its loudest proponent, and Steinbach had 
voted against the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border to Poland in 1991 citing unaddressed 
property issues; Sebastian Fischer, “Streit über Vertriebenen-Stiftung: Merkel wird den Fall 
Steinbach nicht los,” Der Spiegel Online, November 17, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ 
deutschland/0,1518,661738,00.html (accessed Jjanuary 13, 2017). 
585 Jitka Mládková, “Soll es ein Zentrum gegen Vertreibung geben?” Radio Prague, August 28, 2003, 
www.radio.cz/de/artikel/44631 (accessed January 13, 2017); Aureliusz M. Pedziwol, “Vertreibung: 
Eine unendliche Debatte,” Prager Zeitung, September 17, 2003; Jakub Jedras et al., “Old Foes Face Off 
over Expulsion Memorial,” Transitions Online, August 6, 2003, 
http://www.tol.org/client/article/10378-old-foes-face-off-over-expulsion-memorial.html (accessed 
January 13, 2017). 
586 Muted comments on the proposal by Czech Prime Minister Spidla stood in stark contrast to his 
more inflammatory remark that the expulsion was a “source of peace” in discussing the calls to 
repeal the Beneš Decrees, see: “Vertreibung ist nur eine Teilfrage der Geschichte des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges,” Die Zeit, 37/2003, http://www.zeit.de/2003/37/Tacheles_030905 (accessed 
February 10, 2017). 
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Meckel pleaded for an alternative center for researching and portraying expulsion 
history collectively in the spirit of European integration, arguing, “It would be a 
great step toward our shared future if we can manage to write and remember this 
history collectively within the course of our advancing integration.”587 Meckel’s 
proposal did not contain any plans or concepts for how this should be achieved—
these were specifics that would be planned out cooperatively in a European 
working group. What his proposal did have was a long list of support from 
prominent politicians, intellectuals, and academics from Germany, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, including Günter Grass, Petr Pithart, Czech 
Ambassador to Germany František Černý, Karel Schwarzenberg, and many 
historians with the German-Czech Historians’ Commission.588 
The ZgV debate over forms of expulsion remembrance is best summarized 
as a debate between two distinct ways of thinking: national or European. It was a 
conflict over the method of constructing the historical narrative and the lessons 
that narrative should convey: should those lessons serve to enhance understanding 
587 A similar proposal was actually put forward at a 2002 colloquium of Eastern European historians 
in Darmstadt, although it received minimal publicity at the time. Many of those historians went on to 
support Meckel’s initiative. “Plea for a European Centre Against Expulsions, Forced Resettlements 
and Deportations,” July 2003; full text at: markus-meckel.de/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Aufruf-
Europ%C3%A4isches-Zentrum-gegen-Vertreibungen_mit-Unterzeichnern.pdf (accessed January 13, 
2017). 
588 Pithart argued that a European center would allow for very beneficial and necessary 
remembrance of the expulsions in a way that would prevent any one nation from dominating it or 
instrumentalizing it; see his interview in: Daniel Brössler, “Zentrum gegen Vertreibung in Tschechien 
denkbar,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 18, 2003. Ambassador Černý supported it as a way to present 
Czechs with an alternative historical viewpoint on their history broader than a simple justification of 
the expulsion based on collective guilt; see: “Besuch Außenminister Fischers in Prag,” Die Zeit, 
August 26, 2003. 
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and awareness of the history of a particular nationality or ethnic group? Or should 
they be lessons for Europe that would enhance understanding and awareness of a 
common European past, shared traumas, and a need for collective remembrance to 
frame present and future values? 
Supporters of the ZgV proposal saw expulsion history in a national 
framework and asserted that Germans alone should be the ones to remember and 
retell their own suffering. SPD parliamentarian and vocal spokesman in favor of the 
ZgV proposal Peter Glotz summarized this argument in saying, “even to neighbors 
that suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans, at some point Germans have to 
find the courage to say: ‘Only we can write our history.’”589 Glotz argued that 
nations “only have self-awareness and dignity when they know and understand 
their own history; when they can mourn their dead, be proud of their 
accomplishments and appalled by their atrocities (…) We must present our traumas 
so that the other side can present theirs. Only then is understanding possible.”590 
He cautioned that this history had to be written and presented in a European 
context that “kept the proportions of various wrongdoings in view” and take care 
not “to instrumentalize history against its neighbors,” but ultimately for Glotz and 
many other ZgV supporters, expulsion history was first and foremost a national 
                                                        
589 Peter Glotz, “Der Kampf gegen das Verbrechen der Vertreibung,” Die politische Meinung 417 
(August 2004), 17, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.5148/ (accessed February 23, 2017). 
590 Ibid., 18. 
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memory whose primary function was to serve the national narrative, not a 
European one. 591 
The alternative viewpoint embodied in Meckel’s proposal was grounded in a 
cosmopolitan way of thinking about Europe and asserted that a center of 
remembrance should be internationally organized and run collectively as 
Europeans to tell a European story. This viewpoint was grounded in new notions of 
a “Europe” post-EU expansion, which required a shift in memory paradigms away 
from the national frameworks that defined the Cold War era and moved toward the 
creation of new paradigms to incorporate countries east and west into the new 
“Europe” of the 21st century. For Meckel and his supporters, the history of 
expulsion on the continent was part of the history of Europe as a whole, and the 
aim of telling it should be to reinforce European values and identity, not national 
ones. They believed that a European center could be the site of creating a 
transnational collective memory of expulsion as Europeans: “In light of the terrible 
history in the first half of the 20th century that binds us Europeans with one another 
it would be a great step in our collective future if we can manage in the course of 
the continuing process of European integration to write and remember this history 
collectively to overcome the danger of using it against each other again and 
again.”592 
                                                        
591 Ibid., 17. 
592 “Plea for a European Centre Against Expulsions, Forced Resettlements and Deportations.” 
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European ways of thinking appeared to gain the upper hand with a 2003 
joint statement by German and Polish presidents Johannes Rau and Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski that called for finding a transnational solution to expulsion 
remembrance.593 At a follow-up meeting in 2004 the cultural ministers of Germany, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria advocated for the 
establishment of a European network for documenting and researching forced 
migration and expulsion in the twentieth century. This resulted in the founding of 
the “European Network for Memory and Solidarity” in 2005, and after subsequent 
debates in the Bundestag and the German chancellor’s cabinet, this network was 
bestowed a primary organizational role in developing the conception of a federally 
funded center on expulsion history. 594 
The final form of the original ZgV proposal was renamed from “Center 
Against Expulsion” to simply the “Documentation Center” of the newly-founded 
federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation established in 2008 to oversee 
the project. This foundation was placed under the auspices of the German Historical 
Museum overseen by the Ministry of Culture, transforming it from a BdV institution 
into a center with an international advisory board and a board of trustees which 
                                                        
593 Levy and Sznaider, “Memories of Universal Victimhood,” 17. 
594 Brandes, Sundhaussen, Troebst, Lexikon der Vertreibung, 734. In Germany the Center was placed 
under the administration of the ministry of culture, though the cultural ministers from the 
cooperating countries in the European Network for Memory and Solidarity were invited to 
cooperate and assured that their input and approval would be taken seriously. See the comments of 
German Minister of Culture Bernd Neumann in: Deutscher Bundestag, 16 Wahlperiode, 50. Sitzung, 
Plenarprotokoll 16/50, September 20, 2006, 4896. 
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includes representatives from the Protestant and Catholic Church and the Central 
Council of Jews in Germany.595 Moreover, the guidelines for the permanent 
exhibition planned to frame expulsion as “universal experiences” under the motto 
“the suffering of others is the suffering of all,” and the exhibit was also to dedicate 
permanent space to European cultures of remembrance after 1989 as part of its 
central mandate.596 
The transformation by external pressure of the original ZgV proposal to a 
European form of remembrance, reflected the strength of cosmopolitan ways of 
thinking in the early 21st century which held that narrating a shared European 
experience of expulsion and suffering was vital for promoting European integration 
and ensuring a peaceful and cooperative European community.597 The German-
Czech conflicts and debates of the 1990s offered the lesson that narratives of 
expulsion grounded in national frameworks were damaging to European 
integration and unity in the post-1989 era, and the cosmopolitan approach of the 
Czech revisionists and Sudeten Germans with the AG offered a model for moving 
                                                        
595 Due to the tensions with Poland during the early ZgV debates and the starkly negative impression 
Steinbach made during this period she is not allowed to serve as a trustee or advisor to the 
Foundation in any official capacity; see: Jeffre Luppes, “Mission Accomplished? Erika Steinbach and 
the Center Against Expulsions in Berlin,” German Politics and Society 115 (2015): 81.  
596 Conceptual Framework for the Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation and Guidelines for 
the Planned Permanent Exhibition, Stiftung Flucht Vertreibung, Versöhnung, 18 and 41, full text at: 
http://www.sfvv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/conceptual_framework_sfvv_2012.pdf 
(accessed January 19, 2017). 
597 Kraft, “Locating German Refugees,” 285–286; Frei, “Gefühlte Geschichte”; Frevert, 
“Geschichtsvergessenheit und Geschichtsversessenheit,” 6–13; Goschler, “ ‘Versöhnung’ und 
‘Viktimisierung’ ”; see also the volume of collected essays in: Dieter Bingen, Włodzimierz Borodziej, 
and Stefan Troebst, eds., Vertreibung europäisch erinnern? Historische Erfahrungen: 
Vergangenheitspolitik—Zukunftskonzeptionen (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2003). 
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past the old, divisive paradigms of expulsion memory. Although at the time many in 
Europe relegated the German-Czech expulsion debates to a narrow issue for Czechs 
and Sudeten Germans, the new moral narrative of ethnic cleansing and the 
expanded Europe of the 21st century created a larger imperative to reevaluate 
expulsion history as a European narrative. By the 1990s, Holocaust narratives 
across Europe had begun to universalize its victims and perpetrators, and when the 
expulsions joined that same moral category, it prompted more people across 
Europe to seek a similar progression of universal morality in expulsion narratives. 
The debates sparked through the ZgV proposal provided an opportunity for 
scholars, politicians, and activists to project this new desire for Universalist morals 
and cosmopolitan European identity in concrete form on the issue of expulsion 
history. 
And yet, as the story told in the previous chapters illustrates, currents of 
cosmopolitan European identities were already manifested in the 1970s and 1980s 
in debates about the expulsion and nationalities in Central Europe among Czech 
dissidents, émigrés, and Sudeten Germans with the AG. During the final two 
decades of the Cold War, Germans and Czechs on a grassroots level began the 
process of working through the troubled history of the expulsion through dialogue 
and cooperation. Individually, many Czechs confronted the immorality of the 
expulsion and grounded this revision in the belief of the sanctity of universal 
human rights. Paramount to this discourse was also a rehabilitation of German 
heritage in discussing notions of a Central European identity, which can be viewed 
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as one form of a transnational European identity. The AG, in turn, pleaded their 
case for promoting Sudeten German identity as belonging to an inclusivist, 
Bohemian identity that downplayed national distinction and emphasized shared 
heritage and values with Czechs, and they sought dialogue, cooperation, and 
partnership with Czechs to work through the troubled history of the expulsion 
collectively. These pre-1989 discourses foreshadowed the later discussions in the 
2000s about Europeanizing expulsion remembrance in the context of promoting a 
cosmopolitan European identity grounded in human rights and condemnation of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
The ZgV proposal and the rise of public discussions of German suffering in 
the early 2000s elevated the debates about narrating the expulsions out of the 
bilateral conferences and cooperations between Germans and Czechs and brought 
them into the highest levels of governance within the European Union. It 
transformed expulsion history and remembrance from a national or bilateral 
concern to a European problem requiring a European solution. A center of 
expulsion history proposed to be a lieux de mèmoire, to borrow Pierre Nora’s term: 
a location to enshrine the memory of the expulsions that would serve as a cultural 
reference point to retell the story and promote a moral narrative to educate and 
guide present and future generations.598 And with the joining of ethnic cleansing 
                                                        
598 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mèmoire,” trans. Marc Roudebush, 
Representations 26 (1989): 7–24. 
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with genocide as a primary moral concern and unifying force for Europe, such a site 
of expulsion memory was vested with much more importance than simply 
providing a forum for allowing expellees to tell their own history: it had to become 
a site for Europe to tell a European history.599 
Writing “European” histories of violence on the continent was an 
international concern, and the expulsion sat squarely in the middle.600 Yet for many 
Czechs and Sudeten German activists, the expulsion had long sat in the middle of 
discussions about European integration, whether it was in the form of seeking 
reconciliation, forging a common community of Germans and Czechs, assisting a 
suppressed Catholic Church in the East, or rejecting the Socialist narrative and 
“returning to Europe.” When viewed in this light, the story of grassroots activism 
and cooperation told here offers a prehistory for the Europe-wide discussions of 
the 2000s. Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism were the buzz words of the 
1990s and new millennium, and scholars sought their roots in the end of the Cold 
                                                        
599 On the pursuits of European Commission officials and federalist-oriented historians and 
politicians to promote and produce histories of Europe to foster integration and that would 
counteract the hegemony of national histories, see: Chris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural 
Politics of European Integration (London: Routledge, 2000), especially 40–65. 
600 On recent efforts to conceptualize and write transnational European histories, see: Jan Werner 
Müller, “On ‘European Memory’: Some Conceptual and Normative Remarks,” in A European Memory? 
Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance, ed. Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth (New York: 
Berghan Books, 2012), 25–37; Konrad Jarausch and H. Lindenberger, eds., Conflicted Memories: 
Europeanizing Contemporary Histories (New York: Berghan Books, 2007); Wulf Kansteiner and 
Richard N. Lebow, eds., The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006); Aleida Assman, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und 
Geschichtspolitik (Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2006); Aleida Assman, Auf dem Weg zu einer 
europäischen Gedächtniskultur? (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 2012); Claus Leggewie and Anne Lang, Der 
Kampf um eine europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt (Munich: C.H. Verlag, 2011). 
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War and increasing interaction and integration in Europe.601 For many Sudeten 
Germans and Czechs, however, these currents had been well underway since the 
1970s. Whether caused by governmental repression, exile, or a sense of moral, 
religious, intellectual or ethnic duty, the pursuit of cosmopolitan identities, 
transnational expulsion memories and European integration were pressing issues 
in Central Europe years before the end of the Cold War made such discourses 
possible on a wider public scale. 
To be sure, the end of the Cold War marked a watershed in European 
history; yet these tales of pre-1989 grassroots activism and their very real effect on 
German-Czech bilateral relations after 1989 further weaken old presumptions of a 
monolithic Iron Curtain dividing the social and cultural histories of East and West. 
The task of pursuing the integration of East and West Europe hit the agendas of 
national governments and European governmental organization after 1989, but 
these pursuits guided the activities of scores of non-governmental German and 
Czech actors before 1989. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, it was the 
contentious and divisive issue of the post-WWII expulsion and the quest for 
reconciliation and understanding that drove much of those pursuits toward 
integration and shared identities and memories. The expulsion that many 
previously believed had forever distinguished Czechs from Germans as distinct 
                                                        
601 Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective,” 87; Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, 
21; Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 93; Pichler, “How Real is Cosmopolitanism in Europe?” 
1107–1126. 
 304 
 
nationalities circled back to serve as a unifying force bringing them together once 
again. Though the road toward reconciliation has been rocky and continues to 
confront new stumbling blocks and setbacks, the story of Czechs and the AG can 
perhaps offer a testament to the power of individual initiative, cooperation, and 
seeking to understand and to be understood as a path toward unifying Europeans 
to come to terms with a troubled past as a foundation for confronting an uncertain 
future. 
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